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............... 
And through this distemperature we see 
The seasons alter: hoary-headed frosts 
Far in the fresh lap of the crimson rose, 
And on old Hiems' thin and icy crown 
An odorous chaplet of sweet summer buds 
Is, as in mockery, set: the spring, the summer, 
The chilling autumn, angry winter, change 
Their wonted liveries, and the mazed world, 
By their increase, now knows not which is which: 
And this same progeny of evils comes 
From our debate, from our dissension; 
We are their parents and original. 
Shakespeare:  A Midsummer Night's Dream  
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 1 
SUMMARY 
If public policy sectors are to support the adaptive capacity and adaptation of our 
social-economic-ecological systems, these sectors require a considerable adaptive 
capacity across policies, administrative practices and governance. Yet when arguing 
for adaptive approaches to policies and governance, literature concerned with 
climate change adaptation (CCA) often treat public administration as something of 
a ‘black box’; seemingly falling prey to the myth of a linear model of public policy. 
In advocating the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into public policies, 
adaptation literature and research often fail to consider the existing institutional 
landscape with which concepts such as adaptation necessarily have to interact. Even 
less acknowledged is the role of a sector’s bureaucrats in policies, governance and 
administrative practices, and therefore in the adaptive capacity of public policy 
sectors. This thesis sought to consider these issues by addressing the research 
question: what capacity for reflexive learning exists within the administration 
of the fire management sector of Victoria, Australia? 
This central research question drove a review of a wide-range of literature , 
which in turn directed attention to several key factors that can be influential upon 
reflexive learning in public sectors. Identification of these key factors provided the 
thesis its theoretical basis and gave rise to the research sub-questions. The 
theoretical basis stems from the following concepts: Adaptation in public policy 
requires more than adaptive management. It requires a capacity for deliberate 
reflection upon the policy frames and informal institutions that structure a sector’s 
practices, policy options and governance arrangements. It also demands exploration 
of alternate ways of framing the sector’s fundamental issues and the structuring 
influence of a sector’s informal institutions. Ignoring the structuring effect of policy 
frames and informal institutions ignores the reality that new ideas or approaches 
will necessarily have to interact with and potentially challenge existing approaches 
to governance, policies and programs. In short, adaptation in public policy sectors 
demands adoption of an explicitly reflexive learning approach to policy, practice 
and governance. 
The factors identified in the literature review as influential in a sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning were policy frames, informal institutions and 
networks. Therefore, the study combined frame, institutional and network analyses 
2 
to explore these factors both separately and in combination. Working with multiple 
analytical perspectives provided a more nuanced appreciation of the capacity for 
reflexive learning within a public policy sector, than may have been gleaned from a 
singular perspective. Moreover, because bureaucrats are central influences on both 
the formal and informal processes of governance and administration, the research 
sought to understand the sector’s policy frames and informal institutions from the 
perspective of these actors. A key methodological contribution of this study 
therefore, was the application of a triangulated analytical framework to a public 
policy sector using the perspectives of those who work within the sector. 
The policy sector of landscape fire management in the state of Victoria, 
Australia, was chosen for the case study because of its complex formal institutional 
structure and because its two objectives – disaster risk reduction and ecological 
management – are often argued to be key climate change adaptation strategies.  
The research identified two dominant master-frames: emergency 
management and sustainability. Yet while the majority of participants drew on a 
sustainability frame, the institutional analysis indicated that an emergency 
management frame is highly institutionalised within the sector. The findings also 
suggested that the identified bureaucratic network within this policy sector was not 
unitary in its conceptions of the sector’s purpose, the implications of climate 
change and of preferred policy approaches. This analysis also indicated a complex 
role for social networks in reflexive learning within the sector, a role that can both 
close down and open up the sector to new frames or ideas.  
Implications of the findings for the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning, 
including a focussing of policy options on physical, technical or engineered 
responses, are discussed in the concluding chapter. Overall, the findings suggested 
that it may be challenging to introduce frames that counter or do not ‘fit’ the 
sector’s current policy frames and institutional landscape. For example, an 
institutionalised demarcation of ‘legitimate knowledge’ may ignore underlying 
drivers of vulnerabilities1 to inappropriate fire regimes and climate change impacts. 
In addition, the perception of many participants that society expects fire to be 
readily controlled appeared to underlay several of the informal institutions. As a 
                                                 
1 ‘Vulnerabilities’ is used throughout this thesis as a means of conveying the fact that we are all vulnerable to different hazards, at different 
times, for different reasons. As Barnett et. al (2008) argue, vulnerability is context specific, not a generic condition  
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driver of some of the sector’s informal institutions, the expectation of control 
would present a particular challenge to adaptation within this sector. 
This study contributes to our understanding of barriers to and enablers of 
adaptation in public administration specifically and society more generally. The 
seemingly ubiquitously institution of quantifiable reactivity in public administration 
is likely to constrain reflexive learning. This may be particularly the case where 
knowledge from alternate but equally relevant perspectives is considered less 
legitimate merely because it is less quantifiable. Reactive decision-making without 
underlying reflexive practice will rely on (and potentially entrench) existing frames 
and approaches. An implication of an institutionalised quantifiable reactivity for 
reflexive learning will be the reinforcement of the aforementioned ‘rationality of 
control’ that seems to drive some of the sectors institutions, even though 
participating bureaucrats identified it as constraining. If climate change increases 
the number of extreme weather events, quantifiable approaches will predominate 
and dictate the kinds of ‘science’ or evidence that is explored and used as a basis for 
policies. Where these sorts of informal institutions shape decision paths that ignore 
the systemic nature of the issues faced, the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning is 
limited. Without an explicit reflexive practice it may be challenging to introduce 
perspectives that do not fit with the sector’s current policy thinking and the sector’s 
capacity for adaptation may be constrained. The concluding section of the final 
chapter proposes some areas for future research and reflection. 
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Chapter One 
1 INTRODUCTION 
When arguing for adaptive approaches to policies and governance, literature 
concerned with climate change adaptation (CCA) often treat public administration 
as something of a ‘black box’2; seemingly falling prey to the myth of a linear model 
of public administration. In advocating the mainstreaming of climate change 
adaptation into existing policies and practice, adaptation literature and research 
often fail to consider the existing institutional landscape with which such concepts 
necessarily have to interact. Even less acknowledged is the role of bureaucrats in a 
sector’s governance and administrative practices, and therefore in its adaptive 
capacity. It was to these issues that this thesis turned.  
If public policy sectors are to support the adaptive capacity and adaptation 
of our social-economic-ecological systems, they themselves require a considerable 
adaptive capacity across their policies, practices and governance. Adaptive 
governance is more than adaptive management: it requires policy sectors to reflect 
on how policy frames and institutions structure a sector’s governance arrangements, 
institutions, policies and programs. Consequently, adaptive governance and 
administrative processes aimed at supporting it require public sectors to have a 
capacity for reflexive learning. Therefore, this thesis aimed to examine the capacity 
for reflexive learning in a public policy sector. A consequent second order aim was 
to identify an approach to analysing such a capacity.  
The policy sector chosen for this study was landscape fire management in 
the state of Victoria, Australia, where fire refers to vegetation-based fires (i.e. not 
building fires). Because of their central roles in public administration, this thesis 
took its perspective from the sector’s bureaucrats. The research methodology was 
an analytical framework comprised of three broad theoretical components each 
aimed at examining different factors considered influential in a policy sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning. Semi-structured interviews and an online survey for 
                                                 
2
 
Black box’ refers to the notion of public administration being something of a machine into which information is pumped and policy churned 
out the other end. It is an attempt to caricature the 
“
ideology of administration in which civil servants and government departments or bureaus 
are depicted as competent and politically neutral officials administering the implementation of policy decisions” (Rosenthal et al 1991) as a
 
mechanistic, linear process.
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was used to collect data for analysis through this framework. Overall, the study 
contributed to an understanding of the barriers to and enablers of adaptation in 
public policy administration and of adaptation more generally. 
6 
1.1 ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY ADMINISTRATION 
IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION (CCA) 
Australian society generally expects that governments will care for the welfare of 
people and the environment, manage economic matters, and do all of this in 
partnership with communities. At the same time, citizens condemn ‘the State’ as a 
bureaucratic monstrosity, an impersonal, faceless ‘black box’ that follows its own 
logics over which ‘the common people’ have no control (Davis, et al., 1993:18; 
Waterman, et al., 2004:5). “Public administration is thus paradoxical, caught 
between citizens’ antipathy toward government and their insistence on government 
services and protection” (Kettl, 2002:27; Peters, 1989).  
Yet, administration is an integral component of any government’s decision-
making, advising political leaders and translating authoritative decrees into policies 
and laws (Peters, 1989:6) from development through implementation and 
evaluation. Policy is the instrument of governance, informing decisions that direct 
public resources, and is the outcome of competition between ideas, interests and 
ideologies that impel our political systems (Althaus, et al., 2007). As Scharpf (1978) 
contends, public policy is an important vehicle available to modern societies for the 
conscious, purposive management of their problems and aspirations; including 
adapting to climate change.  
Governments and their policy sectors play important roles in facilitating the 
enabling environment for adaptation because incentives for adaptation and building 
adaptive capacity are largely affected by resources, regulations and policies decided 
at various levels of government (Brooks, et al., 2009; Engle & Lemos, 2009; Lebel, 
et al., 2006a; Mickwitz, et al., 2009:67; Pelling & High, 2005a:1; Stern, 2007). Key 
roles in the adaptation agenda for administration and public policy include 
facilitating reduction in vulnerabilities to climate change impacts, supporting the 
adaptive capacity of social3 and ecological systems, and enabling avoidance of mal-
adaptation. Policy sectors have to perform these functions while concurrently 
negotiating decisions (often involving value judgements) under varying degrees of 
uncertainty. Ideally, these negotiations combine ‘top-down’ strategic perspectives 
with ‘bottom-up’ experience and expectations. Such functions demand a 
                                                 
3 Here the term social incorporates economic, technological and cultural aspects of society 
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considerable adaptive capacity within the governance and administration of policy 
sectors themselves. 
Middle and street-level bureaucrats in particular work at intersections 
between strategic and on-ground actions, between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
facets of public administration. They provide (hopefully) ‘frank and fearless’ advice 
to Ministers, Secretaries and executive staff, and work directly with communities 
and other stakeholder groups. They have a coordinative, discursive role that is 
pivotal in administration and governance processes. “Without an adequate 
administrative foundation, bold policy ideas will fail in execution, or at least will 
stumble erratically in ways that further erode the public’s trust in government” 
(Kettl, 2002:48). Bureaucrats play key roles in co-ordinating a diversity of 
stakeholder inputs, facilitating negotiation between different objectives, and making 
(or at least supporting) management decisions. As policy experts within the political 
system, bureaucrats develop and shape the understanding of policy issues and 
alternatives (Heclo 1974 in March & Olsen, 1989:18). They therefore navigate the 
heart of the bureau-politics4 that create institutional complexities, driven by 
intersections between a multitude of actors and objectives that are typical of most 
democratic governments. 
It seems however that very little, if any, research has directly considered the 
role of these bureaucrats in adaptation. Much of the literature and other 
communiqués use the generic term ‘policymaker5’, with the focus typically being 
‘policy elites’ - Ministers, Secretaries and executive staff considered more powerful 
because of their final decision-making roles. However, ‘final’ decisions are often 
(albeit not always) informed by advice and processes from the middle and street-
levels of public administration, levels that often function as a bridge between the 
expectations and needs of communities and those of governmental ‘political elites’. 
Calls for more adaptive approaches to public policy in the face of a changing 
climate, often forego an understanding of ‘how policy is really made’ and 
                                                 
4 Bureaucratic politics is characterized by many actors in the policy-making arena; actors have diverging and conflicting interests; no one actor 
has over-riding influence; decisions are inherently compromises; and these decision outcomes tend not to anticipate the requirements for 
effective implementation (Rosenthal e.t al 1991) 
5 Although it is rarely defined, the term ‘policymakers’ seems to be popular in the adaptation field, often without definition or explication as to 
which actors the work specifically refers. Generally it appears that the term refers to policy ‘elites’ – Ministers, Executive staff and Secretaries, 
those who have the final say over policies. Here the terms public administrators or bureaucrats are used to denote those people who advise on, 
develop, implement and evaluate policies on behalf of the aforementioned ‘policymakers’. Crozier (1964) and Page  (2006b) refer to middle and 
street-level bureaucrats. See page 45 for a more complete definition of the phrase ‘middle and street-level bureaucrats’. 
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administered within and through these levels, let alone appreciating the 
paradigmatic context of a policy sector within which these processes occur (Dovers 
& Hezri, 2010; Page, 2006a).  
Some adaptation-focused studies have considered the role of institutions in 
interactions between ‘the State’ and communities or within various communities. 
Others have considered the role of frames in directing policy options. The question 
of informal institutions and policy frames within bureaucracies has received 
considerably less, to no, attention. Little research has investigated the relationship 
between individual learning and the underlying communication pathways and 
institutional constraints through which adaptation capacity and action are 
negotiated within and between organisations (Pelling & High, 2005b my emphasis). 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis was to explore the capacity for reflexive learning 
within a specific policy sector. The research purposively took its perspective from 
the coordinative, discursive role of the sector’s bureaucrats - those actors who 
develop, implement, advise on, coordinate, evaluate and ‘juggle’ policies, programs 
and other processes of public administration and governance. 
 
 9 
1.2 RESEARCH RATIONALE 
The whole-of-government-and-society nature of climate change and its impacts 
disperses a need for learning across all aspects of society. If public policy sectors are 
to play their part in adaptation, then the constituent government departments, 
agencies and authorities are key learning locations (adapted from Handmer and 
Dovers 2008). It is therefore surprising that while statements are made about 
policy-makers and politicians playing a crucial role in the framing of climate 
adaptation issues and responses (van Nieuwaal, et al., 2009), there is a paucity of 
research that has explicitly explored the role of policy administrators (particularly 
middle and street-level bureaucrats) in questions of the adaptive capacity of public 
sectors.  
This research sought to open up the ‘black box’ of public administration in 
the context of climate change adaptation. An important area of influence upon a 
sector’s adaptive capacity is its ability to reflect upon the sectoral paradigm: the 
policies, programs, governance, and the underlying policy frames and informal 
institutions that structure that paradigm. An ability to reflect upon the underlying 
policy frames and informal institutions that structure a sector’s paradigm is 
particularly important because these factors greatly influence a sector’s governance 
arrangements, policies, programs, and practices, and are the more difficult to 
change. Moreover, the introduction of new ideas or approaches within the 
administration of any sector will necessarily have to interact with and potentially 
challenge that paradigm.  
Through their day-to-day practices, bureaucrats influence and have 
particular insights into the informal institutions that guide the processes of public 
policy administration. By applying a single case study approach, this thesis was able 
to glean a ‘thick6’ description of the selected sector’s policy frames and institutions 
from the perspective of that sector’s bureaucrats. This approach sought to 
appreciate and learn from their insights in order to enrich our understanding of the 
theoretical and practical implications of adaptation in public policy. 
 
                                                 
6 A description that not only describes behaviours (or in this case, discourse) but interprets that behaviour through an appreciation of the 
context within which the behaviour occurs.  
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1.3 ADAPTATION IN THE POLICY SECTOR OF 
FIRE MANAGEMENT 
“The world cannot be understood without considering fire, because fire 
has strong ecological and evolutionary consequences for biota, including 
humans. Since the rise of humans, people have heavily influenced fire 
regimes, often in ways that greatly affect the sustainability of some 
ecosystems” (Pausas & Keeley, 2009) 
Humans have a very long relationship with fire. In Australia, we know that 
indigenous peoples used and lived with fire for tens of thousands of years (Rolls, 
1994). We also know that variations on these ‘traditional’ practices persist in very 
few places across the country (Beringer, et al., 2007; Bradstock, et al., 2002). Even 
though Australia has become a highly urbanised society, many communities still live 
in landscapes where fire is an intricate and essential ecological process. 
Consequently, as a public policy sector, fire management concerns both disaster 
risk reduction (DRR) and ecological sustainability, each replete with its own 
complexities and challenges. The term ‘fire management’ refers to management of 
fire-prone land, including the use of fire to meet land management goals and 
objectives (AFAC, Undated) and the management of bushfires. 
Unplanned fires (bushfires7) can present a real and grave threat to both 
social and ecological communities, and are a major natural hazard in many parts of 
the world. In places like SE Australia, bushfire risk evolves as we continue to work 
and live in fire-regime adapted lands (Blanchi, et al., 2004; Gill, 2005; Gillen, 2005; 
Handmer & Tibbits, 2005). Our vulnerability8 to bushfires depends on a complex 
array of factors, not least of which our preparations for and actions during an 
inevitable bushfire. Fire and its management remain highly emotive subjects. The 
word bushfire can conjure images of threatened people and homes, of devastation 
and tragedy, as well as of survival and overcoming adversity. It can also conjure 
images of renewal, diversity and ecological cycles.  
                                                 
7 As this is an Australian thesis, the term bushfire is used for unplanned fires rather than the American term wildfire 
8 Vulnerability is context specific, not a generic condition (Barnett, et al., 2008).   There are a variety of definitions and uses of the term, 
including within the disaster risk reduction communities. “However, a widely accepted definition is that vulnerability means the conditions and 
processes determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact 
of hazards or reduce the ability of a community to recover from such impacts (UNISDR, 2005; Wisner, et al., 2004). Thus, vulnerability is a 
combination of exposure, plus sensitivity, plus adaptive capacity (Adger, 2006; Alwang, et al., 2001; Blaikie, et al., 1994; Smit & Wandel, 2006)  
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Our well-being depends on the health of the ecological systems within 
which we live, in turn, their health depends on how we interact with and manage 
them, including our management of fire as both a tool and a threat. We shape 
ecosystem function and dynamics through suppression, exclusion and use of fire. 
No single fire regime is optimal for all organisms and ecological communities 
(Burrows, 2008; Mackey, et al., 2002; Whelan, 2002; Whelan, 1995). Our land use 
can fragment natural systems and complicate the type of fire regime that might exist 
in a landscape. Although it seems rare, we can ‘reconnect’ natural systems through 
the creation of ‘biolinks’, but this too has implications for bushfire risk and how 
fire might be used in landscape management.  
Now, amongst these already complex issues, reside the implications of 
climate change for fire management. A burgeoning body of research repeatedly 
highlights that climate change will affect fire weather (see Chapter 4). Looking 
beyond these biophysical projections however, climate change also has the potential 
to alter - if not increase - the complexities and challenges that infuse the sector’s 
twin objectives of DRR and ecological management, and most certainly their 
interactions (refer to Chapter 4). Without an adaptive approach, climate change will 
only serve to exacerbate the challenges of fire management’s complicated social-
ecological issues. Because of its complex institutional landscape and the emphasis 
often placed on DRR and ecological conservation as adaptation strategies, fire 
management was a particularly interesting policy sector in which to explore the 
capacity for reflexive learning within a public policy sector. 
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1.4 RESEARCH SCOPE & AIMS  
1.4.1 Scope 
This research focussed on the administration of the public policy sector of fire 
management in the State of Victoria, Australia. A policy sector is defined here as an 
institutional field of actors, rules and practices associated with state efforts to 
address a particular category of social issues and problems (Boin & Hart, 2003). 
Using this concept of a policy sector helps to put boundaries around the complexity 
of the policy situation while recognising its broader political context. The sector 
examined here was that concerned with management of fire as a landscape process, 
including prescribed burning and community safety through management of 
bushfires. It did not include issues around management of building fires.  
In seeking a better understanding of the adaptive capacity of a public policy 
sector, attention was given to the constellation of actors with direct responsibilities 
in public administration. Bureaucrats are in the centre of the administration, 
development, implementation and evaluation of relevant policies, and therefore in 
the centre of a sector’s governance. Beginning with these policy administrators 
provides a revealing diagnostic entry point into governance (Moser, 2008). 
Appreciating their coordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2006) provides insight into 
constraints or enablers of the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. Hence, this 
research focussed on the community of actors that Page (2006a) and Crozier (1964) 
call middle and street-level bureaucrats respectively, within the policy sector of fire 
management. The research excluded Ministers and Secretaries (policy ‘elites’), as 
well as those people whose substantive roles were fire suppression – both volunteer 
and professional.  
Participants in this study included people from the Country Fire Authority 
(CFA), Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), Department of 
Human Services (DHS), Department of Planning and Community Development 
(DPCD), Department of Justice (DoJ) and several local governments – primarily 
those involved in fire management/prevention planning, environmental 
management and land use planning. These people were located across Victoria. 
Bureaucrats who worked or lived in areas impacted by the fires of February 2009 
were not approached; political sensitivities, their potential levels of stress and legal 
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proceedings associated with the Royal Commission led me to conclude that their 
inclusion was inappropriate at the time. 
1.4.2 Aims 
This research aimed to explore the capacity for reflexive learning within the selected 
policy sector, as a requisite for adaptive governance and general adaptive capacity. 
Chapter 2 defines and explains these key concepts along with several other related 
topics. The thesis did not set out to develop recommendations or ‘solutions’ for the 
adaptation challenges facing fire management. This author very much doubts the 
existence of a singular ‘fire management’ panacea.  
Broadly, this research sought to contribute an improved theoretical 
understanding of the challenge of climate change adaptation in public policy. 
Compared to complementary mitigation actions, adaptation to climate change is a 
relatively new concept for public administration. To date, much of the work around 
adaptation in public policy has been theoretical. Rather than develop another suite 
of process-driven recommendations, this study focussed on contemplating what a 
policy sector might augment to bolster its adaptive capacity, as well as what may be 
hindering such an ability and the requisite capacity for reflexive learning.   
Specifically, the research explored and highlighted the role of bureaucrats as 
key actors in the institutional dynamics influencing adaptation in public policy 
sectors. The work presented an approach by which a policy sector might explore its 
capacity for reflexive learning, and thus stimulate ideas surrounding improved 
adaptive capacity. By attempting to ground key theoretical perspectives with 
empirical case study data, this research actively sought to learn from the lived 
experience of policy administrators. Finally, a very pragmatic aim also drove this 
study: to support Victoria’s fire management sector in its deliberations about 
adapting to our changing climate. 
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1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis has eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the research by outlining 
the research context, rationale, scope and aims. Through a synthesis of a number of 
focused reviews of literature from different disciplines and bodies of research, the 
second chapter provides the study its theoretical basis and identified research sub-
questions. The theoretical basis defined and discussed key concepts relevant to the 
central research question and consequently also informed the study’s research 
design. The research design, presented in Chapter 3, describes the methods of data 
acquisition and the use of theory in analysing the gathered data: specifically an 
exploration of the frames, informal institutions and networks of bureaucrats within 
the selected policy sector. Chapter 4 describes the policy settings of fire 
management in Victoria, Australia as the case study of interest. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 collectively present the research results, with each 
chapter building upon and relating to the other. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of 
how bureaucrats within the policy sector of fire management frame the sector’s 
goals and efforts to address both fire management and climate change9. This 
analysis sought to understand the current ideational context with which concepts of 
adaptation would have to intersect. Chapter 6 presents an analysis of several 
informal institutions of the fire management sector and discusses these institutions, 
including institutionalised policy frames, in relation to the sector’s capacity for 
reflexive learning. As the last of the results chapters, Chapter 7 discusses the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the participating bureaucrats network of 
information and idea sharing. The study concentrated on the ‘bureaucratic 
network’, recognising it as one network among many within the sector; albeit one 
that is an important conduit of learning. That analysis also considered the role of 
policy frames and institutions in the structure and function of the identified 
network.  
The eighth and final chapter returns to the central research question 
regarding the adaptive capacity of the fire management sector of Victoria, Australia, 
from the perspective of the sector’s bureaucrats. That chapter discusses how the 
study addressed the research sub-questions to inform the central research question. 
                                                 
9
 
It is necessary to qualify that I can only talk about those who participated in the interviews or survey. There are hundreds who did not.
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It synthesises the findings from the three separate analyses to examine how the 
frames, informal institutions and networks of bureaucrats interact to facilitate or 
hinder the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. The discussion concludes with a 
deliberation on the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning, including opportunities 
for the sector, and fundamental issues that will need addressing in order to bolster 
the sector’s capacity for adaptive governance. The chapter closes with a brief 
discussion regarding potential areas of future research. 
. 
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Chapter Two  
2 THEORETICAL BASIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As its title suggests, this chapter describes the theoretical basis of the thesis. This 
basis is a synthesis of a wide range of literature and this chapter defines and 
discusses key concepts from that synthesis that are relevant to an exploration of the 
capacity for reflexive learning in a public policy sector. As outlined in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1), when arguing for adaptive approaches to policies and 
governance10 as a way to address the challenges of adapting to climate change, 
much of the literature treats the administration and bureau-politics11 of these 
processes as something of a ‘black box’. Doing so ignores the challenge that any 
new concept or approach in public administration will not begin with the proverbial 
blank slate, but rather will have to interact with each sector’s existing policy 
paradigm. As Termeer (2009) argues, implementing new strategies of policy-making 
is difficult, above all when the new strategies conflict with the rules and beliefs of 
existing institutions. Ignoring this institutional landscape also excludes a community 
of actors who are central to the formal and informal processes of policy 
administration and governance. In seeking to build our understanding of barriers to 
and enablers of adaptation to climate change, it seems useful then to identify how 
an existing policy paradigm may influence the construction or adoption of 
approaches to adaptation. It may be equally important to challenge a sector’s 
dominant paradigm if a sector is to realise its adaptive capacity.  
The purpose of the literature review was therefore to gain an in-depth 
understanding of socio-cultural factors that may influence the bureaucracy’s role in 
the adaptive capacity of policy sectors, including their administration. Viewing the 
informal, cultural context of human ‘systems’ as being equally, if not more, 
                                                 
10 Governance means the institutional arrangements for debating, considering, deciding, prioritising, resourcing, implementing and evaluating 
public policy, and includes the formal and informal means of policy persuasion, alongside the creation and use of policy relevant knowledge 
(Head, 2005:44). 
11 The idea of bureau-politics challenges the long-prevailing image of government bureaucracy as machinery of unitary, organized action (Gray 
and Jenkins 1985) and acknowledges the importance of conflict, diversity of interests and the need for negotiation and reciprocity in 
administration (Rosenthal, et al., 1991). It is a way of recognising the negotiated space that is the discursive arena of public administration. 
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important as formal arrangements and processes, this study found resonance with 
the new or constructivist-institutionalist perspective. This included a theoretical 
recognition that while actors operate within socio-structural influences, they also 
have agency in creating, maintaining and changing those influences. A focus on the 
issue of the socio-cultural context of public administration drew attention to 
literature from across the public administration, organisational learning, political 
and policy sciences, as well as adaptation and the disaster risk reduction fields. This 
extensive range of literature provided a rich background to the issues. As a 
consequence of this breadth and richness, this chapter does not present a typical 
literature review. It presents a synthesis of literature regarding each key concept, 
using a number of more focused reviews. While this hybridized perspective may 
mean that the depth and detail of each research field cannot be conveyed in each 
summation, it is more likely to account for the complexities of adaptive governance 
and reflexive learning in public administration than might be gathered from a 
singular disciplinary lens (Armitage, et al., 2008:26).  
The chapter has four main sections. The first provides the study its broader 
context by discussing the theoretical role of public policy governance and 
administration in climate change adaptation. The second section defines and 
discusses the requisite importance of reflexive learning for an adaptive capacity in 
public policy governance and administration. The third section represents the 
substantive theoretical basis of the thesis. It defines and discusses four concepts 
central to the issue of understanding and exploring a capacity for reflexive learning 
in a policy sector. As such, it is presented in four sub-sections. The first and second 
sub-sections examine the role of policy frames and informal institutions. The third 
sub-section discusses the important but somewhat neglected role of bureaucrats in 
administrative processes that influence climate change adaptation, and specifically a 
sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. This leads into the fourth sub-section on the 
role of networks among these actors in that capacity.  
Drawing upon the truncated literature reviews, the final main section of the 
chapter identifies the research sub-questions (Section 2.6) used to address the main 
research question. The literature review also informed the research design and its 
triangulated analytical framework.  
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2.2 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION (CCA) 
It has only been in the last decade that adaptation to climate change has been 
acknowledged as equal a component in managing climate change risks as reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (Adger, et al., 2005; Berkhout, 2006; Burton, et al., 2002; 
Folke, et al., 2002; Pielke Jr, et al., 2007; Smithers & Smit, 1997; Tol, 2005).  Yet, 
even the most stringent mitigation efforts cannot avoid further impacts of climate 
change in the next few decades, which makes adaptation essential, particularly in 
addressing near-term impacts (Parry, et al., 2007). It is because a certain amount of 
climate change is inevitable that adaptation to climatic change is a fundamental 
concern for communities and governments (Smit, et al., 1999). It is also because of 
some of the potential impacts that are outlined in Chapter 4. Climate change 
adaptation (CCA) is of particular interest to state and local governments because 
many impacts and adaptation will occur, locally. Adaptation actions are much less 
dependent upon national and global action than mitigation. That said, the ‘degree’ 
of adaptation required increases with every day we delay ambitious mitigation 
efforts, there are limits to adaptation (Adger & Barnett, 2009; Parry, et al., 2007), 
and actions at national, regional and international levels have implications for a 
locality’s adaptive capacity.  
Adaptation has a multitude of definitions and categorisation (Smit, et al., 
1999). The most widely used is that of the IPCC (2007:869): 
Adaptation to climate change is an adjustment in natural or human systems 
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.  
The term’s use however, depends on the context of that use. Any 
systematic treatment of adaptation requires specification of three core elements: 
adaptation to what (the climate-related stimulus), who or what adapts (the system 
of interest), and how adaptation occurs – the process and the form (Smit, et al., 
1999). For example, adaptations in unmanaged natural systems are necessarily 
spontaneous and reactive, whereas adaptations initiated by public agencies are 
usually planned and may be anticipatory (ibid). Understanding, and therefore 
descriptions of adaptation have evolved over time. Mirroring the field of disaster 
risk reduction (DRR), CCA has moved from a focus on the impacts of the hazard 
to a more nuanced appreciation of the need for a better understanding of the 
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underlying drivers of vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities. This evolution in 
thinking has several implications for public policy sectors. Not least is that climate 
change portends a potential shifting, even erosion, of ‘stability domains’. Policies, 
trials, and management will seem to operate effectively as long as the system 
remains within known stability domains (Clark, et al., 1979). This challenges the 
notion that the past is a sound guide to future (Handmer, 2003a) management and 
governance. Moreover, responses to reducing and adapting to climate change 
require more holistic and flexible approaches in public policy than perhaps we have 
seen to date.  
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2.3 GOVERNANCE & ADMINISTRATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION 
The introductory chapter intimated that public policy has a key role in facilitating 
the enabling environments for adaptation. As background to appreciating the need 
for an adaptive capacity in public policy sectors, this section briefly discusses 
functions of public administration and governance that various literature have 
identified as being important for climate change adaptation. Three themes were 
found in the literature: the need to address underlying drivers of vulnerability to 
hazards12; the need to avoid maladaptive responses; and the need to facilitate 
negotiation of value choices. The demand for coordination, integration and 
adaptation are not particularly new to public administration. However, the advent 
of climate change increases their imperative. The role of each in CCA is touched on 
here. 
A primary role for public policy governance lies in addressing underlying 
drivers of vulnerability to hazards. Since Gilbert White’s (1945) seminal work, the 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) literature has argued that risk reduction and hazard 
mitigation strategies must address the underlying drivers that contribute to 
vulnerability to hazards. The adaptation field is increasingly adopting a similar 
position. It argues that addressing the (primarily social) underlying drivers of 
vulnerability and building resilience would support DRR, sustainability, and 
adaptation efforts. (See for example: Berkes, 2007; Briceño, 2004; Brooks, et al., 
2009:279; Burton, et al., 2002; Few, 2007; Haque & Burton, 2005; Haque & Etkin, 
2007; Vogel et al, 2007 in Hart & Kroon, 1997:8; ISDR, 2005; Naess, et al., 2005; 
Parry, et al., 2007; Schipper & Pelling, 2006; UNFCCC, 2004).  
However, vulnerability is a complex notion (Barnett, et al., 2008). To varying 
degrees, we are all vulnerable to climate change, either directly because of the 
environments in which we live, or indirectly through our connections to each other 
and the environment from which we gain sustenance (Handmer, 2003b). 
Vulnerability is more than just likelihood and consequence (risk), where likelihood 
                                                 
12 Writing from a natural hazards management perspective Handmer  (2003a) suggests that both the concept of resilience and the capacity to 
adapt is preferable to vulnerability as they are more positive, which would be more politically acceptable, and would aid in communication with 
climate change fields. Certainly the word resilience is used prolifically throughout the adaptation literature. There is much debate about the 
various definitions and uses of the word(Carpenter, et al., 2001)  
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is typically assessed based on ‘exposure’ to a hazard. Hazards differentially affect 
social and ecological communities because of high differentiations in access to 
resources, age, gender, class, ethnicity, capacities, etc. These differences are highly 
significant to the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of individuals (Dovers & 
Handmer, 1992). Adger (2001) argues that institutional and economic parameters 
determine the underlying vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities of societies. 
Vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is therefore also a human rights issue 
(Sarewitz, et al., 2003).  Consequently, related decision-making needs to also 
consider and address more complex drivers such as equity and discrimination 
arising from historical and current power imbalances (Ostrom, 1999). 
Understanding the range of social-ecological-economic parameters and the systemic 
drivers of surrounding institutions will help the application of our growing 
understanding of adaptation approaches. 
In their coordinative efforts to help reduce vulnerabilities, governments and 
their policy sectors need also be conscious that making one part of a system 
resilient to one set of shocks may lower the resilience of some other part of the 
system to a different set of shocks (Walker, et al., 2002:92). Adaptation decisions 
that may impose negative environmental and social impacts to other people, 
ecosystems or future generations (ibid), are maladaptive responses (Barnett & 
O'Neill, 2010). A DRR example is where response and reconstruction policies 
perpetuate the disasters we seek to avoid (Comfort, et al., 1999:43) by addressing 
the underlying drivers that created the vulnerabilities. This can be particularly so 
where there is little direct interaction between the set (or sets) of institutions that 
act to create the risk while another distinct set deals with the outcomes (Handmer, 
2003a) – where efforts are not integrated.  
The third central role for public administration in CCA is the need to 
facilitate negotiation of value choices in responding to climate change. Climate 
change responses reveal conflicts of beliefs, values and interests (Hulme & 
Neufeldt, 2010). It is almost trite to point out that in the complex world to which 
public policies are addressed, and from which in part they spring, a considerable 
range of factors and concepts can only be arbitrarily quantified and these factors 
generate political passions that influence political processes (Minogue, 1993:18). As 
a broad conception, adaptation cannot be scientifically determined as ‘objective 
knowledge’ because, like other broad concepts such as sustainability or social 
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equity, they always incorporate normative valuations that only become ascertained 
in processes of social interaction (Kemp & Martens, 2007; Voss & Kemp, 2005). 
Moreover, as Adger et.al (2009:338) remark, the values that underpin adaptation 
decisions become more diverse and contradictory as one moves from small-scales 
and single agents to larger-scales and multiple agents, and values are not held in 
isolation, they are different for different stakeholders with different levels of 
influence and power over their own destinies. Another function of governance and 
administration then, is to manage and try to resolve these technical and political 
trade-offs and general conflicts over ideology and values, particularly as climate 
change may alter the importance given to different positions or may reframe the 
whole discussion (Mickwitz, et al., 2009:12 & 68) and this too may change along the 
way.  
Some authors argue that in making these decisions, the ‘value’ of any 
adaptation action “may be best evaluated by those adapting or affected by the 
adaptation measures” (de Franca Doria, et al., 2009). However, as was highlighted 
above, it remains a highly political challenge to ensure that adaptations undertaken 
in one sector, community or geographical area do not increase the vulnerability or 
reduce the adaptive capacity of another; including future generations and 
biodiversity who cannot evaluate the ‘value’ of any measure. If one of the roles of 
government is to resolve these conflicts inherent in coordinating and addressing 
these issues, as well as engendering collective action, then governance in adaptation 
decisions becomes increasingly important (Cash 2006 in Adger, et al., 2009; Engle & 
Lemos, 2009). 
Tackling the interconnected nature of such challenges necessitates a 
reorientation of collective understanding and of formal institutions to focus on the 
key intersecting and interacting elements of complex problems (Folke, et al., 
2005:443; Haas, 2004:570). Government therefore remains a key institution for the 
coordination and mediation of efforts aimed at reducing vulnerabilities to hazards, 
avoiding mal-adaptation, and particularly in negotiating the inevitable value-based 
decisions that all the related decision-making entails (at least in most democratic 
societies). Such efforts require coherently developed policy (the role of 
administration) rather than simply trying to harmonize often contradictory and 
inconsistent outputs in the field (Campbell, 2007:396). The need for coherence 
however, should not to be confused with the need for a diverse range of responses 
 23 
that would provide a policy sector greater adaptive capacity. The complexities and 
associated uncertainties of climate change require a holistic conceptualisation of our 
responses to climate change and are often the basis of arguments for ‘systems’ 
approaches, certainly for integrated, co-operative policy processes.  
Overall, adaptation requires consideration of mechanisms to formulate and 
implement integrated, whole-of-government responses to governance and policy 
generally (Ahmad, 2009:2; Brinkerhoff, 1996; Folke, et al., 2005; Fussel, 2007; 
Kerkhoff, 2005). The growing complexity of problems and the increasing 
interdependencies in trying to deal with them increases the complexities of policy 
issues and virtually by definition, challenges existing organizational and political 
boundaries (Kettl, 2006:246; Ross & Dovers, 2008). Should administrative 
boundaries be considered sacrosanct, then vulnerability to hazards will likely 
increase (Handmer & Dovers, 2008a:158), alongside maladaptive responses and 
increased tensions between policy objectives. Coordinating and integrating these 
approaches is a primary challenge facing governance and administration in the 21st 
century - weaving the vertical (organisational) warps of separate programs with the 
horizontal woof of (cross-sectoral) policy problems into an overall framework 
(Kettl (2002) in Parsons (2004) and in Campbell (2007)). 
Because of the need for a comprehensive and participatory approach to 
addressing these issues, much of the literature surrounding governance asserts a 
need to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches. Top-down approaches are 
too blunt and insensitive to local constraints and opportunities, and bottom-up 
approaches are too insensitive to the contribution of local actions to larger 
problems, so a middle and more difficult path is required that addresses the 
complexities of multiple scales and multiple levels (Cash, et al., 2006). Combining 
the approaches could ensure over-reliance on local knowledge does not increase 
vulnerabilities through inhibition of innovation and adaptive capacities and to 
mediate tensions between individual ‘rights’ and the collective interest (Dovers & 
Handmer, 1992; Nelson, et al., 2008:592; Schneider, et al., 2003). Facilitation of 
vertical and horizontal interactions across a governance landscape is about trying to 
ensure that short-term and long-term adaptive measures are linked, with a clear 
focus on possible future risks because, while adaptation is generally considered to 
occur locally, many adaptation issues are cross-sectoral, multi-level challenges 
influenced by complex, interacting processes in social, ecological, economic and 
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technological systems. (Birkmann, et al., 2009:27; Fussel & Klein, 2006; O'Brien, 
2006; O'Brien, et al., 2006; O'Brien & Leichenko, 2000). 
While simultaneously addressing drivers of vulnerabilities to hazards, 
avoiding mal-adaptive responses, and negotiating value judgements through a 
combined top-down and bottom-up approach, public administration and 
governance will itself have to be adaptive. This is for several reasons. A certain 
amount of climate change is inevitable and the potential for novel risks is 
increasing, including those which may be outside the range of human experience, 
(Parry, et al., 2007:17; Schneider, 2004), so new approaches may be needed. 
Approaches that assume a predictable future or a near-term return to previous 
conditions may not work in the face of longer term change (Bosomworth & 
Handmer, 2008), so existing approaches will have to be adapted or transformed. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, climate change is a multi-dimensional 
problem that intersects with other existing societal challenges and system dynamics, 
and our knowledge and understanding of these systems and their interactions is 
limited (Haque & Burton, 2005; Schneider, et al., 2003), so our approaches will have 
to be adaptive as these various systems interact and respond to one another, and we 
learn about them. Recognising that climate change and its associated uncertainties 
will remain even though immediate and significant action is required, means that 
rather than attempting to fully predict and grasp relevant dynamics in detail, policy 
making and governance should cope with the inherent uncertainty (Adger, et al., 
2009; Kotchen & Young, 2007:150; Lynn, 2003b; van Nieuwaal, et al., 2009:17).  
To cope with these inherent uncertainties, public policy sectors will need to 
be reflexive, adjusting to new circumstances and actively seeking new information 
to contribute to learning over time (Mickwitz, et al., 2009:78). In being reflexive, a 
policy sector is more likely to be able to respond to abrupt and unforeseen threats 
and opportunities associated with climate change (Pelling, et al., 2008:868). Thus, 
while approaches to adaptation can often build on existing practices, policies and 
programs (Dovers, 2009; ISDR, 2005; Parry, et al., 2007; Tirpak & Ward, 2005), it 
comprises much more than just old wine in new skins (Fussel, 2008). Public 
administration and governance will have to be adaptive because adapting to climate 
change is not a ‘final destination’. It is a journey. Adapt is a verb.  
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2.4 ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE REQUIRES 
REFLEXIVE LEARNING  
He who learns from one occupied in learning, drinks of a running stream. 
He who learns from one who has learned all he has to teach, drinks 'the 
green mantle of the stagnant pool’ (A.J. Scott 1852 in Whelan, 1995)  
Reflexive learning requires an ability to get beyond the assumptions and 
acceptance of the status quo that can blind us to the underlying reality of 
these life worlds (Innes & Booher, 2003:40) 
Literature concerned with concepts of adaptive governance13  span a wide range of 
disciplines from political economy, resource and environmental economics, 
experimental economics, evolutionary game theory, organizational theory, ecology, 
systems theory, and complex systems science (Hatfield-Dodds, et al., 2007), and 
overlap with theories of resilience and adaptive capacity (Brown, 2009). Generally, 
the notion of adaptive governance integrates principles from adaptive management 
with ideals of governance. Adaptive management emphasises learning using 
structured experimentation (Boin & 't Hart, 2008; Holling, 1978; Pahl-Wostl, 2007) 
the results of which are used to improve management (Clark, 2002). The concept of 
governance can refer to a general pattern of rule. In this work it is also used in an 
attempt to capture the way in which the state increasingly depends on other 
organisations and groups to enable its intentions and deliver it policies (Bevir, 
2009); a “way of describing the links between government and its broader 
environment – political, social, administrative” (Kettl, 2002:119)14. In many ways, 
the concept of governance reflects the notion of combining top-down and bottom-
up approaches in public administration.  
The idea of adaptive governance focuses on ideals of joint ownership of 
developing and implementing a suite of policies and processes that adapt to 
                                                 
13 Nomenclature of concepts of adaptive governance is varied. It includes terms such as reflexive governance (Hendriks & Grin, 2007) and 
adaptive co-management (Armitage, et al., 2008). Concepts of adaptive management and adaptive governance are sometimes conflated. 
14 Others contend governance is a way of capturing initiatives that governments have deployed to shrink their size while struggling to meet 
their citizens’ demands. The situation may also imply a need for polycentric approaches to governance, where institutionally rich environments 
are considered to improve prospects of resolving complex problems, encourage innovation and experimentation, and thus enhance response 
options (Hahn, et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1999).  The issue was not explored in this thesis, but the role of diverse perspectives and knowledge as 
may be afforded by polycentric approaches, reflects a number of arguments herein.  It is also noted that polycentricity in governance of public 
policy must legitimately consider fundamental questions of efficiency (Bardach, 1994:14), transparency and accountability (Sorenson & Torfing, 
2005). 
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changing societal priorities (Armitage, 2008; Brunner, et al., 2005; Nelson, et al., 
2008; Olsson, et al., 2004; Pahl-Wostl, 2007), and improved understanding of social-
ecological systems. Fleischman (2008:4) posits that recent literature uses the term 
‘adaptive governance’ to overcome a view that social and political actors and 
institutions are barriers to implementation of adaptive approaches, rather than 
system components that need to be understood in their own right. Boyle (2001) in 
(Folke, et al., 2005:444), describes adaptive governance as a process involving 
resolution of trade-offs and provision of vision and direction, where management 
puts the vision into operation, and monitoring provides feedback and synthesis of 
observations. Bringing this process-orientated interpretation together with notions 
of learning through social networks, enables the concept of adaptive governance to 
be viewed as a dynamic, problem-solving process in which learning is an essential 
component of any basis for joint action (Brunner & Lynch, 2010; Carlsson & 
Berkes, 2005; Folke, et al., 2004).  
The idea of learning being a central aspect of adaptive governance is 
consistent throughout the literature. However, as an important idea in public 
administration, learning is not new. Nor is it a new challenge. Nearly 40 years ago, 
Schön (1973:23) argued for a need to ‘redesign’ government so that it was better at 
learning in the face of complex social, technological and environmental changes, to 
bring about continuous transformation. As argued in the preceding section, climate 
change escalates this imperative: a challenge that some governments and sectors 
will find it easier to meet than others (Biermann, 2007:333). Building a high-level 
administrative capacity upgraded and geared for anticipatory, future-weaving, 
requires retooling in both theory and practice, to develop new sets of knowledge, 
skills, cultures, and designs that are nonlinear and surprise-management-oriented 
(Farazmand, 2009). The policy administration literature tells us that if governments 
are to learn to solve new public problems, they must also learn to create the 
systems for doing so, discarding the structure and mechanisms grown up around 
old problems (Schön, 1973:109). New learning systems are required for 
understanding not just which actions did or did not work but also whether there is 
a need to rethink purposes, analyses and chosen directions (Mulgan, 2009:175).  
A sector’s purpose, analysis and chosen directions are developed within the 
constructs of its paradigm; the set of ideas about what constitute the main features 
and problems of the sector, and how these can be governed the best possible way 
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(Boin & Hart, 2000). Even within the ‘garbage can’ model of public administration 
the drift of decisions is not random but occurs in a context of beliefs and norms 
that can produce a systematic bias (March & Olsen, 1989:29). That paradigm is 
symbolised and expressed through a sector’s governance, institutions, policies and 
practices (Hall, 1993). Consequently, if governments are to enable new learning 
systems, these systems need to encourage reflection upon each sector’s underlying 
paradigm. It suggests that instead of going straight to problem solving, the sector 
reflect on how the sector’s ‘problem’ or features are framed, and how this 
structures policies, practices and governance. There are numerous monikers given 
to this kind of learning, including triple-loop, deutero, institutional, and sometimes 
even social learning, but at its core lies the intent of frame reflection (Georges, et al., 
1999; Ison, 2005; Ison, et al., 2007; Schön & Rein, 1994). Adaptive governance 
requires influential actors to reflect upon (and possibly change) the underlying 
policy frames and institutions that structure a sector’s policy paradigm (Fischer, 
2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hall, 1993; Hendriks & Grin, 2007; Pahl-Wostl, 
2009; Schön & Rein, 1994). For adaptive governance, policy sectors require a 
capacity for reflexive learning. 
Reflexive learning comprises three orders of learning. The first and second 
orders involve changes to existing policies or dominant policy instruments within 
the existing institutional landscape (Hall, 1993), mirroring ideas of single and 
double-loop learning (Sabatier, 1999; Schön & Rein, 1994), and paralleling the 
intent of ‘learning by doing’ so often described in references to adaptive 
management. However, adaptive governance is more than adaptive management. 
Adaptive governance requires an additional, third order of learning that involves 
the potential for change to overall goals and shifts in the institutional landscape 
(Hall, 1993), including what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) have called core 
policy beliefs. This conception of learning is very different to that which sees 
learning as simply the acquisition of more information. “Gathering evidence is not 
always the same as learning” (Hudson, 2007:211). Reflexive learning requires 
influential actors to consider how they are conceiving of a policy sector’s context 
and issues, how this directs preference for particular policies and programs, and 
how the sector’s formal and informal institutions reinforce these conceptions. It 
also demands that actors reflect on how these frames, structures and patterns of 
action contribute to the persistence of policy ‘problems’ (Hendriks & Grin, 2007; 
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Sardans & Penuelas, 2007; Voss & Kemp, 2005). It demands that actors consider a 
broader range of different perspectives, from which additional possible approaches 
might be illuminated.  
Drawing this all together, adaptive governance requires reflexive learning; a 
reflection upon knowledge gained during a process or activity (such as policy 
development and implementation) combined with reflection upon and review of 
the frames and institutions that structure the sector’s paradigm; its raison d’être. If 
reflexive learning is requisite for adaptive governance in policy sectors, the 
subsequent obvious question becomes “what factors influence such learning within 
a public policy sector?”  
A number of authors suggest that reflexive learning in policy sectors 
requires a large perturbation in its context or a major event. Certainly, Argyris and 
Schön, (1978) considered that such learning typically requires a crisis or revolution15  
“because organizational actors are acculturated to be primarily single-loop learners”. 
However, the word reflexive implies a purposive approach to learning. That 
reflection may encourage continuation of a construct or approach. It does not 
imply change for change’s sake. Reflexive learning for adaptive governance could 
avoid an entirely reactive basis to a sector’s adaptation. It could avoid waiting for a 
'disaster’ as a catalyst (the proverbial ‘window of opportunity’) for change. 
Responses to crises are no guarantee of genuine learning (Boin, et al., 2009), 
particularly reflexive learning. Without reflection and consideration of broader 
options, responses to disasters may simply reinforce the existing paradigm whether 
or not it is supporting the aforementioned ‘purposes’ of governance and public 
policy in adaptation (and other societal imperatives).  
 The next subsection discusses three factors that the literature repeatedly 
highlights as important influences on purposive reflexive learning and thereby, a 
capacity for adaptive governance.   
 
 
                                                 
15 The punctuated equilibrium model of policy-making takes a similar interpretation 
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2.5  ROLE OF BUREAUCRATS IN REFLEXIVE 
LEARNING: FRAMES, INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS & NETWORKS  
There is debate in much of the literature as to the proximate ‘causes’ of policy and 
governance processes and outcomes. The position of this research reflects that of 
authors such as John (2002) and Page (2006a) who argue that there is no singular 
cause of these processes, there are many. Unpacking the notion of reflexive 
learning as reflection upon a sector’s underlying policy frames and institutions, 
directed attention toward the role of frames and institutions in the structuring of a 
policy sector’s paradigm and its capacity for reflexive learning. In addition, the 
thesis sought to highlight the role of bureaucrats in influencing a sector’s paradigm; 
a role generally overlooked in adaptation studies.  
There are strong theoretical reasons to consider the role of frames and 
institutions in a public sector’s capacity for learning and adaptation. Discussion of 
putting learning into operation has revealed the complexity that underlies the 
attractive notion of ‘institutional learning’ (Connor & Dovers, 2002:26) and its 
related multi-disciplinary work (Vogel, et al., 2007). The most important obstacles to 
learning within government and policy processes have to do with frames, tradition, 
ideologies and power (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005:19; Metcalfe, 1978:42; Chapman 
2002 in Parsons, 2004). Therefore, in order to adequately understand the reflexive 
learning capacity within a policy sector, we need to not only consider the 
construction and communication of policy ideas (frames) but equally importantly, 
the institutional context in which and through which they are communicated 
(Schmidt, 2009:197-8). Moreover, this thesis sought to highlight the role of middle 
and street-level bureaucrats in these processes. 
Drawing on an examination of a broad range of literature, the first two sub-
sections of this chapter section discuss the concepts of policy frames and informal 
institutions as important, interrelated but varying influences on reflexive learning in 
policy sectors. The second two sub-sections respectively discuss the role of middle 
and street-level bureaucrats and their networks in a public policy sector’s capacity 
for reflexive learning. 
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2.5.1 Policy frames 
The notion of frames is often attributed to Goffman (1974) who denoted them as 
schemata of interpretation that enable people to locate, perceive, identify and label 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large (p21). Research regarding 
frames and framing can be found throughout the social sciences and its various 
subfields (Druckman, 2001:226). Rein and Schön (1991:263) define a frame as a 
perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be 
made sense of and acted upon. “Like a window, we see the world through frames 
that determine our perspective while limiting our view to only a part of a complex 
world around us” (Creed, et al., 2002:36). As Hajer (1995:44) asserts, ‘large groups 
of dead trees as such are not a social construct; the point is how one makes sense of 
dead trees. In this respect, there are many possible realities’. We each may ‘frame’ 
those trees as a timber resource, as carbon sequestration means; a source of 
amenity; eyesores; habitat; a means of soil stabilisation; as fuel; or even as entities in 
their own right.  
Framing is a way of selectively drawing from fundamental ideas, such as 
issues of democracy, equity and intrinsic environmental rights, to structure a 
perspective on a more specific subject. Frames are basic cognitive structures that 
guide perceptions and representations of reality; they are not consciously 
manufactured but are unconsciously adopted in the course of communicative 
processes (Koenig, Undated). It is more a way of thinking about a problem or 
subject than it is an assemblage of facts (Fischer, 2003:103)16. Because it is the task 
of making sense of complex, information-rich situations, framing necessitates 
selectivity and organisation (Schön & Rein, 1994). Consequently, different frames 
direct attention to different aspects of a situation and tell a different story about 
what is going on and what should be done (de Boer, et al., 2010:464; Dewulf, et al., 
2004; Dewulf, et al., 2007; Dewulf, et al., 2011:53; Fletcher, 2009; Isendahl, et al., 
2010; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). As Dewulf (2011:53) argues, it may often look like 
everybody is talking about the same thing, but they frame that ‘same thing’ in very 
different ways. The implication being that these people may not actually be talking 
about the same thing. 
                                                 
16 This is not to argue that all ideologies or frames are equal. They vary in their internal coherence, their ability to provide cogent warrants for 
policy claims, and their congruence with empirical reality (Fischer & Forester, 1993) 
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Our tendency to focus on selected aspects of a subject or issues is partly 
innate because we are boundedly rational and therefore can only hold partial views 
of reality. Equally our existing cultural-commitments that exist prior to factual 
beliefs also influence the ‘facts’ we look for (Kahan & Braman, 2006). It’s well-
established that a person's prior cognitive map shapes their interpretation of 
information, and that these cognitive ideas or frames vary within and across 
organizational [and sectoral] units with different responsibilities (Huber, 1991:102).  
In the context of policy sectors, what people (including bureaucrats) believe 
about the empirical consequences of policies derives from their cultural worldviews 
based on their vision of a good society (Kahan & Braman, 2006:148). In the 
context of adapting to climate change, understanding the underlying drivers of 
vulnerability will influence the nature of approaches to addressing differing 
vulnerabilities to various hazards (Barnett, et al., 2008; Birkmann, et al., 2009; 
Blaikie, et al., 1994; Brooks, 2003; Few, 2007; Furedi, 2007; Fussel, 2007; Gallopin, 
2006; Homer-Dixon, 2006; Kelly & Adger, 2000; Lavorel, et al., 2006; Manuta, et al., 
2006; O'Brien, 2006; O'Brien, et al., 2004; Pelling, 2003a, 2004; Smit & Wandel, 
2006; Thomalla, et al., 2006; Turner, et al., 2003)17.  
 
2.5.1.a Policy frames in public administration 
The work of authors such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Rein (1976), Fischer 
(1980) and Fischer and Forester (1993) have pointed out the role of values and 
implicit meanings in the practice of policy and public administration (Hajer, 1993). 
In the 1990s, the ‘linguistic’ or ‘ideational’ turn in policy and institutional studies 
further developed the idea that policies and programs incorporate implicit theories 
about approaches to achieving their objectives (ibid). Every government department 
and agency has 'deep structures' of policy - the implicit collection of beliefs about 
aims and intentions of the department, agency and policies therein and about the 
relevant actors who influence or benefit from the policy (Parsons, 1995:146). These 
‘deep structures’ constitute what Laski called the 'inarticulate [sic] major premises' 
                                                 
17 For example, there is now broad acceptance that it is not only natural events that cause disasters but that they are also a product of social, 
political and economic environments that structure people’s lives, and it is these aspects that require policy attention, not simply response to an 
event (Bankoff, et al., 2004; McEntire, 2005; Mileti & Gailus, 2005; O'Keefe, et al., 2004; Yamin, et al., 2005) 
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of the policy-makers (Gordon, et al., 1993:9), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) call 
policy core beliefs, and Schön and Rein (1994) call policy frames. 
This is a fairly social constructivist perspective on policy, which sees it as 
something constructed and sustained by actors in the choices they make about 
which interpretative map to use and which cues to follow (Colebatch, 2002:4). 
From a similar interpretative basis Schön and Rein (1994) introduced the idea of 
‘frames’ to discourse analytic studies of public policy and administration. 
Exploration of theories-in-use [frames] of policy actors is fundamental to revealing 
‘the creature’ of public policy and governance (Fischer, 2003:160; Klein & Marmor, 
2006:892). Conceptions of ‘what’s wrong and what needs fixing’ are the hallmarks 
of policy frames (Schön & Rein, 1994). Policy frames define value priorities in 
public policies, perceptions of causal relationships, perceptions of the magnitude of 
the problem and the efficacy of various policy instruments to address those 
‘problems’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999:119). They influence how actors 
perceive the validity of policy options including the information, research and 
perspectives that inform those options. They determine what a person counts as a 
fact and how they make the normative leap from those ‘facts’ to prescriptions for 
action (Schön & Rein, 1994:71).  
The political science literature that explores the role of ideas in political and 
public administrative processes raises similar concepts. It argues that ideas, like 
frames, affect (or at least have the capacity to affect) policy by providing causal road 
maps and suggested strategies for the attainment of goals (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993 in Blyth, 1997, 2009; Gofas & Hay, 2009:23; Schmidt, 2008). Parallels between 
the conception of the role of ideas and policy frames in governance, policy 
processes, and their institutional context is particularly striking when appreciating 
Schmidt’s (2008) description of ideas. She describes them as underpinning 
paradigms that reflect underlying assumptions and principles orienting policy; as 
frames of reference; as programmatic beliefs; as policy cores that provide sets of 
diagnostics and prescriptions for action; or as problem definitions that set the scope 
of possible solutions.  
If we accept the proposition that the dominant framing of a sector’s 
‘problem’ or features plays a fundamental role in structuring a sector’s paradigm, 
then the frames used in governance and policy processes are as important as the 
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actual choice of policies themselves (Handmer & Dovers, 2008a; Jenkins, 1993:41). 
It is because ideas are the medium of exchange in policymaking, that policymaking 
is a constant discursive struggle over the definitions of problems, the boundaries of 
categories used to describe them, the criteria for their classification and assessment, 
and the meaning of ideals that guide particular actions (Fischer, 2003:60). 
Therefore, much as Stone (2002a) describes the politics of policy-making as a 
struggle over ideas, it might also be considered a struggle over frames. Schön and 
Rein certainly maintain that it is conflicts between frames that often cause policy 
controversies (1994:xviii). 
The concept of ‘wicked policy problem’ also mirrors this notion of frame 
conflicts. For example, van Buuren, et al. (2004:5) state that confronting different 
sources of knowledge, creating a joint base of knowledge for action are all difficult 
things to achieve when the problems are wicked, involving actors, who are 
necessary to solve these wicked problems but who have different perspectives on 
the problem and interpretations of information (my emphasis). The ‘wickedness’, 
and by implication intractability of policy ‘problems’ may be due in part to our 
remarkable ability, [particularly] when we are embroiled in controversy, to dismiss 
the evidence adduced by our antagonists (Schön & Rein, 1994:4). Avoiding 
cognitive-dissonance - perceiving contrary empirical data to be credible – can steel 
individuals to resist data that either threatens practices they revere or bolsters ones 
they despise, particularly when accepting such data would force them to disagree 
with individuals they respect (Kahan & Braman, 2006:163; Koch & Hauknes, 
2005:40). The role of perceptual filters (frames) and the ‘devil shift’ – the tendency 
to ascribe our antagonists more power than they actually have - is often identified 
in policy analysis as systematically inhibiting learning (Sabatier, et al., 2005b:199). 
Yet the inherited knowledge assumptions that frames may represent are 
rarely (explicitly) explored in public administration because they are so embedded in 
the ontology of the public sector (Adams, 2004:32). As philosophical ideas, frames 
generally sit in the background as underlying assumptions that are rarely contested 
except in times of crises (Schmidt, 2008:307). Indeed, Allison and Halperin (1972) 
and more recently, Boin and ‘t Hart (2003) and Boin et. al (2009), argue that crises 
generate framing contests to interpret events, causes, responsibilities and lessons in 
ways that suit the political purposes and visions of future policy directions of 
government actors and their critics. Open and questioning approaches to 
34 
governance of public sectors may be difficult in crises (and post-event responses to 
them); because managers under intense public scrutiny - as managers dealing with 
wicked problems of public policy often are - might be inclined to adopt a ‘fortress’ 
mentality as a means to shut out criticism (Weber & Khademian, 2008:342), or to 
even simply cope with stress.  
Adaptive policy development might also be viewed as a threat to existing 
programs and management, rather than as an opportunity for improvement (Folke, 
et al., 2005). This may be particularly the case where key actors have hard-won, 
long-term investments (financial, temporal and reputational) in current problem 
frames (Connor & Dovers, 2002) that existing programs and management reflect. 
Adaptive or transformative changes to policies and institutions may be perceived as 
an even greater threat where policy frames are institutionalised. This issue is 
discussed in Section 2.5.2.b below. As argued in the preceding section, reflexive 
learning demands purposive reflection on policy frames – both in times of crises 
and in the course of proactively adapting to potential climatic changes. 
2.5.1.b Frames & a policy sector’s reflexive learning 
We may not ever see eye to eye, yet there is a world of difference between a 
political process in which people honestly try to understand how the world 
looks from different vantage points, and one in which people claim from 
the start that their vantage point is the right one (Stone, 1989). 
It seems obvious that policy frames influence a sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning through the breadth of perspectives considered, and the lenses through 
which new ideas such as adaptation are likely to be conceptualised. Crucially for this 
research, frames (or ideas) are the medium through which new perspectives enter a 
sector’s institutional landscape – a source of potential adaptation and change. 
Without reflexive practice, the success of adopting and mainstreaming the concept 
of adaptation will greatly dependent upon its resonance with the dominant frame of 
a policy sector. Several authors posit that new frames must respond to those already 
operative (Ross, 2000:174). Past policies and frameworks have an important role in 
defining and problematising current issues (Parsons, 1995:230), in providing 
channels through which the political process must flow today (Fenna, 2004:136), 
and in establishing a sector’s dominant frame.  
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Without reflexive practice, the policy struggle will focus on defining the 
dominant frame rather than exploration of a multitude of frames, which is likely to 
provide a multitude of policy and practice options. In facing climate change, 
consideration of a multitude of options would provide a more robust18 and adaptive 
policy suite. From this perspective, a diversity of views would be viewed a strength 
even where differences between perceptions and conceptions of issues give rise to 
contention. It does not require wholesale adoption of the tenets of social 
constructivism to see that often considerable room is available for developing 
different ways to think about complex environmental problems (Wendt 1992 in 
Young, 2002a:174). Drawing from a diversity of frames has the potential to provide 
a sector greater adaptive capacity, by providing an extensive and more robust suite 
of policies and programs, than one drawn from a single framing. Accessing a 
diversity of frames may depend on a capacity for more polycentric approaches that 
the concept of adaptive governance would seem to encourage. As Rosenthal (1991) 
and Ostrom (2008; 2009) have argued, polycentric approaches have problem-
solving potentialities that can include multi-agency and departmental checks and 
balances, and help design effective local institutions when used by informed and 
interested citizens and public officials. The point is, to make use of a diverse range 
of frames, a sector must first reflect on the frames that construct its current 
paradigm. 
In line with a broad social constructivist perspective, this research argues 
that because policy frames are social constructions they can also be de- and 
reconstructed. Therefore, decision-makers may gain from making frames more 
explicit to reflect on and better understand the relationships between hidden 
premises and normative conclusions behind current approaches to governance 
(Rein & Schon, 1991:150; Wagner, et al., 1991:19). Purposive frame reflection is one 
way to explore or better understanding the discursive landscape of the bureaucracy 
within which governance and policy processes occur. Moreover, although they may 
not simply be able to change their frame at will, it is important for decision-makers 
to be made aware that ‘taken-for granted’ frames, including those ‘built-into’ 
decision-making, can subtly shape conceptions of reality (de Boer, et al., 2010).  
                                                 
18 A robust policy strategy is one that performs well when compared with the alternatives across a wide range of plausible futures, a strategy 
that need not be the optimal one in any future; but will, however, yield satisfactory outcomes in both easy-to-envision futures and hard-to-
anticipate contingencies  (Popper, et al., 2005) 
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Recognising and accepting different knowledge claims could provide a 
common ground and point of departure for cooperation (Buizer, et al., 2011; de 
Boer, et al., 2010; Ison, 2005). More importantly, in the context of adaptation, by 
exploring the frames ‘at play’, a deliberately frame reflexive process could generate 
different visions about central issues (Blyth, 1997:246; de Boer, et al., 2010:1). Such 
a reflexive practice however, must not only include reflection on the underlying 
policy frames, it should also include the sector’s informal institutions. For reflexive 
learning and adaptation, sector’s need to move beyond ‘groupthink’, they need 
heterogeneity more than uniformity, disagreement more than consensus, creativity 
more than predictability, and frankness more than conformity(Hart & Kroon, 1997)  
The same concept of a gaining a richer understanding through multiple 
perspectives applies to this research. While ideational factors (frames and ideas) 
need greater attention in studies of governance and adaptation, this should not be 
at the expense of variables, such as institutions (de Franca Doria, et al., 2009:212). 
The next sub-section discusses why. 
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2.5.2 Informal institutions 
Institutions are both formal (regulative) and informal (normative and cultural-
cognitive) ‘rules in use’. They are a form of systemic memory without which every 
issue, whether threat or opportunity, would have to be considered afresh and no 
action contemplated until basic decisions about proceeding were resolved 
(Considine, 2005:87). Institutions shape organisational and sectoral structure and 
function (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). As norms and routines informal institutions 
give rise to stable, recurring patterns of behaviour and thus structure collective 
actions (Balzer in Lauth, 2000:23; Lowndes, 2010:61). Although it is often implied, 
informal institutions have an obligatory dimension (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003; 
Scharpf, 2000) that means they can be as every bit important in shaping actors’ 
behaviour as formally agreed procedures (High, et al., 2005; Lowndes, 2010:68). 
While they are known, practised and accepted by actors who expect to continue 
interacting under those rules, informal institutions need not necessarily be approved 
by those same actors  (O'Donnell in Lauth, 2000:23). The obligatory dimension of 
informal institutions is often based in ideas of normatively appropriate behaviour 
rather than calculated returns expected from alternative choices (March & Olsen, 
1989:22). 
Following the new-institutionalist stream of institutional theory, this study 
sought more cultural and cognitive explanations (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) for the 
‘actual’ processes of public administration (and its adaptive capacity). In recognising 
the agency, autonomy, individuality and identity of actors as shapers in these 
institutions, rather than mere bearers, of systemic logics (Hay, 2006a), this research 
conceived institutions and frames as social constructions that can be socially de- 
and re-constructed. Therefore, while institutions are a key influence on behaviour 
and decision-making in policy sectors, they are path-shaping rather than necessarily 
path-determining (Blyth, 2002, 2009; Marsh, 2010; Scharpf, 1997; Schmidt, 2008; 
Smit, et al., 1999:214).  
The challenge is that institutional change is not easy since actors have a 
major hand in creating the meanings (frames) and rules (institutions) that they view 
as facts to be accommodated (Termeer, 2009:301). Moreover, in public 
administration, the ability to change institutions may not only be constrained by 
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their depth throughout a sector or government, but because these institutions may 
well be manifestations of broader societal rationalities or master-frames. Indeed, the 
political science literature explicitly considers broader political philosophies and 
cultural, societal rationalities as conditioning institutions within governance of 
public policy sectors (Schmidt, 2002). 
2.5.2.a Informal institutions in public administration 
In much of the literature, including that focused on adaptation, formal structures 
and procedures in governance arrangements and policy processes are given a great 
deal of attention. The constraining and enabling influence of formal institutions on 
innovation in public administration is a whole field of research. Formal constraints 
may include budgets that restrain resources in capital, time and personnel needed 
for entrepreneurial activity (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:34). Equally, while 
bureaucracies and their policy sectors are among a range of arenas for contending 
social forces, they are also collections of standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs 
(March & Olsen, 1989:17). Hence, even though the role of the public employees is 
changing in many countries (and many are seeking it), they may still find it hard to 
be innovative because their roles are institutionalised (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:34). 
The new-institutional literature emphasises that less formal structures and 
processes are as equally likely to influence governance and policies as more formal 
ones. Minogue (1993:21) posits that “policies proposed and authorised by formal 
political institutions and participants are, in a wide variety of ways, influenced, 
mediated, even altered by informal administrative institutions and participants at 
both the higher and lower levels”. Careful attention to informal institutions such as 
bureaucratic norms is therefore critical to understanding the incentives that enable 
and constrain administrative behaviour and outcomes, including the performance 
of formal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004:726).  
There is much discussion in the literature as to whether actors actively 
maintain institutions because of their material interests or simply out of practice. A 
premise of this thesis, influenced by the work of authors such as Blyth (2002), is 
that this argument depends on your definition of interest. An interest may lie in the 
active girding of a sector’s dominant frame/s because it is part of how that actor – 
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individual or organisational – defines itself. Bureaucrats might also (unconsciously) 
re-enact an institution in their practice because they conceive no alternative or 
regard the alternatives they can imagine as unrealistic (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991:11).  
2.5.2.b Informal institutions and policy frames 
In much of the literature, the terms frames and institutions are interchanged or 
frames are discussed as institutional factors (Campbell, 2002). This study however, 
has interpreted frames and institutions as subtly different but closely interrelated 
concepts. Just as Blyth (2008) posits that ideas are the blueprints behind 
institutions, the media out of which they are constructed, Scott (2001) describes 
frames as the cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions. Epstein (2006) argues that a state 
observes collective norms or institutions because they are part of how it sees itself 
contributing to ‘good government’. Similarly for a policy sector, its actors may 
collectively observe its institutions because they are part of how the sector ‘frames 
itself’ as contributing to good government or public good. Consequently, the 
impact of policy frames depends on the degree or ‘thickness’ of their 
institutionalisation (Riker 1980 in Lenschow & Zito, 1998:420).  
Over time, as frames are expressed in discursive practices, they become 
unreflectively taken-for-granted, scarcely noted by the actors who employ them and 
embedded in institutional deliberations and practices (Fischer, 2003:74). As 
informal institutions, institutionalised frames include an implicit assumption that all 
actors will use the same frames, so even if they try to challenge the dominant 
storyline, people are expected to position their contribution in terms of the known 
categories (Hajer, 1995:57). By defining the terms of discourse within the 
bureaucracy of a policy sector, institutionalised frames both constrain and enable, 
often in highly specific ways, the sphere of discussion regarding a sector’s purpose 
and its policies (Hall, 1993:292). Thus, when institutions define the rules for 
expressions of a particular frame such as in sectoral practices and ways of reasoning 
(Hajer, 1993:46), frames can be considered key institutional factors in shaping a 
sector’s policy paradigm (Nylander, 2001:293). 
Institutionalised frames are important to the question of a sector’s capacity 
for reflexive learning, because “the degree and type of institutionalisation is a key 
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aspect of the ‘cognitive map’ that filters and shapes the conduct of actors in any 
policy system” (Boin & Hart, 2003; Brunner & Lynch, 2010; Considine, 2005:70), 
including what questions are asked (by whom), prioritisation of research, and 
proposed ‘solutions’ to new concepts or issues (Forsyth, 2003). Actor perceptions 
about what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable are shaped by the 
institutional environment and existing policy paradigm (Hay, 2006b:8), and are 
crucial influences upon conceptions of responses to the adaptation imperative.  
Blyth (2008) suggests that the ideas that become institutionalised are best 
thought of as emergent properties of the moment rather than a reflection of the 
quality of the idea (or frame). The resonance of a particular frame with a particular 
‘moment’ might also be a reflection of the frame’s resonance with existing 
institutions (representing a potential for self-reinforcement). Hall (1993) submits 
that frames are likely to become institutionalised in settings where policy is 
superintended by experts or by administrators with long tenures in office, so policy 
paradigms are likely to become intertwined with firmly established operating 
procedures and departmental routines (p:291). As touched on in Section 2.5.1.a, it 
may also be where key actors have hard-won, long-term investments (financial, 
temporal and reputational) in current problem frames (Connor & Dovers, 2002). In 
such situations, participants may continue to rely for long periods on rules that 
produce suboptimal outcomes because the expected costs of changing rules are 
higher than the benefits they could derive from a better set of rules (Ostrom, 
2005:63). 
2.5.2.c Informal institutions and a policy sector’s reflexive learning 
Institutions are an issue in questions of reflexive learning because they can create 
expectations of conformity and restrict the attention span of actors to approaches 
previously found to be appropriate (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:34). Institutions can 
create shape actions and decisions, and resist new ideas because practices and 
structures are taken for granted, are not questioned, or are not compared against 
alternatives (Considine, 2005:105; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:192). Reflexive 
learning depends on a capacity for departing from the path-deterministic potential 
of institutions, including institutionalised frames. Particularly instructive for this 
study was an argument in some of the political science literature that ideas are 
important facilitators or influences upon institutional change. Schmidt (2008:304) 
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states that large numbers of new-institutionalists have sought to use the concept of 
ideas to counter the static and overly deterministic nature of institutions in their 
explanations. In a similar vein, Morrill in Creed, et al (2002:36) suggested that an 
essential mechanism of institutional change is the articulation of frames for 
alternative practices, “albeit ones that resonate with the beliefs of a critical mass of 
potential supporters”. Whether or not a new idea or frame can be considered or 
even incorporated into a sector’s policy paradigm may well depend on that 
landscape of informal institutions – expressions of the beliefs of a critical mass of 
actors within a sector.  
Handmer and Dovers (2008a) surmise that strategic policy is dependent 
upon the suitability of the institutional settings within which policy is formulated, 
developed, implemented and monitored, and within which it evolves. So too, is the 
adaptive capacity of a policy sector. A sector’s institutions mediate the introduction 
of new ideas or frames. Therefore, reflexive learning requires an institutional 
landscape that encourages questioning, reflection and even changing of rules, (and 
recognising the potential for antagonism this may engender). As Moynihan and 
Landuyt (2009:1100) assert, learning forums work best if they occur within a culture 
that is purpose driven, encourages the open sharing of information, supports the 
presentation of different perspectives, and examines errors to solve problems rather 
than to allocate blame. “Although both informal and formal learning behaviours 
foster inter-organisational learning, too much formalization stifles learning 
behaviours – particularly those through networks. A balance must be struck 
between relying on spontaneously emerging informal behaviours and on 
purposefully designed formal interactions, particularly because informal and formal 
learning behaviours, rather than being independent, are also likely to influence each 
other” (Janowicz-Panjaitana & Noorderhavenb, 2008:1338). 
Authors such as Schön and Rein (1994) suggest that reflection in policy 
practice has very little currency among scholars and practitioners, driven by 
perceptions that awareness of the range of perspectives may lead to an impasse or 
stalemate, or that reflection is impractical, distracting or too time hungry. Existing 
practices may be institutionalised when actors finding few, if any, venues to voice 
differences between personal and institutional preferences, leave the organisation or 
re-evaluate their preferences (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:34). The influence of ‘hard-
won’, long-term investments [financial, temporal and reputational] in maintaining 
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current, institutionalised frames has already been mentioned. The implications for 
reflexive learning are that if actors feel it costly to change their knowledge, skills, 
past decisions, or hard-won outcomes, change and innovation may be resisted or 
viewed as an unwelcome perturbation, which in turn may lead to entrenched 
practices and procedures (Bressers & Rosenbaum, 2000; Koch & Hauknes, 
2005:40; Weber & Khademian, 2008:15). 
Whilst some institutional inertia may not always be a bad thing – when past 
experience is a good predictor – resistance to change also hinders our ability to 
recognise and implement necessary adaptations when dealing with novel events and 
circumstances (Beratan, 2007), the very antithesis of an adaptive approach. In the 
context of climate change, past experience may no longer be a good predictor. 
Conscious deliberation is needed to ensure review of practice is not improving only 
a limited (and existing) range of options, or worse, is simply cosmetic change for 
change’s sake even though those approaches may become increasingly irrelevant. 
Reflexive learning for adaptation requires conscious deliberation upon the frames 
and institutions that underpin a sector’s governance and its policy suite. 
A sector’s informal institutional landscape appears to be particularly crucial 
in influencing ‘crises’ as so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ for learning (Birkmann, 
et al., 2008). The challenge, as discussed in the earlier policy frames section, is that 
crises are likely to create framing contests (Boin, et al., 2009). Without an 
institutionalised practice of reflexive learning, immediate responses to and the 
inevitable post-event analyses, inquiries and reviews are likely to be conducted 
somewhat circularly within the sector’s existing frames and institutions. This may 
be particularly the case when, by defining what constitutes ‘legitimate knowledge’ 
(Considine, 2005), institutions also define the constellations and interactions of 
actors that may participate in governance and policy processes (Lowndes, 2010:70; 
Ostrom, 2005; Scharpf, 2000:775), including analyses, reviews and inquiries. 
Consequently, as Connor and Dovers (2002:15) assert, “rapid change in institutions 
may depend on conflict or political opportunism or both (and even these are no 
guarantee), otherwise we may need to rely on generational change or long-term 
societal normative change”.  
The point is that institutions need not be path determining. Though they 
are path-shaping, institutions are not determining of a reflexive actor’s conduct 
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(Gofas & Hay, 2009; Scharpf, 1997:43). Institutions are social constructs upon 
which we can reflect and seek to change. Recognition of this human agency “serves 
to bring people back in, not as merely static upholders of this or that idea, but as 
active makers and re-makers of their culture” (Archer 1996 in Gofas & Hay, 
2009:43). The people that this study wishes to ‘bring back into’ questions of 
reflexive learning for adaptive governance are bureaucrats, particularly those 
working at ‘street and middle’ levels. The collective, social nature of reflexive 
learning in a public policy sector raises questions about who learns what and why, 
since there is not only interaction between individual frames of thinking within 
organizations but also interaction between collective frames of thinking of different 
organizations (adapted from Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). The following section 
discusses the role of middle and street-level bureaucrats in public administration 
processes and how their role is important to issues of reflexive learning for adapting 
to climate change. 
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2.5.3 Middle and street-level bureaucrats 
Policy-making is not only a political activity but also a bureaucratic one. It 
takes hard work to shape a policy into a form that can be put to ministers 
and a wider audience and turned into a set of policy instruments in the 
form of a law, plan, budget, consultation document, or even statement of 
intent. Politicians need bureaucrats to develop and maintain policy, not 
simply for ‘advice’ on how to do it (Page & Jenkins, 2005:2).  
Good government requires well-trained, professional administrators to prepare 
policies and put them into effect (Olsen, 2008:24). While Carlsson and Berkes 
(2005:73) assert that “it is a well-known fact within social science that the structure 
of formal political administrative systems may have little in common with how real-
life actors behave”, outside of the policy analysis and public administration fields, 
the coordinative policy deliberation among bureaucrats tends to escape analytic 
gaze (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003:88; Miller, 2004; Schmidt, 2008). Although, Page 
(2006b) argues, even in public administration and policy analyses the work of street 
and middle-level bureaucrats is given less attention than that of ‘policy elites’. 
Certainly, much of the adaptation literature appears to treat government and the 
role of administrators in policy administration as a kind of ‘black box’ - a mystical 
‘machine’ into which information is pumped with ‘policy’ produced at the other 
end. This situation may be a reflection of the broad, normative ideal of public 
administration as a mechanistic tool for the preparation and implementation of laws 
and policies that still holds a strong position in the literature (Olsen, 2008:22; 
Simon, 1997) and arguably society more generally.  
The problem is when governments, departments or agencies are conceived 
in this way, order is overemphasized and elements underemphasized; when 
described as mere aggregates, elements are overemphasized and order 
underemphasized (Brown & Duguid, 2001). Overemphasising order, such as 
viewing governance arrangements as simply a set of formal couplings between 
different levels of organisation, risks regarding real-life actors as external to those 
processes of choice, and in the worst case, only regarded as attributes to formally 
decided power-sharing agreements (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005:73).  
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In their roles as administrators of public policy, middle and street-level 
bureaucrats are pivotal to a sector’s governance. The phrase ‘middle and street-level 
bureaucrats’ aims to capture a large cohort of public servants and is an amalgam of 
two terms: Lipsky’s (1993) street-level bureaucrats – “the people who actually 
implement policy” – and Page’s (2007) middle-level bureaucrats – “specialist/expert 
civil servants in policy development”. Within the structure of Victoria’s fire 
management sector this cohort includes local and state government personnel who, 
on a day-to-day basis, deal in person with members of the public and have to 
interpret policies on the ground; the practical implementation. My interpretation of 
the width of the ‘middle-level’ is quite a wide band. It includes policy officers who 
are involved in supporting both street-level and very senior bureaucrats, to policy 
advisors and executive staff involved in advising Departmental Secretaries, CEOs 
and Ministers. By ‘policy elites’, the typical focus of many policy studies, I refer to 
Departmental Secretaries, CEOs and Ministers. 
Middle and street-level bureaucrats work at intersections between strategic 
and on-ground actions. They have key roles in co-ordinating a diversity of 
stakeholder inputs, facilitating negotiation between different values, objectives and 
demands, and they make (or at least support) policy development and 
implementation choices. They have substantial discretion, can control resources, 
exercise power, and are active participants in the preparation, formulation, 
implementation and enforcement of public policy (Olsen, 2008:26). Public 
managers must be accountable for the programs under their guidance while also 
facilitating collaboration across organizational and government boundaries, 
between the public and private sectors, and among officials, professionals, and 
members of the public, particularly via a critical role in soliciting, sharing, and 
integrating knowledge among participants in the network (Weber & Khademian, 
2008:341). As Moser (2009) argues, because governance is constantly held in the 
dialectic tension between structure and agency, decision-makers – as active agents 
embedded in particular institutional and political contexts – are placed at the centre 
of governance (p315). 
Middle and street-level bureaucrats work amongst the aforementioned 
struggles over policy frames and within the bounds of a sector’s institutions. They 
are central actors within the bureau-politics of public administration, the strategic 
dimensions of which occur in inter- and intra-organisational settings that include 
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actors of diverging and sometimes conflicting interests (Rosenthal, et al., 1991), 
objectives and frames. Schmidt (2002:233) asserts that although government 
officials and other key policy actors tend to be central to the construction of a 
sector’s discourse, they are not necessarily the originators of the ideas (frames) 
informing that discourse, which may instead be the product of policy experts, 
scientists, research institutes, lobby groups and even social movements. However, 
while bureaucrats may not control the agenda process, they have far more impact 
and influence over what goes up, what goes down and what gets on the agenda 
than those members of society whose participation is marginal and impaired 
(Parsons, 1995:206).  
March and Olsen (1989:49) suggest that administrators solicit public 
participation in decision-making in order to secure public support for policies to 
which they are already committed. Similarly, Koch (2005:32) postulated that 
because of their world views, ideologies, and thus institutions, that civil servants can 
be both a source of innovation and a constraint on innovation, and that they may – 
consciously or unconsciously – work to stop the new policies from being 
implemented. The bureaucrats of interest here are unlikely to be able to prevent 
policy implementation because their roles do not involve final endorsement of 
policies. However, they may well influence the style or conduct of policy 
implementation.  
From a pragmatic perspective, while support from executive levels is 
essential to facilitating such actions, the behaviours and norms of bureaucrats, 
including middle and street-level bureaucrats, influence the conduct of policy 
development, implementation and evaluation. As policy experts within the political 
system, they have a particular role in developing and shaping the understanding of 
policy issues and alternatives  (Heclo 1974 in March & Olsen, 1989:18). All of this 
touches upon the role of administrative systems in the formation rather than in the 
execution of public policy; a feature often missed by an analysis that concentrates 
on political decision-making elites (Jenkins, 1993). Many policy officials, other than 
the ‘policy elites’ have responsibility for developing policy details, without which a 
large number of policies cannot be deemed to have been formed (Page, 2007:154). 
Moreover, their role is not just about providing ‘solutions’ to policy problems but 
also to ensure the situation or context is seen as ‘a problem’ in the first place 
 47 
(Lasswell, 1936). In other words, these bureaucrats play a central role in framing the 
sector and its purpose.  
2.5.3.a Role of bureaucrats in the reflexive learning of a policy sector 
The adaptation literature is not alone in generally treating government and its 
agencies as ‘black boxes’. Analysis of public policy or administration tends to focus 
on a policy’s ‘target community’ such as those who live with a risk of bushfire, an 
ecosystem, or the analysis considers factors of power and influence of ‘policy elites’ 
– politicians and Departmental Secretaries (Page, 2006a). Yet middle and street-
level ranking bureaucrats also play a key role in public policy processes, especially in 
a sector’s learning (Crozier, 1964; Page, 2006a, 2007; Raadschelders, et al., 2007). 
Adopting a model of individuals as reflective, establishes the argument that through 
their interactions, bureaucrats create, maintain and alter a sector’s institutions and 
frames. They are therefore important players in a sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning. 
These agents “not only use their ‘background ideational abilities’ to create 
and maintain their institutions, but also their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ to 
communicate and deliberate about taking collective action to change (or maintain) 
those institutions” (Schmidt 2008). Foreground discursive abilities refer to people’s 
ability to think outside the institutions in which they continue to act; to talk about 
such institutions in a critical way, to communicate and deliberate about them; to 
persuade themselves and others to change their minds about their institutions; and 
then to take collective action. Such actions may be taken by policy entrepreneurs, 
leaders, by building discursive coalitions against entrenched interests (or other 
discursive coalitions) in the coordinative policy sphere or in deliberating and 
engaging with the public” (Schmidt, 2009:197-8). 
Humans have the capacity to reflect and learn, and actively change 
‘dominant paradigms’ or institutions. Hints of structural determinism in who can 
enact change in social systems including institutions, is a problem because learning 
is a dialectical process between individuals and collectives (Lee & Roth, 2007:96; 
Lizardo, 2010). As Ostrom (2008; 2005) reminds us, institutions are not the only 
explanation for human behaviour. This assertion is most strongly argued in the 
organisational learning literature. “Social action both reflects and reconstitutes 
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structure: structure influences agents, agents influence structure, and so on. 
Individuals are more than passive recipients of organizational influence; they are 
agents capable of reconstituting the broader social norms” (Moynihan & Landuyt, 
2009:1102). Similarly as Lee and Roth (2007) state, learning individuals make 
learning organizations what they are, while the latter simultaneously provide 
necessary affordances or action possibilities for its members to develop. Therefore, 
because institutions are essentially social constructions, they can be reflected upon, 
and de- or re-constructed.  
Through their sustained interactions, actors create network structures: rules 
and resources that (will) have a structuring effect on future interactions in the 
network” (Klijn, 2001:135). Actors can not only deliberate to get to favourable 
solutions for particular problems but while deliberating they can also negotiate new 
institutional rules, develop new norms of appropriate behaviour and devise new 
conceptions of legitimate intervention (Hajer, 2003b:175). These types of ‘co-
evolutionary interactions’ between individual behaviours and institutions are mainly 
channelled via knowledge, norms and values which bridge the collective outcomes 
of far from equilibrium interactions and heterogeneous learning at the behavioural 
level with the established mechanisms at the institutional level that shape, constrain 
and initiate low-level behaviour (Rammel, et al., 2007:14).  
At its best, policy-making is a dialectic within which policy-makers function 
as designers and exhibit reflexive practice (Schön & Rein, 1994:xi). Hall (1993) 
argues that the process of learning associated with important third order changes 
can be a much broader affair subject to powerful influences from society and the 
political arena, rather than occurring within ‘the state’ or a sector19. An obvious 
question then is, how much does the state or a sector, contribute to the 
development and maintenance of its own paradigm? Without reflection upon the 
beliefs, values and perspectives held by particular institutions and interest groups 
from which particular policy positions are derived, [reflexive] deutero-learning 
would not occur (ibid). “The hope is that if individuals learn how to better conduct 
their inquiry, they may contribute to the pragmatic resolution of the controversies 
in which they are embroiled; and that they are capable of reflecting on frame 
                                                 
19 He also argues that "the autonomy of the state in a given field of policy may also depend on whether there is a coherent policy paradigm 
present. Policymakers are likely to be in a stronger position to resist pressure
 
from societal interests when they are armed with a coherent policy 
paradigm” (p 290) 
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conflicts” (ibid:33). Therefore, understanding and working with different frames in a 
policy sector would likely support reflexive learning.  
However, enabling reflexive learning for adaptive governance is more 
complex than might be concluded from the common image of joint management as 
the sharing of power and responsibility between a ‘unitary state’ and a homogenous 
‘community’ (Cash, et al., 2006). Just as communities are a host of different 
interests, perspectives, and political actors, the state is rarely unitary; being an 
amalgamation of different branches, agencies, and political factions, who each focus 
on many problems, and make choices according to various conceptions of 
community, organisational, and personal interests (Allison & Halperin, 1972:43; 
Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).  
In generally treating public policy administration and government as an 
amorphous ‘black box’, the ‘social capital’ within bureaucracies receives little 
consideration. As was already argued, academics [and society generally] tend to have 
a rather top-down view about how policy is made, the older ‘rational’ model, 
whereas the reality is that it is a fairly unstructured process (Page, 2006a:3). Frames 
and institutions that guide often invisible choices deeply affect governance and thus 
the degree to which those structures (policy paradigm) can enable or hinder 
effective adaptation actions (Moser, 2009:317). Little research has investigated the 
relationship between individual learning and these underlying institutional 
constraints and communication pathways through which adaptation capacity and 
action are negotiated within and between organisations (Pelling, et al., 2008).  
Focussing on the role of bureaucrats in the reflexive learning capacity of a 
policy sector directs attention to the ‘social capital’ within bureaucracies. It is about 
tapping into the treasure within government (Leicester, 2007), as well as outside it. 
A well-known theory and analytic approach for exploring such capital is that of 
social network analysis. The subsequent and final section of this chapter discusses 
the role of informal (or rather, non-formalised) networks among a sector’s 
bureaucrats as an important influence upon a sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning. 
 
  
50 
2.5.4 Networks among bureaucrats 
As was highlighted in section 2.3, bureaucracies have a clear coordinative role in 
public administration and governance, particularly in the context of the adaptation 
imperative. The growing interest in the concept of governance is recognition of the 
inherently networked and multi-party setting of negotiation in policy making (Hajer, 
2006b:43). These patterns of interaction and their outcomes depend on the 
relationships among governance actors at different levels and the problems they are 
addressing (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). The discursive arena of public policy 
administration (‘the bureaucracy’) is just one arena that intersects and interacts with 
several others, including parliament, politicians, media, lobby groups, and 
communities. It interacts with a broader ‘issue network’ of individual and 
organisational policy entrepreneurs, interest groups, and interests of various types 
participate in give-and-take with the aim of influencing policy (Heclo 1978 in 
O'Toole, 1997b). 
Moreover, each agency or organisation is a discursive arena made up of 
numerous other arenas. In 1994, Schön and Rein argued that in order to make a 
legitimate place for practically useful reflection, policy practice should be viewed as 
a kind of distributed designing, undertaken by multiple actors. In other words, 
reflexive learning in policy sectors depends on multi-level, multi-sectoral networks. 
This section discusses the roles of informal networks among bureaucrats (as a sub-
set of a sector’s broader governance network) in facilitating and hindering reflexive 
learning in public sectors. As discussed in the preceding sub-sections, middle and 
street-level bureaucrats work at the vertical and horizontal (and diagonal) 
intersections of the inherently network-based processes of administration and 
governance.  
Network concepts have a fairly long history in the scholarship of public 
administration, political science and organisational management (Milward & 
Provan, 1998:387-8; Rhodes, 2007). In political science, inter-organisational 
networks have long been recognised as an important feature of influence and action 
(Laumann & Knoke, 1987). In the organisational literature, the breadth, intensity 
and heterogeneity of social ties are argued to influence an organisation’s access to 
different sorts of information, thus affecting its ability to recognize and respond to 
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environmental threats [or changes] (Kraatz, 1998; Powell, et al., 1996). In addition, 
the need to facilitate cross-sectoral, multi-level interactions and co-operation across 
governments has been long recognised. No matter the policy arena or issue, there 
are regular calls for (improved) horizontal coordination across policy portfolios and 
vertically within the various agencies and departments (Mickwitz, et al., 2009:37). 
These calls repeat in concepts of joined-up-government, integrated governance as 
well as management for social-ecological system resilience and adaptation more 
generally. These calls have also be made to connect the sometimes siloed nature of 
public administration; where different departments (or even sections within the 
same department) work on different or similar aspects of the same policy issue but 
rarely interact (Bodin & Crona, 2009; Chapman, 2004; Dawes, et al., 2009; Metcalfe, 
1978; Page & Jenkins, 2005; Peters, 1989; Verhoest & Bouckaert, 2005; Wanna, 
2008). Section 2.5.5 discusses this factor in further detail. 
Policy network analyses (PNA) in particular, attempt to explain both policy 
development and its outcomes through examination of networks of involved or 
concerned ‘policy actors’. Numerous authors maintain that the PNA field stems 
from a recognition that the complexities of governance and policy making occur in 
dynamic, often fragmented and negotiated spaces amongst myriad actors (Hanf & 
Scharpf, 1978; Peterson, 1990:8; Provan & Milward, 2001; Sabatier & Zafonte, 
1995; Weible & Sabatier, 2009). The PNA literature has identified at least five 
reasons for stakeholders to form networks: the most common is for the exchange 
of information and advice; but also for exchange of resources; to form alliances, 
particularly with influential actors who have control over critical resources; and to 
coordinate the pursuit of common objectives (Weible & Sabatier, 2005:182). Its 
literature divides roughly into two strands: analysing policy network structures; or 
analysing the efficacy of the governance of policy networks. However, PNA 
predominantly examines government-stakeholder-community relationships and 
consequent policy outcomes. Focussing on the role of bureaucrats as agents of 
reflexive learning in policy sectors draws attention to the social networks that these 
actors use in their day-to-day practice of policy administration and governance.  
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Without connections among bureaucrats20, policy and practice decisions can 
be made without the involvement of anyone that has a deep knowledge of the issue 
under discussion (Mulgan, 2009:168), or without involvement of those with 
alternate or complementary understandings. Even more simply, governments have 
a lot of knowledge, but they rarely know what they know (Mulgan, 2009). Units 
with potentially synergistic information are often not aware of where such 
information could be useful, and conversely, units that might be able to use that 
information often do not know of its existence or whereabouts (Huber, 1991:100). 
The consequence of decisions made in different places and in different policy 
arenas, is that they might be only loosely, if at all, coupled  (Bressers & Rosenbaum, 
2000:527). All of this may undermine the necessary coordinative approaches that 
work toward reducing vulnerabilities to hazards and avoid mal-adaptation.  
While Toikka (2010) suggests that network structures have often been 
neglected in governance research, there is a vast array of work that has focussed on 
networks between governments and communities. This work has demonstrated 
that understanding social networks among policy actors can provide a more subtle 
understanding of the processes and outcomes of governance and policy (Agranoff, 
2007; Bodin & Crona, 2009; Brown & Duguid, 2001; Carlsson, 2000; Carlsson & 
Sandstrom, 2008; Cash, et al., 2006; Compston, 2009; Dengler, 2007; Hartley, 2010; 
High, et al., 2007; Moschitz & Stolze, 2009; Olsson, et al., 2006; Pahl-Wostl, et al., 
2007; Powell, et al., 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier, et al., 2005a; 
Schneider, et al., 2003; Weible, 2006; Weible & Sabatier, 2005, 2009). In 1998, 
Milward and Provan speculated that network analysis is important to public 
management because of an underdeveloped capacity for administrative analysis. Yet 
few network analyses appear to have paid attention to the coordinative, discursive 
context of public policy making within bureaucracies. Compared to the bulk of the 
adaptation literature however, policy network analyses tend less to treat 
governments and their agencies as amorphous entities (See for example 
(Brinkerhoff, 1996; Considine & Lewis, 2007; Considine, et al., 2009). However, it 
appears that networks among middle and street-level bureaucrats have yet to be 
studied as an influential factor in a policy sector’s capacity to adapt to climate 
change. 
                                                 
20
 
Like most of us, bureaucrats are likely to be members of a number of communities and networks, beyond those associated with their work. 
However, the focus of this work was on the networks they use in the day-to-day conduct of their work
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2.5.4.a Role of networks in learning 
Cross-sectoral, multi-level connections are vital for reflexive learning in adaptive 
governance of public sectors. The implications of complexity, uncertainty and flux 
point towards diversity, decentralisation and dynamism, implying a need to have 
institutions, networks, and engagement and deliberative processes that privilege 
multiple sources of knowledge not only from ‘the centre’, but also beyond it (Bell, 
2004:26). The process of effective transfer, receipt, and integration of rich and 
sensitive knowledge to develop a new knowledge base, is very important in 
addressing complex policy challenges and as an ongoing premise for cooperation; 
particularly as the challenges may take on different dimensions and as management 
participants change (Bouwen, et al., 2005; Dovers, 2003:9; Handmer, et al., :217; van 
Buuren, et al., 2004:24; Weber & Khademian, 2008:338). Dealing with the challenge 
of accessing diverse knowledge is - to a large extent - a problem of interaction, 
rather than of more research that will not solve differences in perceptions of issues 
and their management (van Bueren, et al., 2003:194).  
Much of the adaptation literature supports the view that learning in 
institutions and networks through the storing of knowledge and experience, can 
create flexibility in problem solving and balance power among interest groups, and 
plays an important role in adaptive capacity (Berkes, et al., 2003). For example, 
Pelling and High (2005b:1) see adaptive capacity as “arising out of the power that 
resides in the relationships between individuals and sub-groups that comprise 
organisations and administrative regimes rather than being held in structures or 
wielded by individual actors”.  
Consistent throughout the literature is the recognition that it is connections 
amongst people that facilitate learning because it is an intrinsically social process 
(Teece et. al. 1994 in Brown & Duguid, 2001:200). This argument reflects the 
concept of learning as being relational; as it is conceived in social learning21. The 
foundation of social learning is that interactive, iterative and networked approaches 
to multiparty collaboration are the nuclei of learning processes, influenced by the 
governance structure and/or social environments in which those processes are 
embedded (Christie, et al., 2009:86; Pahl-Wostl, et al., 2007; Pelling & High, 2005a:7; 
                                                 
21
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the notion of social learning gained attention in many disciplines such as political science and coincided with the 
thrust for public participation (ideas of governance), the growing importance given to sustainable development (Tabara & Pahl-Wostl, 2007). 
54 
Valente, 2005). Like other ‘forms’ of learning with a collective intent in its moniker, 
social learning is increasingly described as an essential feature of sustainable and 
adaptive management of social–ecological systems (Berkes, et al., 2003; Gunderson 
& Holling, 2002; Holling, 1973; Pahl-Wostl, 2007) and adaptation more generally 
(Jordan & O'Riordan, 2005; Pelling & High, 2005b; Tabara & Pahl-Wostl, 2007; 
Tabara, et al., 2010; Winsvold, et al., 2009). It is germane to the collective intent of 
adaptive governance, where collaborative learning amongst peers is believed to 
facilitate faster and deeper learning compared with learning received through the 
transmission of an instructor (Elwyn et. al, 2001 in Pelling, et al., 2008).  
The parallels between the intent of learning described in the adaptive 
governance literature and that of social learning seem obvious. Several authors 
suggest that social learning is an instance of reflexive or deutero-learning, because it 
involves learning about values and other ‘higher-order’ properties such as norms, 
responsibilities, goals and the framing of issues, leading to a change in ‘theories-in-
use’ [policy frames] (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). Similarly, Keen et al. (2005) 
conceive social learning as a braided rope consisting of reflection, system 
orientation, integration, negotiation, and participation that draws together human 
agency, individual and collective learning, and processes of change. They too, argue 
that without social learning, approaches claiming to be adaptive and integrative tend 
to be more of the same, with operations occurring in traditional disciplinary or 
managerial enclaves, actions hampered and visions constrained by the values and 
ethics that created the problems initially.  
More recently, the adaptation literature has adopted concepts of social 
learning and has directed a focus on the role of networks in the adaptive capacity of 
various communities. Yet while there is growing interest in both social and policy 
networks in the adaptation literature, it focuses primarily on community networks 
as a measure of social capital and thereby adaptive capacity of those communities. 
Interestingly, Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) suggest that while there is an implicit 
assumption in adaptive governance and its similes as to the role of social networks, 
there have been rather few attempts to incorporate formal social network analyses 
into the NRM or commons governance literature. Similarly, a review of literature 
suggests that there have been few, if any, attempts to apply SNA to bureaucratic 
networks as an important influence on the adaptive capacity of a policy sector. 
Consequently, this study draws from the argument that networks provide social 
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capital and thereby a learning capacity, and applies it to an examination of networks 
among a policy sector’s bureaucrats. 
Like their institutional-analysis counterparts, network researchers have 
sought to augment or supplant the view that organisational practices and outcomes 
are solely the result of formal processes, by examining how informal processes 
within organisations may also shape actions and outcomes (Kraatz, 1998). A similar 
argument is put within some of the adaptation literature, where informal or 
‘shadow networks’ are viewed as providing some relational space for people to 
learn (Pelling & High, 2005a; Stacey, 1996; Walker, et al., 2002).  
“...the ideal balance between formal and informal institutions that give 
shape to relational space as lying at the boundary between stability and 
instability, regularity and randomness. This place of bounded instability 
allows novelty to emerge, but in a form that is at least potentially positive 
and has a sense of continuity with earlier innovations. ..... shadow systems 
might contribute most to learning and innovation in organisations when 
they are recognised but allowed to have a life of their own” (Pelling, et al., 
2008:869) 
However, there is some debate in the network literature as to whether or 
not networks are a causal factor in various policy and governance processes, or a 
result of those processes (Dowding, 2002). Examination of a wider range of 
literature suggests that both are likely to be true. The advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) is based on a premise that policy actors actively work together (advocate) to 
create or maintain a particular framing of that sector (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993, 1999). However, a discourse coalition perspective suggests that actors help 
reproduce or change a frame or institution without necessarily orchestrating or 
coordinating their actions or even sharing deep values (Hajer, 1993). Whether 
because of deliberate advocacy or not, network structure and function can influence 
reflexive learning in a policy sector by influencing how (and if) knowledge and 
information moves through a policy sector. This can in turn influence the frames 
and informal institutions that are considered or embedded within a sector. This is 
important because reflexive learning depends on a capacity to consider and even 
perhaps adopt different and/or additional frames. 
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2.5.4.b The role networks in reflexive learning 
Stakeholders in a policy dialogue must be diverse in order to take full 
advantage of the creativity that can come from trying to find actions that 
can respond to a wide set of competing interests. They must also be 
interdependent in order to achieve the kinds of results that will allow them 
collectively to create an adaptive learning system that can be robust and 
effective (Innes & Booher, 2003:40).  
Connections between different communities, groups and frames in a network are 
important in accessing a diversity of knowledge and perspectives and in increasing a 
sector’s adaptation options. Repeatedly the argument is that through interaction 
with others, who may even have conflicting views, interests and frames, participants 
collectively gain new insights on issues and options for management, which in turn 
can help to reframe the issues and thereby expand possible policy options 
(Hisschemoller & Olsthoorn, 1996:290; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993:42; Schön 
& Rein, 1994; van Buuren, et al., 2004:8). “Institutional interaction across 
organisational levels can increase the diversity of response options and can deal 
more appropriately with uncertainty and change” (Ostrom, 2005). Lee and Roth 
(2007:96) also assert that, through practices of the production of documents, 
routines, equipment and institutions, people can increase action possibilities in and 
for the collective because each action and conversation becomes a potential growth 
point for the actions or talk of other colleagues.  
Connection of different frames into a jointly meaningful story can generate 
motivation and commitment for collective action and, provided participants are 
able to deal with the variety, confers the potential for crafting innovative solutions 
(Dewulf, et al., 2011:52; Nylander, 2001). The wider the number of organisations 
and actors that are drawn into the policy network and the broader the pool of ideas 
entering the feedback loop, the deeper the level of policy change (Pemberton 2004 
in Hudson, 2007:208). Similarly, constructivist or discursive institutionalism regards 
the capacity for institutional change as residing in the relationship between actors 
and their contexts (Hay, 2006b:7; Schmidt, 2008). The generation and change of 
institutional rules stems from a variety of experiences in a variety of places under a 
variety of situations (Dahrendorf 1968 in March & Olsen, 1989:24). Actors in 
reflexive practices do much more than simply work together around and across 
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existing institutions; they engage in a process of transforming the very systems in 
which they operate (Hendriks & Grin, 2007:336). 
The ability of a network to encourage reflexive learning does not require 
connections between every single actor. Studies regarding core-periphery structure 
in the network literature indicate that the diversity of connections between different 
groups in a sector is more important than the density. Network relations link 
individuals to collectives, and then indirectly to each other through these shared 
memberships (Valente, 2005:119). Even individuals or groups with relatively few 
contacts, can still play important roles in the conveying of new knowledge or 
perspectives in policy processes. Granovetter (1973) and  Burt (2002b) propose that 
“weak ties" can bridge across clusters, across structural holes, and can be powerful 
conduits of information. Even if networks are not solidaristic and are rife with 
conflict, network researchers imply the possibility that ‘weak’ connections are 
conduits, even if inadvertent, for information, ideas, or resources (Ansell, 2006:77).  
Schön (1973:165) also suggests that opportunities for learning are primarily 
in discovered systems at the periphery, where “the movement of learning is as 
much from periphery to periphery or from periphery to centre, as from centre to 
periphery”.  “While a member of a network may only know a small number of 
other members, she potentially has access in turn to the networks and communities 
of these associates. These linkages can lie latent until some change in the needs of 
the individual stimulates a search for new information or other forms of support” 
(Pelling & High, 2005a:4). Entrepreneurs located at borders and interstices of 
several networks will be more likely to be exposed to the diffusion of new ideas, 
which then become part of their repertoire and can therefore, lead to change 
(Campbell, 2007:12). Arguably then, a diversity of network connections is as, if not 
more, important than the density. Thus, the concept of learning through social 
connections also highlights the important role of ‘boundary spanners’ – those 
individuals and organisations that span network, frame and institutional boundaries. 
In returning to the inherently networked and multi-party setting of 
negotiation in policy making and governance, the conception of organisations as 
‘systems’ is instructive. Stacey (2007:29) describes organizations as complex 
responsive processes of human relating – such as communication, relations of 
power, and interplay between choices - and it is in the simultaneously cooperative-
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consensual and conflictual-competitive relating between people that they 
perpetually construct their future together in the present. If we extend this idea to 
public sectors and governance, then as Rhodes (2007), Ostrom (2005), Dengler 
(2007) and others have proposed, it may be useful to conceive of governance of 
public sectors as operating within a web of social networks, which consists of 
multiple spaces or action situations focused on different types of knowledge.  
“Each knowledge space is focused on different competencies necessary for 
achieving an agreed policy. Rather than attempting to integrate multiple 
knowledges into a single decision-making space in the arena, which may 
detrimentally become dominated by a single communicative rationality, this 
conception presents decision-making as informed by different types of 
knowledge in separate, but networked, spaces. It is particularly germane at 
larger spatial scales where it would be difficult to meaningfully integrate the 
gamut of competing knowledges into a single decision-making space” 
(Dengler, 2007).  
Enabling ‘problem restructuring’ (reframing) through social networks may 
not produce consensus nor obviate difficult political choices, but the learning 
process may improve policy choices and inform trade-offs even if it is time 
consuming and there is no guarantee that policy learning will really evolve (Dovers, 
2005; Hisschemoller & Olsthoorn, 1996:290). 
Network function in enabling or hindering reflexive learning includes the 
positions of key actors – individuals, groups and organisations - within the network. 
Power, influence and leadership can be concentrated in one or a few people or 
dispersed in a network of several actor groups (Olsson, et al., 2006). Key actors are 
not necessarily formally appointed leaders. Many authors (and commentators) 
suggest that the fundamental understanding of what is an appropriate policy 
solution is defined by the most powerful actors within the normative premises of 
the dominant discourse (Flyvbjerg 1998 and Owens 2005 in Juntti, et al., 2009). 
Well known however, is that leadership and influence are not automatically granted 
because of titles or location within a hierarchy. Leadership is also be earned or 
awarded by others to those with access to critical resources or the ability to catalyse 
and apply them successfully for problem-solving purposes (Weber & Khademian, 
2008:342). Others emphasise that trust is essential for cooperative behaviour and, 
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therefore, the existence of a network (Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Lundin, 2007; 
Rhodes, 2007), although trust on its own is enough to engender collaborative action 
(Lundin, 2007). 
Bureaucratic networks are also likely to be important for reflexive learning 
where formal institutions hinder reflexive learning and cross-sectoral interactions, 
or where there is an institutionalised ‘culture of antagonism’. Actors may devise 
their own de-facto institutions outside formal channels because they feel the 
informal channels may be less costly than trying to use the available formal ones, 
and through shifting levels of action participants may be able to self-consciously 
design rules in their efforts to change patterns of undesirable interactions and 
outcomes (Ostrom, 2005:63). They may also use informal networks when current 
arrangements do not fit their frames, or those of particular groups or agencies 
within the sector.  
“In intra-governmental policy processes, we know that separate parties and 
separate government departments and agencies and, often, separate 
parliamentary committees will pursue their separate and often conflicting 
goals in spite of the existence of formal institutions for authoritative conflict 
resolution, such as the cabinet or the penury parliament” (Scharpf, 
1978:347).  
From both of these perspectives, networks are critical mediating variables 
that affect power distributions, constructions of interests and identities, and the 
dynamics of interaction, mobilising information, social influence, resources and 
social capital in highly differentiated ways (Ansell, 2006:75-6). Consequently, a 
number of authors maintain that institutional analysis will be deficient if it neglects 
informal networks and relationships (High, et al., 2007:273) and vice versa: network 
research should “treat the complex role of contexts in which network participants 
are embedded, as everyday sources of meaning that guide and define the actions of 
the participants” (Berry, et al., 2004). 
What is called for is an approach that views political actors, policy network 
structures, and contextual factors in interaction to understand influences upon the 
evolution of particular types of networks and communities, and the privileging of 
certain actors and policy outcomes (Skogstad, 2005  Draft). This is not least 
because, there are likely to be factors that separately influence adoption of new 
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ideas or learning and choice of social network contacts (Valente, 2005:104). For this 
study, contextual factors of particular interest are a sector’s policy frames and 
informal institutions within the bureaucracy as being influenced by the network 
structure and function. Equally, the structure and function of those networks may 
well be influenced by the policy frames of network actors (at the individual and 
group or organisational scales), and by the institutional landscape within which the 
network is situated – network rules may well be institutionalised (Ostrom, 2005). 
Networks are conduits of frames and of institutions. Frames are not consciously 
manufactured but rather are unconsciously adopted in the course of 
communication and dialogue (Koenig, 2004). The rules and conventions that 
constitute social order have to be constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in actual 
speech situations (Hajer, 1995) and/or through practice (Fischer, 2003). 
Interrelationships between networks, policy frames, and institutions are discussed 
in the following sub-section.  
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2.5.5 Bureaucrats, policy frames, informal institutions and 
networks in a sector’s reflexive learning 
2.5.5.a Networks and policy frames 
The structure of a network influences how various knowledge and information 
move through a network and thereby, with whom that knowledge is shared. A 
growing body of work suggests that cognitive frames and beliefs influence and are 
influenced by the structure and function of social networks (Lizardo, 2010; 
McLean, 1998; Sabatier & Zafonte, 1995). Policy and governance outcomes are 
shaped by existing organisational structures, institutional settings, budgeting, 
reporting requirements, avenues of public input, and by informal networks of 
communication between practitioners that are in turn the products of values and 
norms embedded in an organisation [or sector] (Jordan & O'Riordan, 2005; van 
Nieuwaal, et al., 2009). People tend to take the word of those whom they trust on 
issues of credibility regarding empirical claims and supporting data; and the people 
they trust tend to be those who share their values (Kahan & Braman, 2006). This 
can also mean that institutional factors such as a lack of durable relations, frames, 
shared convictions, norms and values, or a shared language, often lie behind social 
and cognitive causes of impasses in policy networks (van Bueren, et al., 2003:196). 
Hence, we cannot simply associate dense connectivity in networks with an 
increased adaptive capacity. Like most things social, it is just not that simple.  
There are several reasons to pay attention to cautions that “Not all 
networks are equal” (Burt, 2002a, 2002b; Newman & Dale, 2005). Some literature 
argue that collectives, epistemic communities, policy communities22, or 
communities of practice that share values, frames and information, are an 
important source of knowledge in policy domains. Some authors argue that the 
ability of an organisation to adapt continuously and respond proactively to 
environmental change is determined by these communities, as sources of locally 
produced knowledge that create links between organizational strategy and changes 
emerging outside the organization (Brown & Duguid, 2001:203). However, not all 
                                                 
22 Definitions of epistemic communities and policy communities are very similar. Epistemic communities are described as networks of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain, who have some kind of authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge (Haas 1992 in Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). Policy communities are defined as having ‘shared experience, common specialist language, 
and frequency and mode of communication’, and shared ‘community’ views or perceptions on the problem’  (Radaelli, 1995) 
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communities or networks are equal because they have the potential to contribute to 
or exacerbate the often ‘siloed’ nature of public sectors like fire management.  
Subcultures facilitating sharing within communities of practice may also 
block intercommunication across them (Pak and Snell (2003) in Janowicz-
Panjaitana & Noorderhavenb, 2008:1340). Researchers using the advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) have also indicated that actors who rely solely on members of 
their own coalition are very unlikely to modify their beliefs significantly, while those 
who access sources from outside their own coalition are more open to belief 
change, particularly on policy core issues (Sabatier, et al., 2005b:193). “Communities 
practice can nurture adaptive action, but they can also prevent aspects of adaptive 
capacity from being socially permissible or even discussable” (Pelling, et al., 
2008:870). Haas (2004:573) suggests that some studies have convincingly argued 
against relying on individual institutions for research and policy advice because they 
may bias the information flow. This is because of our tendency to form 
connections with people who share similar frames and perspectives on issues. 
Actors with closer preferences are more likely to meet and therefore more likely to 
send and receive valuable information, even more so in segregated policy domains 
(Konig & Brauninger, 1998:445). Thus ideas about politics shape political alliances 
and strategic considerations of building and maintaining alliances in turn shape the 
ideas people espouse or seek to implement (Stone, 1989). Unfortunately, this can 
then see us going around in circles that confirm how we frame issues. We can end 
up in ideological and/or disciplinary ‘echo-chambers’. 
In social network theory, the tendency for us to form connections with 
people with whom we share frames and values is known as ‘homophily’. People’s 
networks are homogenous with regard to many socio-demographic, behavioural 
and intrapersonal characteristics (including status and values), and are remarkably 
robust over widely varying types of relations (McPherson, et al., 2001:418). 
Homophily limits social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the 
information we receive, the attitudes we form, and the interactions we experience 
(ibid) and the information to which we pay attention. As individual’s decisions 
depend strongly on their social context (Siegel, 2009), the implication of homophily 
for a policy sector is a risk of ‘problem closure23’ (Forsyth, 2003:79). It can pre-
                                                 
23 The pre-definition of the purpose of enquiry (Forsyth, 2003) 
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define how we frame a problem, rather than encourage us to reflect on and 
examine how we frame a problem. Problem frame closure could also be thought of 
as an ‘ideological echo-chamber’ (Zuckerman, 2008), where we only listen to 
information and people who confirm our existing ideologies. Studies warn of the 
dangers of isolating ourselves in these chambers because people who deliberate 
with like-minded others tend to emerge more partisan than before their 
deliberations (ibid).  
From the perspective of reflexive learning for adaptive governance, people 
do not have to share a policy frame24. As has already been argued, a diverse array of 
frames is preferable. There is a very clear need however, for a policy sector’s 
paradigm to allow for numerous ways of conceiving an issue. Without recognising 
and making allowances for socially constructed sources of knowledge, the problem 
solving effectiveness of networks will be hampered (Weber & Khademian, 
2008:338) and trust damaged quite significantly (Brown & Duguid, 2001). Without 
building and sustaining a capacity for dialogue across these normative and 
sometimes cultural boundaries, the presence of different perspectives may lead to 
unsolvable conflicts and an inability to come to shared agreements (Pahl-Wostl, et 
al., 2008:491). Not appreciating and respecting differing perspectives, may create a 
situation where each actor (group or agency) collects their own information based 
on different assumptions using different parameters; resulting in a myriad of 
reports and streams of information at best but often a ‘war of reports’ (van Buuren, 
et al., 2004:6), and a form of defensive reasoning25  (Argyris, 2004). In these viscous 
cycles people doubt that errors are likely to be genuinely corrected, so defensive 
consequences persist (van Buuren, et al., 2004). Persistence of these kinds of 
uncooperative behaviour and conflicts in interactions may create institutional 
barriers that are not easy to break down (Klijn, 2001:159). In policy sectors, such 
situations are known colloquially as ‘silo mentalities’. Under these kinds of 
‘dialogues of the deaf’, learning across coalitions or groups is very unlikely (Jenkins-
Smith & Sabatier, 1993:55). In the context of governance of a public sector, all of 
this reduces a capacity for reflexive learning. The challenge is that dialogue and 
                                                 
24 Nor are policy frames static. As Koenig (undated) has expressed, frames are re unconsciously adopted (and perhaps, changed) in the course 
of communicative processes. Thus, the question of what conversations are enabled, with whom, are important. 
25 Defensive reasoning occurs where the logic is self-referential (the ideological echo-chamber effect), discouraging the detection and 
correction of errors, escalating misunderstandings, and people experience ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’, and a generic ‘syndrome’ against learning is 
created (Argyris, 2004:2). ‘Problem closure’ (Forsyth, 2003) and insight inertia (Godkin, 2010) are similar concepts. 
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reflexive learning requires free and open inquiry unimpeded by defensive reasoning 
and behaviour (Argyris 1985 in Dengler, 2007).  
Clearly then, there is a crucial role for individuals and groups in conducting 
or sensing learning and knowledge across organizational boundaries (Janowicz-
Panjaitana & Noorderhavenb, 2008:1339). This draws attention to people or groups 
that make such connections. Discussions of the importance of these ‘boundary 
spanners’ abound in the organisational and network literature. Boundary spanners 
are particularly important if we consider Valente’s (2005:104) description of the 
process of innovation diffusion (a form of learning), as one that tends to spread in 
‘fits and starts’ because an innovation or idea reaches pockets of interconnectivity 
and spreads rapidly within these dense pockets, but slows between groups. 
Boundary spanners have a capacity to understand the social constructions of other 
actors, how they ‘define the issue in relation to their own values and interests, what 
‘outcomes’ and processes different actors value, knows who needs to be involved, 
knows who could mobilize influence, and so on (Adger, et al., 2009:110). Boundary 
spanners can affect the degree of innovation in administrative settings and the rate 
and pattern of the diffusion of those innovations (O'Toole, 1997b:67). Without 
these connectors, diffusion of new ideas, frames, information and knowledge is not 
likely to occur. Thus, boundary spanners might also be thought of as ‘collaborative 
capacity builders’ as they are important in establishing functional links within and 
between organizational levels and therefore facilitating the flow of information and 
knowledge from multiple sources (Olsson, et al., 2004:85; Weber & Khademian, 
2008).  
At the same time, such connections must be nurtured because while the 
role of ‘boundary spanners’ is critical, it is also fragile. You can tie several few-
person networks together into a network of networks where the connections are 
still between individuals, but these people (boundary spanners) become even more 
critical (Shirky, 2008). Too few connections and the network is prone to collapse; 
too many, and people get bogged down in maintenance of connections (Cross, et 
al., 2002). Therefore, boundary spanners not only require the institutional 
imprimatur to work across boundaries, they need the time and space. What follows 
is a discussion of the role of institutions in enabling the work of boundary spanners 
and indeed, networks in reflexive learning.  
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2.5.5.b Networks and informal institutions 
No matter how governance arrangements are formally structured, because of the 
interconnectedness of our environment and society, there will always be some 
misfit among institutional arrangements and thereby, the potential for ‘silos’ within 
government. Potential for disjointed approaches are persistent. Institutionalised 
practices of co-operation, even collaboration, and learning are needed to counteract 
this persistence. Such practices are dependent upon a sector’s institutional 
landscape. As a sector’s ‘unwritten rules’, informal institutions can define who is 
‘allowed’ to participate in decision making processes and who defines these 
processes. Therefore, a sector’s informal institutions can influence the function of a 
network to be inclusive or exclusive. The more exclusory the network the more it 
becomes a mechanism for reinforcing policy frames and institutions (ideological 
echo-chambers) that guide decision-making and resource sharing. 
What happens in policy networks is largely a process of resource exchange 
(including knowledge, differing perspectives, etc) that occurs within understood 
‘rules of the game’; the sector’s or organisations informal institutions (van Waarden 
(1992) and Rhodes (1985) in Compston, 2009:728; Pelling & High, 2005b). 
Institutions influence how a network is (able to be) structured and how it functions, 
e.g. ‘bottlenecks’ or barriers in knowledge sharing. Ostrom (2005) and Dengler 
(2007) describe governance as a social arena consisting of multiple, complementary 
and networked action situations or nodes, which may each focus on its own 
component of knowledge. Through an institutional lens, we can then view what 
happens in each action situation or knowledge space, as being guided by formal and 
informal institutions (Ostrom, 2005). A general set of institutions partially structure 
all situations within a sector, and specify the paths that may be chosen from one 
situation to another (ibid) – network ‘rules’. A more particular set of rules applies at 
each connection. Having some understanding of a sector’s informal institutions 
could help in understanding how the bureaucratic network/s may function to 
enable or restrict dialogue, knowledge sharing and ultimately, reflexive learning. 
Within our professional capacities, our choice of network contacts is primarily 
determined by similarity of preferences and utilitarian motives (frames), but these 
are qualified by institutional settings (Konig & Brauninger, 1998:445; Raab, 
2002:581; Smith Ring & van de Ven, 1994).  
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Formal hierarchies are perhaps the most obvious formal institution in 
public sectors, and Hammond (1986:381) cautions that we cannot ignore their 
influence on learning and networks in governance. “Hierarchy and authority are, in 
the traditional thinking and practice of complex organizations, the key building 
blocks of coordination” (Seidman 1998 in Kettl, 2006:12). It is obvious that 
decisions made above and below in the chain of command heavily influence public 
agencies, which interact closely with ministries as well as subordinate organisations 
and stakeholders (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:19). As Connor and Dovers (2002:9) 
suggest, the concern is that as a consequence, a standard administrative rationality is 
also built into the mindset, thought processes and language of administrators, 
influencing their views of what constitutes values as well as ‘facts’. An obvious 
expression of this is informal networks closely mirroring the prevailing hierarchy 
within organisations and sectors with a strong top-down culture. Such organisations 
or sectors may lack the flexibility to respond effectively to new opportunities 
(Cross, et al., 2002:72). If a sector’s networks only reflect the hierarchy, then any 
dialogue, coordination, co-operation and learning is primarily dependent on those 
at the top of hierarchies or those tasked with a formal networking role.  
Institutions that influence the creation and function of multi-level, cross-
sectoral and cross-frame policy networks will have an impact on reflexive learning. 
For example, collaborative arrangements are costly in time and resources, are 
inherently fragile, and are uniquely distinct, requiring commitment, trust, leadership, 
clarity of objectives and planning stages, development of understanding and mutual 
working relations (Wanna, 2008). Institutions surrounding collective action norms 
reflect incentives to cooperate in bearing the costs of negotiating and ‘enforcing’ 
cooperation, so they directly influence the level of cooperation and ultimately 
effectiveness (Leach & Sabatier, 2005:201). Ansell and Gash (2008) posit that other 
incentives include actors seeing a direct relationship between their participation and 
concrete, tangible, effectual policy outcome, or perceiving that achievement of their 
goals is dependent on cooperation from other stakeholders. Incentives decline 
when actors perceive their input to be merely advisory or largely ceremonial or if 
they feel they are unheard (ibid). Institutions need to support co-operation, even 
collaboration, which implies that co-operative action across a sector needs to be 
what Lebel et al. (2006b:380) might call an ‘institutionalised capacity’. Learning to 
craft rules that attract and encourage individuals who share norms of reciprocity 
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and trustworthiness, or who learn them over time, is a fundamental skill needed in 
all democratic societies (Ostrom, 2005:133). Equally however, information about 
the consequences of alternative decisions or behavioural options are generated and 
communicated through networks, so expectations depend on the structure or 
linkages within the system, as well as the ways in which biases and counter-biases 
accumulate (Simon 1957 in March & Olsen, 1989). Therefore, networks among 
bureaucrats in a policy sector can maintain and even change the behavioural 
structuring effects of institutions.  
In sum, networks among bureaucrats are important to questions of reflexive 
learning in policy sectors, because their networks are some of the structures by 
which frames and institutions are created, maintained and even changed. The 
rhetoric they use in framing policy debates and struggles influences their networks 
within institutions, as much as it reflects them (Lees, 2004; Stone, 2002a). These 
networks are one entry point by which new, alternate frames may enter the 
discourse of a policy sector, and by which institutions may be questioned.  
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2.6 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Drawing these different threads from a range of literature together, this chapter 
highlighted three interrelated and important issues when considering the role of 
middle and street-level bureaucrats in the capacity for reflexive learning in a policy 
sector: policy frames; informal institutions; and networks. Like Termeer (2009), this 
study assumes that institutionalised frames and institutions can create barriers to 
adaptive governance, and breaking through them requires their critical 
investigation. Understanding how institutions shape decisions is crucial if policy 
responses are to increase overall adaptive capacity and to amplify the scope and 
effectiveness of responses to impacts (Boin & Hart, 2000). 
Issues of learning and change in policy sectors are not new to the field of 
public administration, the lessons and challenges of which apply equally in the 
adaptation arena. In their exploration of ‘what the learning part of policy and 
institutional learning might be about’ in NRM, Connor and Dovers (2002:12) listed: 
the establishment of organisational structures and processes [networks]; new or 
different social constructions of problem sets [frames]; and mechanisms built into 
institutional arrangements that have promoted learning and innovation 
[institutions]. However, as was discussed at the outset, ‘how policy is really made” – 
the debates and struggles over frames within bureaucracies – is also an important 
context in which all this plays out. It is also a central influence on a sector’s capacity 
for reflexive learning in the face of climate change. As Schön and Rein argued in 
1994, while everyone seems to take for granted that policymakers reflect on policies 
and policy practices, the assumption is called into question when it comes to higher 
level reflection on ‘invisible essences’ of values and perspectives (frames) implicit in 
policy struggles. A capacity for this kind of reflexive learning within a policy sector 
was the focus of this study.  
Because of their role in public administration, this research sought to 
explore this issue from the perspective of the sector’s middle and street-level 
bureaucrats. Consequently, the central research question of the thesis was: what 
capacity for reflexive learning exists within the administration of the fire 
management sector of Victoria, Australia? A consequent second order aim was to 
identify an approach to analysing such a capacity from the perspective of middle 
and street-level bureaucrats. Examination of the literature surrounding these facets 
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of reflexive learning in policy sectors, led to the following research sub-questions 
used to address that overarching research question: 
• How do bureaucrats within the fire management sector frame the subjects 
of fire management and climate change? 
• What kinds of informal institutions exist within the selected sector, and 
what implications for they have for reflexive learning?  
• How might the structure and function of the bureaucratic network 
influence the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning? 
• How do these three factors intersect to influence the sector’s capacity for 
reflexive learning? In this context, what can the sector build upon and 
address to support reflexive learning (and ultimately, adaptive governance)?  
In addition to providing the thesis its conceptual basis and derivative 
research sub-questions, this literature review also guided the development of the 
analytic framework and data acquisition methods, both of which are described in 
Chapter 3. 
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Chapter Three 
3 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of the social sciences is to understand the world as it is made by 
human beings; the structures and institutions they produce, and the actions 
they take within those structures (Hancke):233 
The conceptual basis (Chapter 2) proposed that informal institutions, policy frames 
and networks of bureaucrats play an important role in the adaptive governance of a 
policy sector. To re-cap, the central research question of the thesis was: what 
capacity for reflexive learning exists within the administration of the fire 
management sector of Victoria, Australia? A consequent second order aim was to 
develop an analytical framework through which such a capacity might be examined. 
This chapter sets out that framework and the research strategy used to explore the 
main research question and its sub-questions.  
The chapter has four sections. The first describes the analytical framework 
and research methodology. It draws links between the study’s conceptual basis and 
the selection of analytical perspectives. The second section touches on application 
of the analytical framework to a case study (The case study itself is described in 
Chapter 4). The third and fourth sections outline the data acquisition methods and 
associated limitations and ethics respectively.  
  
3.1.1 Questions of ontology and epistemology 
Descriptions of research methodologies often begin with a discussion of the 
philosophical basis on which their research rests. However, for this study, such a 
construction would be misrepresentative. Typical of policy and governance 
orientated research this study began with its ‘problem’. The research question drove 
a wide-ranging literature review, which in turn gave rise to sub-questions. The data 
collection and analysis approaches were then selected with a view to illuminating 
the research issue (Bryman, 2008). In many ways, theory was latent within the 
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literature (ibid). Nonetheless, the ontology and epistemology of any research is 
present whether explicitly stated or not. The difference here is that the nature of the 
questions placed the study within a very broad philosophical paradigm. It did not 
start with one.  
As a study centred on the role of particular actors within the processes of 
governance and policy-making, this research conceived of these contextual 
processes as occurring through networks and as influencing and being influenced 
by policy frames and institutions. This perspective suggests a relational, 
constructivist ontology where knowledge is influenced and constructed through 
relationships. The focus on policy frames and institutions suggests an interpretivist 
or hermeneutic epistemology.  
3.2 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study of social phenomena generally requires an interdisciplinary and multi-
method approach. A governance and policy-orientated study certainly requires an 
interdisciplinary approach, because no single discipline or method holds the key to 
understanding the context (Lasswell 1951 in Wagner, et al., 1991:7). Numerous 
methods and theories might be used to explore the factors of interest to this study. 
While theoreticians emphasize the distinctive features of a particular approach, 
‘problem-orientated scholars’ mix approaches depending on which are most 
appropriate to exploring the object of study (Fischer, 2003:155; Lowndes, 2010:77-
8).  
Because frames, institutions and networks are interrelated within a 
governance context, these factors were considered analytically but not causally 
separable factors (Blyth, 2002; Gofas & Hay, 2009:41; Hay, 2006a). Consequently, 
this study drew upon three broad theoretical strings as a way of exploring the 
capacity for reflexive learning in a public policy sector: that of frame analysis, 
institutional analysis and network analysis. While each factor was analysed and 
considered separately, a triangulated approach to the final analysis achieved a 
greater depth of understanding. Consequently, the study spills across traditional 
disciplinary boundaries (Baerwald, 2010). The remainder of this chapter sets out the 
theories and methods that were combined to make up the overarching analytical 
framework. Table I depicts these components as they relate to the research 
questions. Figure 3 depicts the components as they relate to each other. 
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3.2.1.a  A triangulated approach to the research  
Table 1. The analytical framework 
Framework 
component 
Research Questions 
Frame analysis 
How do bureaucrats within the fire management sector 
frame the subjects of fire management and climate change? 
Institutional  
analysis 
What kinds of informal institutions exist within the 
selected sector, and what implications for they have for 
reflexive learning? 
Network analysis 
How diverse are the bureaucratic networks – vertically, 
horizontally, and across frames? 
Overall analytical 
framework 
(Addresses main 
question) 
Main question: what capacity for reflexive learning exists 
within the administration of the fire management sector of 
Victoria, Australia?  
What can the sector build upon to address any barriers and 
support its capacity for reflexive learning (and ultimately, 
adaptive governance)?  
 
Figure 1 A simple graphical depiction of the intersections between the different components 
of the analytical framework 
 
Network 
Analysis 
Frame 
Analysis 
Institutional 
Analysis 
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The following sections describe each framework component and how it 
contributed to the overall study. The data acquisition methods are discussed 
separately in Section 3.4. The case study approach used both interview and survey 
techniques to gather relevant data. Data from both methods contributed to all three 
components of the analysis but with differing weights of contribution. For example, 
the survey provided the bulk of the network data, supplemented by interview data. 
The reverse applied for the frame and institutional analyses. 
  
3.2.2 Frame Analysis 
Qualitative, interpretive analyses are useful when focusing on the role of language 
and narratives in definitions of policy ‘problems’ and their so-called ‘solutions’  
(Fischer, 2003). One interpretive approach that is regularly used in such studies is 
frame analysis. Frame analysis has been developed in sociology and policy analysis 
as a way of depicting and engaging the array of arguments and counter arguments 
that surround complex social issues (Creed, et al., 2002; Schön & Rein, 1994). While 
Druckman (2001) suggests it can be found throughout the social sciences and its 
subfields, Koenig (Undated) states that it is neither a full-fledged theoretical 
paradigm, nor a coherent methodological approach but rather a number of related, 
though sometimes partially incompatible, methods for the analysis of discourses. 
He suggests that what unifies these analyses is a (fairly loose) theoretical connection 
to Goffman’s (1974) original definition. Later studies often refer to Schön and 
Rein’s Frame Reflection (1994), which is attributed with the introduction of a frame 
analytic approach into policy and governance studies.  
Analysing policy frames was an appropriate component of this research 
because governance and the processes of ‘how policy is really made’ (Page, 2006a) 
involve struggles over policy frames. Examining where frames become cultural-
cognitive institutions of a policy subsystem can help to appreciate the institutional 
landscape of policy processes (Kisbey, 2007) and governance. As was argued in the 
conceptual basis, policy frames shape and are shaped by the institutional 
environment (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). A policy frame may solidify into a more 
institutionalised  practice or reasoning – a process Hajer (1995) calls discourse 
institutionalisation. Policy frames may also be changed through social interactions; 
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the very notion of social learning. Frame and institutional analyses are therefore 
different ways of shedding light on the functioning of institutions (Hajer, 1995:264).  
3.2.2.a Approach to the frame analysis 
Current approaches to frame analysis are only loosely connected to Goffman’s 
original formulation (Koenig, 2004). I strongly concur with Koenig’s criticism that 
most studies leave the reader in the dark about the actual process of empirical 
frame detection. The work of several authors informed the approach used here, 
albeit that not all of them focus on ‘frame’ analysis. The most instructive works 
came from: Koenig (2004, 2005, 2006), Benford and Snow (2000), Fischer (2003), 
Fischer and Forester (1993), Hajer (1995, 2006a), Hajer and Versteeg (2005), Hajer 
and Wagenaar (2003), Schön and Rein (1994) and several works by Dewulf (2007; 
Dewulf, et al., 2009) and others. Particularly instructive in developing the interview 
and survey questions was the work of Sabatier and his co-authors Jenkins-Smith 
and Weible (refer to the bibliography) in the application of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). The following discussion aims to address Koenig’s call that the 
actual process of frame analysis be made visible and systematic.  
Frame analysis is not a search for an objectively provable reality. Rather, it 
is an approach to seeking descriptions of the multiple conceptions that people have 
about particular issues. It is an attempt to identify taken-for-granted assumptions 
that underlie people’s apparently natural understandings and actions (Rein & Schon, 
1991:150). Frames are generally described as operating at two broad levels, although 
different authors define them slightly differently. The broadest level is often called a 
master-frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Koenig, 2005, 2006) or a meta-frame  
(Schön & Rein, 1994). The second level can be described as the diagnostic and 
prognostic frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), or as (Schön & Rein, 1994) suggest, 
framings of ‘what’s wrong and what needs fixing’. The parallels between Benford 
and Snow’s and Schön and Rein’s interpretations are obvious. Diagnostic framing 
represents problem orientation regarding the current situation, how it differs from 
an ideal state, and the underlying causes or drivers of the problem; the ‘what’s 
wrong’. Prognostic framing revolves around what needs to be done to achieve the 
ideal. It articulates proposed solutions and strategies for implementing those 
solutions - the ‘what needs fixing’ - and often takes its lead from the diagnostic 
frame (Snow, et al., 1986). Included within ‘solution’ sub-frames are notions of what 
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solutions are deemed necessary, valid or appropriate, and whose ‘solutions’ are 
considered valid or appropriate.  
In practice, most frame analyses use techniques borrowed from discourse 
analyses (Koenig, Undated). The job of the discourse or frame analyst is to translate 
a narrative into an argument or to tease out the argument implicitly embedded in a 
narrative (Fischer, 2003:181). We only know that we are dealing with a frame once 
we know which actions for which a policy actor argues (Wagenaar & Noam Cook, 
2003:141). Arguments underpinning policy frames can be uncovered through 
analysis of the stories participants are disposed to tell about policy situations 
(ibid:145, Hajer, 2003b). Discourse analysis provides a tool to describe how 
organisations and actors frame their interests and arguments in order to solve a 
‘problem’ or communicate and sell their interests (Wagenaar, 2006:14). 
Consequently, interview and survey questions were designed to elicit participants 
‘arguments’ surrounding the causes of and solutions to fire management as a policy 
issue. They also focused on similar elucidations regarding possible implications of 
climate change for the sector. Questions specifically related to: 
• The fundamental goal or policy context of the sector, including ‘the problems’ 
and seriousness of the issues 
• What the current situation is, what might be challenging or aiding achievement 
of the fundamental goal, and what they consider to be ‘causing’ the policy 
situation [diagnostic] 
• What should be done to address the issues they’ve identified [prognostic] 
• Whether climate change is considered an issue for the sector 
• How climate change is discussed in the sector (if at all) 
• How climate change is considered to potentially affect the sector [diagnostic] 
and how the sector should/might deal with it [prognostic] 
 
Details regarding the process used to collect relevant data are discussed in Section 
3.4 below.  
  
76 
3.2.2.b Analysing the frames 
“The focus of the argumentative approach is the study of how language 
comes to shape the way we make sense of the world....... exploring the way 
in which ‘policy discourse’ comes to frame the arguments that form the 
frameworks within which problems and agendas are constructed..... If we 
want to understand how a ‘problem’ has been defined, we must endeavour 
to analyse the way in which its ‘discourse’ has been formed” (Parsons, 
1995:151). 
As mentioned above, an interpretative approach was used to identify the policy 
frames. This involved the time-honoured tradition of reading, re-reading and re-
reading interview and survey data to identify recurring patterns within the data 
(Hajer, 2006a; Richards, 2005; van den Brink & Metze, 2006). The reading went on 
before, during and after entering data into the qualitative analysis software package 
nVivo8 (Marshall, 2002), as well as during the writing process. Patterns were 
identified through a process of making connections between the different codes 
and juxtaposing different participants’ arguments (Patton, 2002:466). Richards 
(2005) calls this data-theory bootstrapping. As patterns began to be found, rather 
than taking complete creative license to ‘invent’ another raft of master-frames, pre-
existing and tested master-frames were used as a guiding scaffold (Koenig, 2006). In 
this way, the frames and their differences were inductively derived from coding and 
comparing respondent statements related to the various issues of interest (Dewulf, 
et al., 2007).  
Multitudes of texts describe the somewhat ‘artistic’ nature of coding and 
interpretive analysis more generally. The coding approach used here was guided by 
Richards (2005), Patton (2002) and Marshall (2002). Marshall (2002) particularly 
counsels that initial coding of documents should be done according to base data, 
with subsequent work following those. The basic frame constructs were used to 
develop a codebook ‘skeleton’ in nVivo8 before the analysis began. ‘Base frame 
data’ in this part of the study related to the broad themes of policy context or 
problem, and conceptions of causes [diagnostic] and solutions [prognostic] in 
relation to fire management. For analysis of the framing of climate change, the base 
codes were simply whether or not climate change is conceived as an issue, what 
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they thought it may mean for the sector, and what actions they think need to be 
taken. The codebook skeleton allowed a combination of open and closed coding. 
Combining open and closed coding was useful because while the basic 
frame construction was known, – master-frame underpinned by diagnostic and 
prognostic sub-frames - the descriptive data that would go to make-up these frames 
was unknown. Working with closed-coding at the outset reduced the potential for 
an ill-defined exploration, and combining it with open-coding left space for change 
and discovery (Weston, et al., 2001:385). The first step in the more detailed coding 
looked for the argumentative schemes, the common normative claims and 
descriptions (Koenig, 2006) participants used to organise their views and construct 
meanings of fire management and of climate change within a policy context 
(Dewulf, et al., 2007). This meant looking ‘within’ each argument for concepts and 
metaphors that participants drew upon to describe the causes of the policy 
problems, and how they linked these to conceptions of means to addressing the 
problems. Identification of the positions being criticised, those positions against 
which justification is made was also useful (Hajer, 1993:164; Hoggart, et al., 2002). 
Attention was also given to whether proposed ‘solutions’ and barriers to those 
solutions related to networks or concepts of reflexive learning.  
As Marshall (2002) describes, sub-codes started out as hand-written notes in 
document margins. These were initially entered as free nodes in the nVivo8 
program. Each of these was then re-coded within the closed-coding scheme or left 
as a free node that was not used in the final analysis. Working with these free nodes 
developed the more detailed coding scheme. The process also enabled master-
frames to be ‘built up from the data’. Table 2 below, illustrates the coding skeleton 
into which more detailed sub-codes were eventually entered. 
A document analysis was not conducted. A frame or discourse analysis of 
policy documents in unlikely to provide insight into the underlying policy frames 
within the coordinative discourse in the practice of public administration and 
governance in a policy sector. Words in policy documents may be used without 
consideration of the term’s implications, including the practicalities of 
implementing concepts. They are often developed to please superiors, rather than a 
reflection of the bureaucrats’ own frames. The best examples in the climate change 
adaptation arena, are the use of the words ‘resilience and vulnerability’. A more 
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insightful research endeavour would be an exploration of the process of how and 
why policy documents use particular terms and phrases. However, such an analysis 
was outside the scope of this research. 
 
Table 2 Frame Analysis Codebook 
CODE (in codebook) Description 
POLICY CONTEXT 
[Fire management] 
This included the question of the fundamental goal of fire 
management, as well as value orientation and priorities, 
seriousness of problem, etc. A potential indicator of master-
frame. May include who or what agency or group was 
deemed responsible for achieving that fundamental goal 
Cause [Diagnostic] 
Principal causes of the policy problem, or barriers to 
achievement of the fundamental goal 
Solution [Prognostic] 
What needs to be done, changed, etc to address the policy 
problem & achieve the fundamental goal, including who or 
what agency or group was deemed responsible for 
implementing or achieving the solution/s, or preventing 
their achievement 
CLIMATE CHANGE  Do they consider CC an issue for the sector? Why or why 
not 
Implications for fire 
mgt [Diagnostic] 
What effects, if any, might CC have on the sector? How is it 
or might be causing the problem, the issue described? 
Solution [Prognostic] 
What needs to be done, changed, etc to address the 
challenge of climate change & achieve the fundamental goal, 
including who or what agency or group was deemed 
responsible for implementing or achieving the solution/s, or 
preventing their achievement 
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3.2.3 Institutional analysis 
Much of the background regarding institutions and their influence on a capacity for 
reflexive learning in governance was explored in Chapter 2. Institutional analysis 
was specifically used for this research to understand the existing rules-in-use (as 
bureaucrats conceive them) in terms of structuring their decision options. This 
analysis specifically looked for evidence of institutionalised policy frames and the 
‘rules’ and norms that these actors felt guided their actions and decision-making, 
including those concerned with the questioning and discussion of the sector’s 
institutions and policy frames.  
3.2.3.a Approach to the institutional analysis 
In short, to identify the sector’s informal institutional landscape, an attempt was 
made to make visible both dominant and challenging normative constructs 
(Considine, 2005:77) conveyed by participating bureaucrats. Ostrom (2005) 
suggests that institutional analyses attempt first to understand the prescriptions 
concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted, for 
individuals when making decisions. These ‘rules-in-use’ are those to which 
participants would make reference if asked to explain and justify their actions to 
fellow participants (ibid: 19). She also suggests that if individuals share only 
statements about the particular actions or outcomes of the action to which ‘must’ 
or ‘must not’ rules apply, their discussion of why they would follow such advice 
focuses only on prudence or wise judgement (ibid: 172). That is, if there are no 
consequences for not following a rule or for ignoring a norm, then the statement is 
not a rule, it is a norm. Yet not following norms does have consequences – social 
consequences associated with participatory inclusion or exclusion. Therefore, 
judgements as to whether an action is ‘wise’ may still be institutionally biased.  
Similarly, as was discussed in Chapter 2 cultural-cognitive institutions are 
institutionalised frames that strongly influence system understanding, how 
boundaries are delineated, and how the ‘search space’ for problems and solutions 
are determined (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Scott, 2001). There may be socially derived 
consequences for not adhering to the frame, or actors may simply conceive there to 
be no alternative (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:11). Institutions give rules and 
consequences to a policy frame. However, bringing informal institutions to light is 
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inherently difficult, since they are often not so much stated as acted out in routine 
practices (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Ostrom, 2005). To address this, an interview 
space was provided where participants could comfortably express their experiences 
and perspectives on their work and related processes. Moreover, identification of 
patterns in the interview and survey narratives became clearer with practiced use of 
the IADF syntax grammar tool. 
3.2.3.b Analysing the institutions 
Analysis of the sector’s normative institutions therefore, looked for ‘rules’ and the 
norms that guide or inform actions. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis Development 
Framework (IADF) (1999) provides a syntax tool to identify institutions in analyses 
of discourse and interview data (Figure 4 below). Both interview and survey data 
were coded using this tool. Sometimes institutional statements appeared in almost a 
complete sentence. More often however, it appeared spread over paragraphs. 
Adopting a discourse analytical approach sought to identify patterns in the 
narratives participants were inclined to convey. Once these patterns had been 
revealed, they were then considered in relation to the implications for questions of 
reflexive learning. They were also compared with the frame analysis results and it 
was here that evidence of policy frame institutionalisation emerged. 
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Figure 2 The adapted IADF grammar tool (from Ostrom 2005) 
A ATTRIBUTES: any participant-level variable that distinguishes to whom the 
institutional statement applies 
D DEONTIC: Three Modal Verbs – May (permitted), must (obliged) and must not 
(forbidden), and variations upon the concepts of permitted, obliged or forbidden such 
as ‘have to’, can, cannot, disallowed, allowed, etc. 
I AIM: the particular actions or outcomes of the action situation to which the Deontic 
is applied. It may include an amount of action or outcome or a description of a process 
for an action. 
C CONDITIONS: when and where an action or outcome is permitted, obliged or 
forbidden. This may include statements such as “if this, then this” 
O OR ELSE: the consequence for not following a rule. Consequences were 
considered to include reputational implications. Descriptions of there being no 
alternative option were also placed into the ‘or else’ category. 
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3.2.4 Network analysis 
A new-institutional perspective on learning for adaptation emphasises cultural-
cognitive and normative aspects of organisations and policy sectors. It draws 
attention to the relationships among a sector’s actors. From this perspective, public 
administration can be conceived as a conversation among actors (with different, 
frames, objectives, responsibilities, capacities, etc) linked across a policy sector at 
multiple levels (Stewart-Weeks, 2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, knowledge and 
information are relational. People often learn through their interactions, not simply 
through receipt of information.   
Network analysts maintain that understanding a network’s structure can 
provide insights into how a network functions, including facilitation or hindering of 
knowledge sharing. However, no single network paradigm exists, but rather, 
overlapping discussions in political science, organization theory, public 
administration, and economic sociology (Ansell, 2006). Originally introduced for 
the study of social networks by Coleman in 1958 (Wejnert & Heckathorn, 
2008:106), network analysis has its roots in anthropology, economics, geography, 
sociology and marketing among other disciplines, and in some ways, is adapted 
from epidemiology (Valente, 2005:98). Social network analysis (SNA) focuses on 
the structure of relationships, the implications for behaviour and performance, and 
ways to measure collaborative capacity (Weber & Khademian, 2008:334). It is 
viewed as a means of linking micro-level interactions to macro-level social patterns  
(Granovetter, 1973).  
Network analysis can identify the informal positions held by various actors 
within a network, as well as connections between various networks or ‘sub-groups’ 
within a sector. It helps to identify which actors are connectors (boundary 
spanners), which actors are isolated, where there are clusters and which actors are 
in those clusters. It can also assess whether there is a core within the network and if 
so, which actors are in that core and which are on the periphery (Carrington, et al., 
2005; Everett & Borgatti, 2005; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Hanneman & Riddle, 
2011a; Scott, 2000, 2002; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Mapping who talks to whom, 
where information is obtained and traded, and who seeks advice from whom, 
opens up the possibility of explaining the impact both of traditional forms of 
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hierarchical interaction, and the more lateral and informal links which could 
underpin innovation (Considine & Lewis, 2007:584) and reflexive learning. 
3.2.4.a Approach to the network analysis 
Before describing the network features analysed in this study, it is imperative to 
stress that any substantive analysis of a social network must consider that different 
contents may characterise relations among actors (Knoke, 1990:41). Each type of 
network may exhibit a distinct pattern of interaction giving rise to content-specific 
structural relations (ibid). In other words, the networks identified will depend on the 
issue or question at hand. The question of interest here relates to advice and 
knowledge sharing, as well as questioning, dialogue and shared frames. This 
research drew on the ACF idea of advice and information networks because of the 
relationship between sharing knowledge, information and advice seeking, with 
reflexive learning. Moreover, the specific networks of interest were those 
bureaucrats use in conducting their work.  
This network was analysed using UCINET  software package (Borgatti, et 
al., 2002 v6.202), guided by Hanneman and Riddle (2005). The software contains 
several analytical, statistical and multivariate programs. It is down to the researcher 
to select the most pertinent analyses. Selection of this software was based on 
reviews by Carrington, Scott and Wasserman (2005). UCINET’s complementary 
visualisation program NetDraw was used to create the network diagrams 
(sociograms). Data were recorded as undirected, symmetric networks. That is, 
presence or absence of a connection was recorded but not whether that connection 
was reciprocal (although indications were given as to this). This was primarily a 
practicality and feasibility factor. Each of the basic network features examined are 
discussed below. 
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3.2.4.b Basic graph features 
Network analysis uses graph theory. The basis of graph theory is the connection 
between nodes. In this study, the nodes are individual bureaucrats. Because of data 
collection limitations (large network, only 2 rounds of snowballing conducted), 
connections were treated as symmetric - either present or not. Movement from one 
node to another is considered a walk, which is measured by counting the number of 
nodes from point A to point B (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). A path is a walk in 
which all nodes and all lines are distinct- they are not repeated (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994:107). The geodesic distance is the shortest path between two nodes. 
One of the simplest measurements of a social network is its density or 
connectivity. How a network is connected has consequences for the movement of 
knowledge, information and innovations. More connections often mean that 
individuals are exposed to more diverse information, and these highly connected 
individuals may be more influential and influenced by others (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005). Some argue therefore that connectivity or density is a useful initial analysis 
because it can provide insights into such phenomena as the ease with which 
information can be diffused among a network and the extent of social capital 
and/or social constraint (ibid). However, Burt (2000:346) argues that social capital is 
more a function of brokerage across structural holes than closure within a network, 
although there are contingency factors. Equally, a network may actually consist of 
several networks. If there is no path between these sub-networks, if the graph is 
disconnected, then some pairs of people cannot send or receive messages from 
each other using the existing ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994:109). If a node or set 
of nodes keeps a graph connected, they are referred to as a cut-point or cut-sets 
respectively (ibid: 113). Analysing boundary spanners is discussed below. 
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b.1 Centrality  
Nearly all empirical network studies try to identify the most important actors within 
the network (Everett & Borgatti, 2005:57). Prominence is defined as the extent to 
which a bureaucrat has the types of exchange relations that make them ‘visible’ 
within a network through direct and indirect ties to other bureaucrats (Knoke, 
1990:238; Wasserman & Faust, 1994:173). Centrality prominence emphasises the 
volume of ties, where ‘centrality’ increases the more links an actor has with others 
in a network, regardless of how prominent those others are (Knoke, 1990:239). An 
actor with high centrality is ‘where the action is’ and is likely recognised as a crucial 
cog in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994:179).  
b.2 Degree centrality 
Degree centrality is a measure of the number of direct connections of a node 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors with low degrees are peripheral in the network 
(ibid). A high degree centrality suggests an actor is a connector or hub in the 
network. An important aspect of network analysis is how these ‘hubs’ may connect 
to other parts of the network. If a node is only connected to others in its immediate 
cluster, it is merely connecting nodes that are already connected to each other. 
While this may provide a cluster some ‘redundancy’, unless other nodes within their 
cluster are connected to other clusters (particularly of different policy beliefs), a 
situation of self-referential logic may ensue (or be maintained).  
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b.3 Group centrality or core-periphery structure  
Connections to the peripheries of a sector or network are likely to increase the 
diversity of ideas and information. Thus, this analysis examined the core-periphery 
structure of the bureaucratic network. Analysis of group centrality can identify sets 
of actors as emergent sub-groups - in inclusive or more restrictive terms - such as 
cliques, social cleavages or factions (Ansell, 2006:78; Everett & Borgatti, 2005:58) 
or even communities of practice. Extending the concept of centrality to a group 
suggests that it is possible to evaluate the relative influence of different roles, 
organisations and ‘policy frame coalitions’ within a policy sector, upon knowledge 
flow and possibly learning. Everett and Borgatti (2005:57) state that examining the 
core-periphery structure of a network (or group degree centrality) can be achieved 
by measuring the number of actors outside one group that are connected to 
members of any group of interest. This is more complicated than simply choosing 
the individuals with greatest individual centrality because much of group centrality 
could be due to several individuals within the group having ties with the same third 
parties or with each other (ibid). Such ideas again highlight the important role of 
boundary spanners.  
b.4 Between-ness centrality (looking for the boundary spanners) 
One of the important arguments presented in the preceding chapters was around 
the importance of diverse perspectives or frames in a capacity for adaptation. In 
addition, that it is not necessary for everyone to be connected to everyone else in 
order for information to diffuse through a network. ‘Boundary-spanners’ or 
connectors (whether individuals groups or organisations) are likely to have a strong 
influence in a sector’s capacity for institutional learning. As ACF research indicates, 
actors who rely solely on members of their own coalition are very unlikely to 
modify their beliefs significantly, while those who access sources from outside their 
own coalition are more open to belief change, particularly on policy core issues 
(Sabatier, et al., 2005a:193). 
Network analyses help to explore how individuals are linked to collectives 
and then indirectly to each other through shared memberships (Valente, 2005). 
Even individuals or groups with relatively few contacts, can still play important 
roles in the conveying of new knowledge or perspectives in policy discussions. As 
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was already mentioned, Granovetter (1973) has proposed that “weak ties" that 
bridge across clusters, across structural holes, can be powerful conduits of 
information (Ansell, 2006). Interactions between nonadjacent actors might depend 
on other actors, especially those who lie on paths between other actors (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994:18). Individuals in these critical boundary-spanning roles help to 
connect groups within a sector (Berry, et al., 2004:541). 
Betweenness measures were used to identify bureaucrats and groups who 
may play a role in knowledge brokering, and those who may play an influential role 
in the maintenance of particular institutions. The cut-point equation was also used 
to identify nodes (bureaucrats) that, if removed, disconnect a component of the 
network (sub-group) from the whole network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). If 
actors are placed between several ‘important’ clusters, action situations, or network 
components, they may play an important knowledge and institutional ‘brokering’ 
role. They have the potential to heavily influence communication within a network 
and to even coordinate group processes (Freeman 1979 in Knoke, 1990:10). 
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3.3 APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO A 
CASE STUDY POLICY SECTOR 
Focussing on governance - how, why and with what implications we manage 
collective affairs - and policy - the means through which this is effected - provides 
one lens through which to examine the values, interests and meanings in society 
(Bulkeley, 2010). A major motivation for this research was to explore climate 
change adaptation in a policy sector from the perspectives of those whose roles are 
to develop, implement and evaluate policies – policy practitioners or bureaucrats. 
The focus was to consider what and how bureaucratic frames, informal institutions 
and social networks may affect the capacity for reflexive learning of a policy sector. 
The obvious argument is that this socio-cultural context, within which reflexive 
learning has to occur is crucial. As argued at the outset of this thesis, consideration 
of the role of bureaucrats in these processes has been missing from much of the 
adaptation literature. A sector’s bureaucratic frames, networks and institutional 
settings are intertwined. To explore them in depth required focus on a single 
situation.  
According to Yin (2003a, 2003b) a case study should be considered when: 
the focus of the study is “how” and “why”; the behaviour of those involved in the 
study cannot be manipulated; contextual conditions are relevant to the 
phenomenon under study; or boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon 
and context. All of these factors were relevant to this research. The phenomena of 
interest included bureaucratic frames, networks and institutions as influences upon 
processes of governance and policy. Moreover, case study research enables use of 
in-depth and triangulated data for a contextual analysis of such bounded systems 
(Creswell, 1994) as was demanded by the research questions. Case studies also allow 
emphasis on the social meaning held by the actors under investigation (Fischer, 
2003:139), also a pertinent approach for this research. Use of a single case study 
also provided the research boundaries of practicality and feasibility. Even at the 
state level, the policy sector of fire management is vast, potentially involving 
hundreds of bureaucrats. Although scope to generalise from the unique 
circumstances of one case study is limited, the relevance of the analytical theories 
used - analytical generalisability – can be tested (Yin, 2003b). 
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In addition, analyses that focus on the role of frames and social networks in 
governance and policy processes are associated with the argumentative or 
interpretative ‘turn’ in the social sciences (Fischer & Forester, 1993). Interpretive 
approaches shift the focus away from instrumental behaviour (values as costs, 
benefits, and choice points) to the expression of social meanings as ‘different ways 
of seeing, understanding, and doing’ (Fischer, 2003:141). The interpretative 
dimensions of meaning have resulted in an embrace of various qualitative methods 
(Checkel, 2001; Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1995; Hoggart, et al., 2002; Rhodes, 2007; 
Schön & Rein, 1994). By combining the different propositions that come from 
multiple methods, greater insight into the complexities of the topic may be 
provided (Armitage, 2008:26; Lowndes, 2010). A mixed method approach provides 
several advantages, including: 
• allowing the research question to drive the research (Wolf, 2010) 
• recognising research as a learning process (Hoggart, et al., 2002:67)  
• allowing for the strengths of one method to address limitations of another (ibid) 
• highlighting different aspects of the research question through the provision of 
different perspectives on the same phenomena (ibid), and  
• provision of greater cross-validation of interpretations (ibid)  
Such broader understandings and insights are also likely to have practical 
utility (Baerwald, 2010), which was a key motivator for this research. The focus on 
a single case study was also driven by a desire to develop some insights that may be 
practically useful for those working within the specific policy sector. Following 
principles of qualitative design the analytical framework was applied to the case 
study of the policy sector of fire management in Victoria, Australia. Case details are 
provided in Chapter 4 – Setting the Scene. 
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3.4 DATA ACQUISITION 
This section describes the methods by which relevant data for the analytical 
framework were acquired. Two traditional social science techniques were used: 
semi-structured interviews and an online survey. While the two methods are 
presented separately, both enabled collection of data relevant to all three 
components of the analytical framework. For both methods, the Section describes 
why it was chosen, how sampling was undertaken, how the method was designed to 
gather useful data, and any identified limitations. 
3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Frame and institutional analyses require some form of discourse to be analysed. 
The realm of meaning is to be captured only through the qualitative nuances of its 
expression in ordinary language (Fischer, 2003:145). Dewulf (2009:176) states that 
“the cognitive approach to frames focuses on surface evidence that reveals 
underlying structures of the participants’ cognitions such that their comments serve 
as indirect information about the cognitive frames they hold” [my emphasis]. An 
institutional researcher’s empirical task is to discover the linguistic statements that 
form the institutional basis for shared expectations and potentially for the observed 
regularity in behaviour (Ostrom, 2005). Thus, the role of the analyst is to enable 
people to articulate their stories (Fischer, 2003:173).  
Enabling people to articulate their stories frequently requires the use of 
qualitative methods including in-depth interviews. It sometimes takes trial and error 
to extract a useful summary of institutional statements in an empirical action 
situation that bring analytical focus to the appropriate questions at the appropriate 
level of precision (Ostrom, 2005:173). Two trials of the interview guide – each trial 
involved four ‘test’ interviews – attempted to address this issue.  
As mentioned earlier, many published studies that use frame analyses are 
quite vague about their actual process. Several existing studies, particularly work by 
Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith and Weible using the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999:22), were informative in the development of 
the interview and survey questions used in this study.  
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3.4.1.a Sampling 
Rather than a random sample, an attempt was made to obtain viewpoints from as 
many bureaucrats with various different roles related to fire management issues as 
was possible. In this sense, a purposive sample was initially taken of a cross-section 
of interviewees from different regions across the state, as well as agencies and levels 
of responsibility. The intention was to gather first-hand accounts and perspectives 
of bureaucrats tasked with working through and with the many challenges 
presented in such a public sector.  
The initial sample for interviews was created from publicly available 
information regarding senior bureaucrats within the sector, advice from the 
Bushfire CRC, as well as from individuals with whom I have had or still have a 
professional relationship. Sampling was complemented with a ‘snowball’ approach 
that largely followed Christopoulos’ (2009) peer-esteem technique, starting with 
suggestions from preliminary background interviews (Weible & Sabatier, 2005:186), 
and then from subsequent interviews and from the surveys. Formal approaches 
were also made to the respective administrative head offices for contact 
information and approval to contact, personnel involved in policy processes. For 
local government personnel, contact details were provided either through the 
snowball technique or by direct contact with local governments.  
Balance was sought by deliberately asking interviewees about people, 
groups or organisations they found they disagreed with, as well as use of secondary 
sources of contact information. I tried to avoid inadvertently sampling within only 
one of several bureaucratic networks. Quite obviously, I was unable to interview 
(nor survey) every bureaucrat with a relevant role. In addition, I deliberately 
avoided fire seasons, simply to avoid further impost when these people were 
particularly busy26. Nonetheless, toward the final round of interviews, similar 
themes were occurring in the responses, so I feel confident that the rich data 
gathered during the interviews provided a reasonable summation of a range of 
different viewpoints within the network this research revealed (see limitations).  
                                                 
26 When there is a major bushfire many bureaucrats cease their regular work to undertake various response roles from logistics, information, 
planning, communications and other roles in incident control centres, as well as responding as volunteer or project fire fighters. Also, see 
Section 3.5.2 re: the impact of the Black Saturday fires. 
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Initial contact with potential interviewees was made by email or phone call, 
with an explanation of the purpose of the research and request for an interview. A 
total of 53 semi-structured interviews were conducted with bureaucrats in the state 
of Victoria. Selection was not systematic enough to warrant statistical analysis. 
Therefore, the data presented cannot represent a mean of viewpoints of the 
bureaucrats involved.  
3.4.1.b Style and structure 
A semi-structured interview protocol was developed following the procedural 
guidelines suggested by Yin (2003b) (Appendix I). All interviews were face-to-face, 
and held at the interviewee’s place of work. Interviews included open-ended 
questions that targeted interviewees’ attitudes towards fire management issues; their 
beliefs regarding what they saw as the problems; and whether there were dominant 
views on particular policy issues. Questions were geared towards eliciting an 
understanding of attitudes toward fire management generally, collective action, 
questioning and learning, and climate change adaptation. The semi-structured, 
open-ended questioning aimed to enable participants to convey their concerns, 
perceptions and experiences of the issues; particularly of networks, learning and 
reflection within the sector. To encourage candid responses, interviewees were 
assured of anonymity enabled through rigorous coding. Interviewees were provided 
a ‘Prescribed Consent Form’, which outlined their rights as a participant (Appendix 
I).  
Interviews were conducted over a series of three four month blocks. Fire 
‘seasons’ (November through to end of February) were deliberately avoided. 
Interview lengths ranged from 40 minutes to two hours, with an average of 
approximately one hour. All were digitally recorded and then transcribed. Although 
transcription was done by a transcription service, I re-read each transcription while 
listening to the interviews and repeatedly re-reading my notes. This aided in 
clarifying words or terms used by respondents that were not obvious to the 
transcribers. E.g. DSE was often transcribed as DFC, or phrases such as ‘native 
veg’, which meant native vegetation, were transcribed as native beech and the like. 
Coding and analysis was assisted by the use of the nVivo 8 program.  
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3.4.2 Survey 
An online survey was used to gather predominantly network and some frame data. 
The survey was hosted on SurveyMonkey: http://www.surveymonkey.com/, using 
a ‘professional subscription’. Given the challenges of identifying informal 
institutions, the survey was primarily targeted at gathering network data, with some 
basic frame data. Network studies particularly draw extensively on survey and 
questionnaire data. Surveys allow investigators to decide on relationships to 
measure and on actors to be approached for data (Marsden, 2005). Surveys can be 
used to capture actors’ expectations and beliefs about the “actual” rules of the 
game; about the constraints that individuals face (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003:26). 
Hence, the survey was used to gather data regarding bureaucratic networks and 
institutional factors in the fire management sector.  
As was discussed earlier, network structure is likely to vary depending on 
the context or the factors that connect people. Consequently, the survey specifically 
asked about ‘ally’ and information networks. The on-line survey of the sector’s 
bureaucrats (Appendix I) was designed to identify: 
• Their sector, role and level of seniority;  
• The fundamental goal of fire management; 
• Who they usually go to for information and advice on difficult fire management 
issues; whom they trust to represent their views, and who they consider to be 
an ally 
• Where the disagreements are; who they do/would collaborate with (degree and 
diversity, type) 
• What they think enables & constrains their participation; how the sectors 
intersect (perceived ability to participate etc) 
Following standard survey protocols, the survey was pre-tested before its 
release with a sub-sample of twelve respondents, 4 of which had nothing 
whatsoever to do with fire management issues. Pre-testing was considered 
particularly important as name generators always refer to a specific type of social 
tie, and researchers must take care not to assume that respondents share their 
understanding of a criterion (Marsden, 2005). Simple, familiar web forms were used 
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to help users understand the meaning of the question as quickly as possible, and to 
ensure questions were not suggestible (Vehovar, et al., 2008:221). 
3.4.2.a Sampling 
Target actors for the online survey were a similar audience as for the interviews. An 
initial broad-scale advertisement of the survey was made using industry and 
organisational newsletters, along with supportive emails from organisational 
executives. The survey sampling method used a standard snowball technique. This 
involved starting with a modest number of initial respondents who provided 
information on their network connections; these connections were then the pool 
from which the second wave of approaches to respondents was drawn and so on.  
In such respondent driven sampling (RDS), respondents are asked to recruit 
peers directly, allowing referral chains to efficiently and safely penetrate social 
regions accessible only to insiders (Wejnert & Heckathorn, 2008:106). Web-based 
RDS requires individuals in the target population to have e-mail, so individuals who 
are not electronically connected cannot be recruited or recruit others in their 
networks. In populations where e-mail usage is highly variable, the sampling period 
must remain open long enough for light e-mail users to check their in-boxes and 
reply (ibid). This was not considered a major restriction in this study as state and 
local government employees have ready access to computers and an email system. 
RDS also assumes that each respondent is a unique individual; therefore, steps must 
be taken to avoid duplicate participation in the sample (ibid). Although it was 
considered that there was no real motivation for respondents to provide multiple 
responses in this study, the online survey tool enabled a restriction that prevented 
more than one response from the same computer.  
The nature of bureaucratic titles is a random and mysterious thing. 
Consequently, a handful of categories were created that directly related to the 
number of people or teams they managed (or did not), and the type of work they 
performed. Survey participants were asked to select the one they thought best 
represented their level of seniority. 
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3.4.2.b  Design  
Survey questions were developed based on an extensive literature review in the 
fields of organisational, policy, institutional and social learning, as well as public 
policy administration. The questions were also influenced by the initial exploratory 
interviews with policy bureaucrats from a range of seniorities, as well as pre-testing 
with research colleagues. Phrasing and wording of the survey questions followed 
Ruane’s (2005) guidance. Questions were designed to be clear in meaning and free 
of ambiguity, so common, neutral language was used, and jargon avoided. This was 
assessed through pre-testing of the survey. 
Following Vehovar et al. (2008), standard background information was 
collected such as: role based on seniority categories, organisation, location, and 
work experience regarding fire related issues by type of organisation. Participants 
were asked to select their position’s level of seniority – Executive, Senior 
Management (manages several teams), Team Leader (manages several people or 
officers), officers or volunteer. Open-ended questions were used alongside closed-
ended questions. Closed ended questions were used where ready comparisons 
could be made between respondents. For close-ended questions, five response 
options were generally presented. This follows Lozano et al. (2008:78), who argued 
that fewer than four alternative response categories decreases reliability and validity, 
and more than seven alternatives scarcely further increases psychometric properties 
of the scale. Additionally, for all such questions an ‘other’ or similar option was 
included, where respondents could provide a response different to those presented.  
Open-ended questions were used where more detail regarding opinions and 
personal perspectives were sought. While open-ended questions may make coding 
more difficult (ibid: 132), it was felt that such questions would provide a richer 
understanding of respondent perspectives. The survey was divided into three main 
components: background information, policy frames, and network questions 
(Appendix II). Specifically, survey questions related to respondent views on fire 
management’s fundamental goal; responsibilities for achieving that goal; challenges 
faced in trying to achieve that goal; influential organisations; the value their 
expertise brings to any debate; dominant views and assumptions in current debates 
surrounding fire management; as well as missing views or perspectives.  
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b.1 Collection of network data 
Network data were generated through the use of a multiple name generator 
approach. While, Marsden (2005:10-12) warns that surveys can introduce 
artificiality and findings rest heavily on the presumed validity of self-reports, on 
review of several studies he concludes that informants are "fairly reliable" judges of 
affiliations and can make largely accurate reports about enduring patterns of 
interaction (ibid: 21-2). Importantly, he found that informants were more 
competent in reporting on the networks of people they were close to (in a network 
sense) than those who may be more distantly connected to them. Those proximate 
to the respondent tend to be named first, as are persons of high social status and 
those frequently present in a setting (ibid). Consequently, he argues, broadly defined 
networks almost certainly require multiple name generators. Non-specific probes 
for additional alters are also useful. For web-based approaches, Vehovar et al. 
(2008:221), add that providing a function to small sets of name generators where 
people can add more names than the list suggests can address this. Survey 
respondents were provided space for five names, with the option to add more as 
they saw fit – and many did.  
The first question focussed on informal networks related to information or 
advice regarding fire-related questions or issues. Allowing respondents to reveal 
their sources of information and advice is a typical network analysis question  
(Knoke, et al., 1996; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Based on Weible and Sabatier (2005) 
the second network question asked respondents to list their perceived allies when 
they have deal to with fire-related issues. Respondents were also asked if they could 
create a team to develop and implement fire-related policies for Victoria, who they 
would want on that team, and why. This measure was based on Stone (2002b). In 
contrast to this previous question, respondents were also asked about the units, 
departments, agencies, organisations or groups they find they most frequently 
disagree with on fire-related issues or policies. 
Reciprocity is considered an important factor in SNA because the extent to 
which a participant feels that their ‘doing a good turn’ may one day result in the 
other person doing them a good turn, means they’re more inclined to take action 
that doesn’t have an immediate payoff for them. Reciprocity has many dimensions 
governed by unspoken but observed conventions about giving, receiving, paying 
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back, and asking for help (Hansen, 2004). To try to capture this, respondents were 
asked, with respect to fire-related issues, how often others turn to them to help 
solve a problem, deal with a difficult or complex situation, or apply the respondents 
influence for the askers benefit (Hansen, 2004). Response options were on a Likert 
Scale of: never, seldom, occasionally, quite often, or very often. Respondents were 
also asked whether they themselves, felt there are people that would help them deal 
with a difficult or complex situation, or intervene on their behalf. Again, a Likert 
Scale for responses was used: nobody, very few, some, quite a few, or very many. 
Finally, the bulk of questions about knowledge sharing were adapted from 
Willem and Buelens (2007), who in turn had built their scales on the basis of several 
existing questionnaires. These questions were aimed at measuring the perceived 
importance of informal networks in knowledge sharing; the perceived influence of 
some formal systems; and the respondents perception of their own level of 
knowledge regarding fire management policies and access to that knowledge. 
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3.5 LIMITATIONS & ETHICS 
3.5.1 My role and influence in the research 
It would be hypocritical to argue that people who work within bureaucracies need 
to be encouraged and supported in questioning underlying their assumptions and 
frames, without reflecting on those that I bring to this work. Like all researchers, I 
bring to this study my life experiences, frames, prior knowledge and relationships to 
the research. In considering my impact on the research and its analysis, it is 
important to know that I brought to this study, more than 10 years of work as a 
middle-level bureaucrat. Moreover, during that time I worked for both the Country 
Fire Authority and DSE (although in DSE’s case, not in the fire management 
team). My experience as a bureaucrat provided me some empathy with the research 
respondents. It absolutely influenced my focusing on their role in adaptation. It also 
provided me access to key informants that others may not have had. In many ways 
I feel it conveyed a level of trust from participants and thus a level of honesty they 
may have been more reticent to share with another. However, because I was 
conscious that this could limit the interviews and surveys to my network, I actively 
and repeatedly sought out those whom I did not know and their contacts as well. 
As another tactic against bias, I asked interviewees about groups or organisations 
with whom they disagreed with on several issues. This also provided me another 
‘network’.  
3.5.2 The fires of February 2009 
During February of the 3rd year of the study, major bushfires occurred in the State. 
The State Government announced a Royal Commission (RC), which concluded 
during the writing of the thesis. This study did not seek to analyse the 
Commission’s recommendations, nor the framing of its responses. Nonetheless, 
several of the interviews were undertaken while the RC was being conducted.  
The third round of interviews was held back and undertaken some time 
after these fires. Areas where the fires hit were avoided so as not to impose upon 
already stretched, tired and distressed people. Each of those who did participate 
after the fires was asked whether the events of February 7th had changed their 
views. All said their views were confirmed. However, the impact the fires had on 
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these people was obvious. Many of these interviews went for several hours as 
people discussed their experiences – most had had some role in response or 
recovery or both. All of them take their role in community safety very seriously, 
and the intensity and sincerity with which they spoke was palpable. The interviews 
also took place whilst the Royal Commission was running. All of them had 
expectations regarding what Commission would achieve – according to their frame. 
It would be interesting to go back to them and ask what they think now.  
  
3.5.3 Other limitations 
An obvious methodological limitation relates to participant self-selection. 
Participation may be a reflection of interest in or passion for the subject matter, a 
person’s available time, or even their awareness of the work. Attempts to address 
this were based in using an interview or survey option. Promotion of the research 
used means beyond the email or phone ‘cold call. The research and survey site were 
published in relevant newsletters for local councils and the agencies, as well as 
emails sent from executives to entire organisations encouraging people to 
participate and including assurance about anonymity.  
Despite repeated attempts to obtain a broader range of participants, a 
limited number of people from a limited number of policy areas participated. This 
relatively limited breadth of participant may be because of the way I framed the 
approach or questions, such that people felt the study was of no relevance to their 
work. For example, in local government, most employees have a range of issue to 
deal with on daily basis, and fire management may be only one. In a few replies to 
initial contact, some people suggested they had nothing contribute. After further 
explanation of the research, most agreed to participate. The limited diversity of 
responses may also be a reflection of the limited time people had available because 
of their workloads. 
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3.5.4 Ethics  
Participants were government officials interviewed about their work, much of 
which was already in the public sector. According to the university’s requirements, 
widely accepted confidentiality, consent and data management procedures were 
followed. Data were coded and managed to ensure anonymity of all participants 
and no personal information was collected. Even though Guenther (2009) 
maintains that published work only uses real names when respondents are public 
officials, the anonymity of participants in this research was maintained. A promise 
of confidentiality may well have influenced the decision for some respondents to 
participate. As such I have taken every reasonable step to maintain that promise by 
disconnecting individual respondents from the organisations with which they work, 
and by being especially conscientious of obscuring identities when they are attached 
to statements that could cause insult as when a respondent criticises their 
organization or a colleague (ibid). I am very grateful to those who willing gave up 
their time and provided responses to both interviews and surveys. 
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Chapter Four 
4 SETTING THE SCENE: FIRE 
MANAGEMENT IN A TIME OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a dialectic between humans and nature, fire [management] expresses 
the values, institutions and beliefs of their sustaining societies (Pyne, 
1997b:19). 
Fire regimes should be understood as socially explicit, combining 
biophysical factors with institutional relationships and the identities and 
knowledge practices associated with fire management. Each dimension of 
a socially explicit fire regime mutually sustains the other dimensions, so 
change requires a simultaneous co-production of ways of knowing, 
managerial identity, and institutional form (Jasanoff 2004 in Goldstein & 
Butler, 2010). 
This chapter turns to the practical context of the thesis: the public policy sector of 
fire management in Victoria, Australia. As was defined earlier, fire relates to fire in 
vegetation and the term fire management encompasses all activities associated with 
the management of fire prone land, including the use of fire to meet land 
management goals and objectives, (AFAC, Undated). This includes management of 
unplanned fires called bushfires in Australia and wildfires in other countriess. 
When exploring questions of adaptation within a policy sector, it is useful to 
appreciate the sector’s existing challenges and governance arrangements, as well as 
the implications of climate change for those challenges. Consequently, this chapter 
has two sections. The first defines fire management, describes the role of weather 
and climate in fire behaviour, and outlines some of the key challenges facing the 
sector. The second section portrays some of the potential implications of climate 
change for the sector, with a particular focus on potential impacts beyond those on 
fire weather and fire behaviour. Due to the dearth of literature dealing with such 
implications, the discussion extrapolates from existing literature regarding drivers of 
social-ecological vulnerability to bushfire and altered fire regimes.  
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4.2 FIRE & FIRE MANAGEMENT IN VICTORIA, 
AUSTRALIA 
South-eastern Australia has the reputation of being one of the three most fire-
prone areas in the world, along with southern California and southern France 
(BoM, 2011). As was established in the Introductory Chapter, like many other ‘fire 
prone’ parts of the world, Victorians are a society of communities living in 
landscapes that have complex relationships with fire. Diverse fire regimes, within 
ecological limits, are essential for maintaining biodiversity, with no single regime 
being optimal for all organisms and communities (Burrows, 2008; Mackey, et al., 
2002; Shlisky, et al., 2007; Whelan, 2002; Whelan, 1995). Our well-being depends on 
the resilience of our ecological systems. In turn, ecosystem resilience depends on 
how we interact with and manage those systems. This includes how we interact 
with fire as both a tool and threat. We shape ecosystem function and dynamics 
through suppression, exclusion and use of fire. Our land use can fragment natural 
systems and thereby complicate or remove fire regimes from a landscape. The need 
to restore and ‘reconnect’ ecosystems also has implications for bushfire risk. 
Equally, while fire plays a key role in the function of many Australian ecosystems, 
bushfires (unplanned fires) can present a real and grave threat to both social and 
ecological communities. 
There is no shortage of literature under the rubric of ‘fire management’. 
There is even a journal dedicated to the area – The International Journal of 
Wildland Fire. Yet the majority of research typically focuses on singular issues and 
policies. Although the cadre is expanding, markedly fewer studies and 
commentaries attempt to convey a more holistic picture. Notable exceptions that 
capture a fairly broad swath of the issues, include Gill (2005), Dombeck (2004), 
Murdiyarso (2006), Lavorel (2006), and Pyne (1991, 1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2006). 
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4.2.1 Fire management governance arrangements in Victoria 
Within this State of Australia, two fire agencies hold the majority of responsibilities 
with respect to fire in the natural environment. The Department of Sustainability 
and Environment (DSE) has responsibility for reducing the risk of fire, containing 
outbreaks and managing environmental effects of fire on Victoria's 7.6 million 
hectares of public land, which includes National Parks, State Parks and forests 
(DSE, 2011). Parks Victoria delivers much of these services for DSE related to the 
management of parks, reserves and other public land (ibid). This involves the 
management of both wildfire and the use of fire to meet land management goals 
and objectives (ibid). The Country Fire Authority (CFA) is mandated to provide for 
the ‘more effective’ control and prevention and suppression of fires in the country 
area of Victoria - parts of Victoria that include outer metropolitan Melbourne and 
regional centres, rural areas and plantation forests (State Government of Victoria, 
2003:21). Depending on whether the fire is located on private or public land, either 
CFA or DSE respectively will have responsibility over suppression (ibid). 
However, viewed holistically, the governance of fire management in 
Victoria is very large, with links to many public policy issues. These issues include: 
emergency management; public land management; water management; biodiversity 
conservation; forestry; community safety, engagement and development; 
suppression, fire prevention planning; land use planning; building standards; 
agriculture; roadside management; railways; alpine management; major 
infrastructure management including electricity, water, roads and rail; tourism; 
health; and the education sector. These various policy areas lie within the remit of a 
vast range of organisations and agencies beyond those of DSE or CFA, which 
includes local governments, other government departments, and statutory 
authorities. These bodies include the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services 
Board (MFESB), Victoria Police (warnings and evacuation), Energy Safe Victoria, 
Tourism Victoria, and state government Departments of Human Services 
(recovery), Transport, Planning and Community Development (land use planning), 
Primary Industries, and Justice, which includes the Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner and the newly established Fire Commissioner.  
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Clearly, fire management is a multi-stakeholder, multi-variable, multi-scale 
policy problem that has multiple partial ‘solutions’ and inevitable residual risk (Gill, 
2005). It is a complex policy problem not only because fire is a complex biophysical 
phenomenon (Cary 2003), it is also a complex social phenomenon (Bradstock & 
Gill, 2001; Gillen, 2005). The sector is replete with the social, cultural, 
environmental and economic challenges inherent to disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
and ecological sustainability. While we often do not know enough about the factors 
that influence all the various aspects of fire management, some of the challenges 
faced are a result of the number of actors within the sector’s governance landscape. 
In many ways, a complex governance landscape is necessary because the subject 
matter demands a range of intellectual and scientific skills that far exceed the 
capabilities of any single organisation (Powell, et al., 1996:118). A central challenge 
in such a landscape is that the management strategies of the different actors are 
often based on differing perceptions (van Bueren, et al., 2003:193), objectives and 
ideas.  
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4.3 FIRE MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
As a public policy issue, fire management already demands co-operative action 
between government, communities, individuals and business. A co-operative, 
whole-of-government approach is not a new challenge for the sector, but one that 
is further complicated by the advent of climate change. Fundamentally, adaptation 
demands we rethink our place in flammable landscapes (Bowman, 2009). This sub-
section outlines some potential implications of climate change for the sector. 
4.3.1 Climate change projections for Victoria 
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment report  
(Parry, et al., 2007) states that the evidence for climate warming is unequivocal. The 
increase in average global temperature has not been continuous, with the trend over 
the past 50 years being nearly twice that for the past 100 years and 2008 being the 
tenth warmest on record since 1850 (Hay, 2004). The most recent 10-year interval 
(1999–2008) was the warmest of the past 200 decades (Fussel, 2008). Even with the 
most stringent and ambitious mitigation efforts, further impacts of climate change 
cannot be avoided over the next few decades (Parry, et al., 2007). Due to past 
emissions, temperature increases are estimated to involve at least +0.6°C by the end 
of the century, relative to 1980-1999, even if atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations remain at 2000 levels (Parry, et al., 2007).  
Along with sea levels, temperatures will continue rising for another century 
or more because of a time lag in the oceans' response to atmospheric temperatures 
(Holling, 1978; Solomon, et al., 2009). Moreover, previous IPCC projections may 
have in some respects, underestimated the change (Rahmstorf, et al., 2007) 
including its speed (Steffen, 2009). Thresholds in impacts of climate change may 
involve changes at rates at which ecosystems may not be able to adapt, thus they 
are likely to pose new challenges to DRR and CCA (O’Brien, et al., 2008). Climate 
change may hold surprises that will not be gradual (Mehta, 2010; Schneider, 2004). 
Projected changes in climate variability, including increases in frequency, duration 
and magnitude of extreme events and abrupt changes are a well-recognized societal 
concern (O'Toole, 1997a; Steffen, 2009; Stern, 2007).  
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Since 1950, Australia’s average temperature has increased by 0.85oC, rainfall 
has decreased in the south-east, droughts have become hotter, and the number of 
extremely hot days has risen (Hennessy, et al., 2006). Overall, 2008 was the nation’s 
fourteenth warmest year since comparable records began in 1910 (Preston & 
Stafford-Smith, 2009). Significant change may have already occurred (Hennessy, et 
al., 2006; Voss & Kemp, 2005) and our greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise.  
Victoria is expected to warm at a slightly faster rate than the global average, 
especially in the north and east of the state (DSE, 2008). By 2030, Victoria’s annual 
average temperatures are expected to increase by around 0.8°C (although the array 
of model results indicates a range of 0.6 to 1.2°C) (ibid). Warming is likely to be 
greatest in spring and summer, where by 2070 the average annual temperature 
could increase by 1.4°C under a lower emissions growth scenario or by as much as 
2.7°C under a higher emissions growth scenario (ibid). The numbers of hot days are 
also projected to increase in both frequency and intensity (ibid). As well as decreases 
in total rainfall, evaporation is expected to increase, enhancing an overall drying 
trend (ibid). 
 
4.3.2 Climate change and fire weather 
4.3.2.a Weather, climate and fire 
When, where, whether and how a fire burns is influenced by daily weather, which is 
a reflection of climate. The weather systems that aggregate to form regional climate 
determine rainfall seasonality and thereby influence fire seasonality. Inter-annual 
fluctuations in weather and climate influence fuel loads and condition; and micro to 
meso-scale atmospheric processes and weather conditions establish the potential 
for severe wildfires, as well as the behaviour of fires once they are occurring 
(Lindesay, 2003). Many of Australia’s fires that have caused the greatest number of 
deaths, injuries and economic impacts occurred during droughts associated with El 
Nino events (Hennessy, et al., 2006).  
Climate and weather variables such as those with relatively long temporal 
scales like drought, those with moderate temporal scales like the diurnal cycle, and 
variables with short temporal scales like wind, all affect fire intensity (Gill & 
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Bradstock, 2003; Luke & McArthur, 1978). The seasonal cycle that underlies the 
portent of predominantly warm to hot, dry summers in the south with wetter 
winters clearly influences fire seasons (Lindesay, 2003). Moreover, Gill and 
Bradstock (2003) postulate that a fire regime is an emergent property of abiotic and 
biotic factors, not just climate, vegetation, fuels, terrain, ignition sources or 
herbivore ‘loads’. Vegetation distribution is an expression of climatic patterns 
(Lindesay, 2003), and therefore the types of ecosystems, land uses and human 
activities occurring in a landscape, including ‘fuel’ types, are also a reflection of 
these patterns.  
4.3.2.b Climate change and fire weather 
Climate change will influence fire because of the intimate links between fire, 
weather, and climate. A growing number of modelling studies have projected that 
climate change will increase the likelihood of fire weather across fire-prone areas of 
our planet. These include Australia, New Zealand, North America, Russia and 
many parts of Mediterranean Europe (Amiro, et al., 2001; Beer & Williams, 1995; 
Brown, et al., 2004; Cary, 2002; Flannigan, et al., 2005; Goldammer & Price, 1998; 
Hennessy, et al., 2006; Keeton, et al., 2007; Krawchuk, et al., 2009; Moriondo, et al., 
2006; Mouillot, et al., 2002; Murdiyarso, 2006; Pearce, et al., 2005; Pitman, et al., 
2006; Price & Rind, 1994; Reinhard, et al., 2005; Schumacher & Bugmann, 2006; 
Williams, et al., 2001; Wotton, et al., 2006). In summary, we are likely to see more 
very high to extreme fire danger days. Climate change is expected to increase the 
frequency and magnitude of many types of extreme events, including wildfires 
(Parry, et al., 2007). Extreme events are of particular interest to fire managers, as 
these are where the greatest social and ecological bushfire damage typically occurs. 
Fire seasons and fire danger periods are likely to be extended, including an 
increased number of total fire ban days. Pyne (2007) suggests that the modern era 
of wildfire, dating from the 1930s, occurred during a time of relatively benign 
climate, but that those favourable circumstances have apparently ended; weather 
has worsened, the easy work accomplished. 
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4.3.3 Climate change and fire management 
Better disaster risk reduction will help us adapt to climate change. (Ban Ki-
moon, U.N. Secretary General, 29 Sept 2008) 
As intact, well-connected ecosystems are believed to be more likely to be 
resilient to climate change, many existing conservation measures aimed at 
preventing ecosystem damage and fragmentation will also help to limit its 
impacts. (UNEP) 
As fire management has a role in both DRR and CCA, it clearly has a role to play in 
society’s adaptive capacity. Climate change is formally recognised as an issue for fire 
management. The United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation’s 
overarching Fire Management strategy “aims to support national and international 
capacity in appropriate, proactive fire management response [to climate change]” 
(Koenig, Undated). The principles and strategic actions of its Voluntary Guidelines 
are intended to be interpreted and applied in compliance with these conventions 
and declarations, in particular with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FAO, 2006). While the Hyogo Framework (2005) does not 
directly mention fire, it explicitly aims to promote the integration of risk reduction 
associated with existing climate variability and future climate change into strategies 
for the reduction and management of disaster risk and adaptation to climate 
change.  
In 2004, a Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) inquiry stated that 
“long-term strategic research, planning and investment are necessary if the 
Australian Government and state and territory governments are to prepare for the 
changes to bushfire regimes and events that will be caused by climate change” 
(Ellis, et al., 2004). Victoria’s current Bushfire Strategy explicitly states that climate 
change is a key factor in driving a significant increase in the state’s bushfire activity 
(State Government of Victoria, 2008). It seeks to reduce the threat of bushfires 
while facilitating resilient communities, improved environmental outcomes, and 
enabling fire agencies to be better prepared to meet future challenges in a time of 
climate change” (ibid). 
These broad policy intents seem well-suited to the fact that climate change 
will not just change weather conditions. Stochastic disruptions to our climate 
system will likely exacerbate threats to social and ecological system sustainability  
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(Berkhout, 2006; Burton, et al., 2002; Easterling, et al., 2004; Engle & Lemos, 2009; 
Haque & Burton, 2005; Haque & Etkin, 2007). Changes will interact with existing 
pressures such as altered land productivity, habitat loss, species extinctions, spread 
of diseases and pests, land use planning in areas already exposed to hazards, or 
increased exposure of people to poverty (Dovers, 2000; Lehner, et al., 2006; 
McMichael, et al., 2008; Mendelsohn, et al., 1997; Noble, et al., 2005; Schroter, et al., 
2005). Many of the most severe impacts will probably stem from synergistic 
interactions between trends such as demographic changes and existing threats, 
rather than climate change in isolation (Thiele, 2000:549; Thomas, et al., 2004). 
Combined, this will likely alter and increase vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate 
change in complex ways (Haque & Etkin, 2007:277), complicating assessment of 
impacts and development of policies to manage them (UNFCCC, 2004:11).  
Consequently, climate change can no longer be seen as a purely environmental 
problem but as a risk that affects ecosystems and society alike (Birkmann, et al., 
2009:29).  
Many now recognise the need to prepare for and manage the effects of 
extreme weather events under climate change (Downing, et al., 1996; Thomalla, et 
al., 2006; UNISDR, 2005). Unfortunately however, most climate change 
assessments rarely consider low-probability but high-consequence extreme events, 
even though it is not even clear all climate change surprises are actually “low 
probability’, just very uncertain at this point given that the state of knowledge is still 
evolving (Schneider, 2004). All of this goes to making less useful those theories and 
approaches that largely focus on single issues, using a steady-state view that 
interprets change as gradual and incremental, disregarding interactions across scales 
(Folke, et al., 2005:442). As in many policy sectors, climate change adaptation in fire 
management is about trying to deal with interacting issues and challenges. It is 
perhaps not surprising then, that there have been calls for simultaneous actions to 
address both climate change and goals other than climate, particularly development. 
Yet assessments of the implications of climate change tend to focus on biophysical 
impacts.  
Fire management in Victoria is little different. A report for the State 
Government  hints that many essential services such as electricity, gas and oil, fixed 
line telecom network, rail, bridges, urban facilities and structures generally, face an 
enhanced bushfire risk, as well as to other impacts of climate change (DSE, 2007). 
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A more recent study explicitly examined the interactions between climate change, 
fire regimes and biodiversity in Australia (Williams, et al., 2009). While individual 
events cannot be directly attributed to climate change, events such as the heatwave 
experienced in Victoria in January 2009 are consistent with the climate change 
projections. Seemingly, no research has explored the potential implications of 
climate change for community vulnerability or resilience to bushfires. Because there 
is very little, if any, research that has looked at the implications of climate change 
for community resilience or adaptive capacity, the following synopsis of potential 
implications is based on existing knowledge or vulnerability to bushfire and altered 
fire regimes. The picture is likely to be quite complex, particularly because little is 
known about how these issues may interact.  
Increases in fire danger imply potentially higher fire intensities, longer fire 
seasons and more ‘total fire ban’ days (Hennessy, et al., 2006; Lucas, et al., 2007). 
Upper limits of suppression efforts in forest fuels compare unfavourably with 
wildfire intensities that exceed 100,000 kW/m on 'blow up' days, such as Ash 
Wednesday (Incoll, 1994) and likely, Black Saturday. If we are to see more 
‘campaign’ fires, such as those experienced in the 2006/07 season, personal and 
employer costs associated with volunteers including reliance or pressure on the 
good will of volunteers and their employers will increase (Hennessy, et al., 2006). 
More very high and extreme fire danger days might also raise the chance of 
residential house loss. Analysis has shown that the majority of house loss in 
Australia’s bushfires has occurred on days where the FFDI exceeded 100 (Blanchi, 
et al., 2004) and  that little house loss has occurred on days where the FFDI did not 
exceed 50 (Blanchi, et al., 2010). While, other important factors contribute to the 
degree of house loss, such as preparedness and actions on the day, any increases in 
fire weather conditions that may mimic those seen in Victoria in February 2009 and 
Canberra 2003, are liable to magnify the probability of house loss.  
Several other factors are likely to contribute to increased vulnerability to an 
increased risk of fire. There may be a negative impact on rural incomes, if climates 
in areas vulnerable to climate extremes become more hostile to farming (Lynn, 
2003a; Mendelsohn, et al., 2007). It is not clear that this would happen in Australia, 
but it is clear that climate change will likely have its most dramatic impacts on 
regions already stressed by high temperatures and low precipitation. This is 
especially in those areas where rapid urbanisation is occurring and extreme weather 
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events are becoming more intense and/or more frequent (Parry, et al., 2007). There 
is also potential for insurance erosion, leaving affected communities to deal with 
event hardships and an inability to insure properties because of rising or unavailable 
premiums (Coleman, Undated). Such ‘double exposures’ (O'Brien & Leichenko, 
2000) may also intensify the exodus from parts of rural Australia with concomitant 
implications for local economies and volunteer bases. This rather gloomy picture 
may be counterbalanced in areas where patterns of primary production are 
undertaking adaptive actions and in country towns that are thriving.  
Bosomworth and Handmer (2008) suggested that climate change has the 
potential to alter what is realistic in terms of bushfire impacts, preparedness and 
suppression capabilities under a changing climate, and thereby, what is 
communicated (and how). If the frequency of extreme fire danger increases, then 
translating more sophisticated concepts such as ‘stay or go’ may become more 
difficult if not impractical, with no diminution of “the tension between the ideology 
and practical need of asking those at risk to take more responsibility for managing 
their own risks” (Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; Rhodes & Odgers, 2003). The 
challenge of communicating bushfire risks multiplies in the context of tourism.  
Increasing fire frequency as a result of changing climate is likely to alter 
ecosystem dynamics, changing vegetation types, and biomass fuel loads and types 
(Cary, 2002; Mouillot, et al., 2002). Precisely, how this may manifest is not clear 
(Dyer, et al., 2002; Goldammer & Price, 1998; Sardans & Penuelas, 2007). 
Increasingly stressed human populations may put further burdens on our 
ecosystems and their services, including through strategies to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, or respond to an increasing fire threat. Equally the availability of 
water may be reduced (Jones & Durack, 2005; Koenig, Undated) and may force 
consideration of alternate sources – such as tertiary treated – for suppression by 
agencies and possibly householders. Compounding this, water quality and yield may 
be affected if the ‘protective’ forests of our catchments burn and then suffer post-
fire floods (Tryhorn, et al., 2008), or where residents may have to boil water before 
drinking because water treatment plants are bypassed for fire-fighting purposes. 
Post-fire flood events, such as those seen in Gippsland in Victoria in 2006, may 
diminish recovery capacity of communities.  
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Actions to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change will also 
have implications for fire management. Consider the expanding markets in 
commercial forestry or native vegetation ‘protection’ for carbon sequestration. 
These will bring a concomitant need to protect such sinks from destructive fires, as 
well as consideration of how they may affect fire risk and regimes. There is also the 
growing need to manage our native vegetation for biodiversity and its ecosystem 
services (particularly with respect to water in Australia) in the face of climate 
change. Creation of habitat corridors to facilitate the adaptive capacity of 
ecosystems for example, raises similar challenges for the sector.  
Finally, when bushfires occur, debates, tensions, vested-interests and 
politically motivated arguments surrounding fire management and associated land 
management issues all raise their heads. Blame gets placed on the hazard or the 
emergency managers, rather than on the conditions of vulnerability that have 
resulted from issues such as complex and conflicting policies, or intense, interfering 
and unforgiving media scrutiny (Handmer & Dovers, 2008b; Schipper & Pelling, 
2006), let alone lack of appropriate funding and resources for land management and 
community engagement, certain economic policies and marginalisation of land, 
poor private land management, and inappropriate land use planning. If there are 
more large fires, these debates and associated inquiry costs, will surely escalate. “A 
problem of dealing with the complex issues of fire management is the influence of 
value systems of scientists, policy-makers and other commentators involved in the 
debates (Cary, et al., 2003).  
As Macgregor (2006) states, “in considering the future of fire in 
environmental management, one of the most powerful forces exerted upon the 
area’s decision-making is that of problem framing. Without consideration of how 
the focus of a policy sector is (and can be) framed, ‘symptoms’ are more likely to be 
addressed rather than causes, and worse, actions may be misdirected because of a 
poor understanding of root causes”. Through application of the analytical 
framework from Chapter 3, these kinds of issues were explored within the policy 
sector of fire management in Victoria, Australia. The next three chapters present 
results and analyses from that examination. 
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Chapter Five 
5 BUREAUCRATIC FRAMING OF FIRE 
MANAGEMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fires may be interpreted in various ways. To date they have been 
considered primarily as physical events; but it makes more sense to liken 
them to biological and cultural events (Pyne, 2007) 
This chapter presents an analysis of how bureaucrats within the policy sector of fire 
management frame the subjects and challenges of fire management and climate 
change. As part of the cohort of policy experts within political systems with a 
particular role in the coordinative discourse of policy processes (Schmidt, 2003), 
bureaucrats play a key role in the development and shaping of understandings of 
policy issues and alternatives (Heclo 1974 in March & Olsen, 1989:18). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this has implications for the diversity of perspectives and 
knowledge that may inform bureau-political struggles over policy frames. It is also 
important because new concepts or approaches such as adaptation will be 
conceptualised through the dominant policy frame(s) of a policy sector. Finally, 
when expressed as ‘accepted knowledge’ or norms through prolonged reiteration 
(Keeley & Scoones, 1999), policy frames can become institutionalised, thereby 
acting as signposts for action or inaction (Hajer, 1995:264). Analysing the policy 
frames of bureaucrats was therefore considered an important component of trying 
to understand a sector’s capacity for reflexive learning.  
Two themes shape the bulk of this chapter: fire management and climate 
change. The following sections describe the identified policy frames. Data are 
reported using interpretation, paraphrasing and illustrative quotes. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of these frames as a key influence on reflexive learning 
in Victoria’s policy sector of fire management. 
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5.2 BUREAUCRATIC FRAMING OF FIRE 
MANAGEMENT 
Participating bureaucrats27 broadly framed fire management in one of two ways. 
The first portrayed fire management primarily as an emergency management (EM) 
issue. Its normative claim was that the causes of the issues facing the sector are 
clearly identifiable and measurable, and dealing with them is a matter of rational 
choice that can be addressed through a risk management process that is perceived 
to be objective. The EM framing drew upon a rhetoric that reflected a modernist 
duality of humans and nature, and an instrumentalist notion that action is supposed 
to follow logically and automatically from knowledge (Fischer, 2003).  
The second framing portrayed fire management as a sustainability challenge. 
Its normative claim was that the issues facing the sector are caused by complexities 
of value choices, rather than a singular objective, identifiable factor. In the 
sustainability framing, there were no sole or simple ‘solutions’ to the sector’s 
challenges. This frame drew upon a storyline of humans as part of nature, which 
arguably reflects broader societal shifts towards sustainability or ‘ecological 
modernisation’ (Dovers, 2004; Dovers & Handmer, 1993:205; Eder, 1996). Both 
the master frames are globally popular storylines. From a reflexive learning 
perspective however, an EM framing tended to ‘homogenize’ the situation, in 
attempts to make it understandable, albeit from a reified perception of the wider 
problem field (Hajer, 1995:54). In contrast, the sustainability framing suggested a 
‘heterogenization’ that required an opening up of established discursive categories 
(ibid). It is necessary to stress that presentation of two master-frames should not be 
taken to suggest absolute delineation between the conceptions. Some of the 
arguments underpinning the master-frames drew upon similar normative 
orientations. Nonetheless, distinctions between the underlying sub-frames were 
enough to impose an analytically useful, yet artificial, structure.  
Woven throughout both master-frames was the idea that in Victoria fire is 
natural and inevitable. Equally ubiquitous was the image of ‘good fire’ (ecological or 
fuel reducing, and usually deliberately lit) and ‘bad fire’ (a bushfire that threatens 
                                                 
27 It is necessary to regularly qualify that I can only talk about those who participated in the interviews or survey. There are hundreds who did 
not . In addition, other than those working in uniform or who made mention of the fact, data regarding a participants’ experience as a volunteer 
or other fire fighter was not collected. 
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people and assets). What varied were characterisations of how to deal with the 
issues facing the sector, including dealing with constraints or enablers of the 
sector’s fundamental goal – typical of policy frames. Table 3 depicts how the 
underpinning causal and solution frames informed the construction of the two 
master-frames. To explain this construction, Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively 
discuss key sub-frames as they relate to each master-frame.  
Table 3 Bureaucratic frames of fire management 
Master- 
frame 
 
Sub-frames 
Emergency  
management  
(Societal protection/ defensive) 
Sustainability  
(Humans as part of nature/ living with 
nature) 
Communities lack awareness of risk and 
how to ameliorate, including lack of 
understanding fuel reduction burning 
 
Community disconnect from environmental 
complexity, lack of appreciation for fire’s 
ecological role, fire risk & impacts of decisions to 
ameliorate risks 
Sector lacks understanding &/or acceptance 
of community engagement 
Sector lacks understanding &/or acceptance of 
social sciences 
Lack of fire in the landscape has increased 
fuels & therefore reduced safety 
Altered fire regimes (too much & too little) have 
variably degraded environments & changed fuel 
hazards 
Land use & development in ‘high risk areas’ 
has increased fire risk 
Land use & development has increased risks, 
exacerbated conflicts and environmental 
degradation  
Environmental concerns undermine safety 
efforts 
Lack of environmental concern has degraded 
environment & increased risk 
Complexity driven by the range of 
players/interests 
Complexity driven by range of values & their 
trade-offs 
Causal / 
Diagnostic 
Sub-
Frames 
Lack of integrated approach results in less 
fuel management and reduced community 
awareness 
Lack of integrated approach results in an 
imbalance where environmental concerns are an 
add-on 
Community engagement to increase risk 
awareness & acceptance of ‘treatments’ 
Community engagement for dialogue about 
value trade-offs 
Use of fire to reduce fuels – ecological 
outcomes are added bonus 
Use of fire should be ecologically and fuel 
management driven 
Avoid further creation of risk by avoiding 
development in ‘high risk areas’ 
Avoid further creation of risk & debates by 
avoiding development in ‘high risk’ & ‘high 
environmental value’ areas 
Solution / 
Prognostic 
Sub-
Frames 
Integrated approaches to get FRB across 
land tenures & consistent messages to public 
Integrated strategy to provide space for 
discussion, debates and value-based choices 
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5.2.1 Emergency (risk) management- a defence or control frame 
This master-frame portrayed fire management as a primarily emergency 
management (EM) issue. Its normative claim was a moral argument that human 
safety is paramount to all else, and that because fire can threaten that safety, 
defensive actions are morally superior28. The language of risk management 
permeated this framing, focussing attention on the risk that human safety may be 
impacted. Because ‘the causes’ of bushfire risk were conceived as identifiable and 
quantifiable, in this frame, management of the risk was depicted as equally 
identifiable and therefore a matter of rational choice. In this frame, fire was 
described as something to be battled, prevented, suppressed or controlled, 
automatically portraying fire as a negative force; as an enemy to be subdued 
(Wuerthner, 2006:60).  
Although there were expressions surrounding collective or community-
based approaches to managing bushfire risk, the underlying rhetoric of the EM 
frame employed a defensive, hazard management discourse, focussed on hazard 
management. Through this frame, participants argued that with more funding and 
resources agencies could ensure ‘the community’ is aware of bushfire risk (and 
accepts some responsibility for dealing with that risk) and ‘assets’ could be 
protected through suppression and fuel management [s1-13]. A consistent theme 
was that the agencies are readily able to define risk – based on exposure to hazard – 
because of their knowledge and understanding of fuel management, fire 
suppression and forest management. It was because of a supposed endowed 
knowledge that the agencies – the authorities - were also framed as being ‘in 
control’ in the face of the threat of fire.  
It’s an anathema to our thinking in this organisation that anybody could 
die or we could lose anything [2-2] 
In the good old days we were the shining yellow knights on the big red 
charger and “don’t worry your pretty little head, we’ll look after you” [1-
15] I remember in ’94....[1-1] 
 Yet within this frame, there was an argument that people cannot expect to 
be defended by the ‘authorities’; that communities must take responsibility for 
                                                 
28 In Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, safety is a fundamental requirement (Aucoin 2006:72) 
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defending themselves (see Section 5.2.1.b). While perhaps a reflection of the reality 
of limited resources, this argument continued the theme that if communities simply 
understood the ‘logical knowledge’ that the agencies have, they would be 
incentivised to prepare and gain an understanding what to do during an emergency. 
They would therefore accept the twin rationales of defence and hazard 
management.   
Another diagnostic sub-frame was reference to complexity. In this frame, 
complexity was engendered by the number of organisations and thereby issues that 
require consideration. This situation was couched as impinging upon achievement 
of the safety objective. Consequently, while arguing for integrated approaches in 
the associated prognostic frame, the purpose of collective risk management was 
generally about achieving the hazard management goal of this master-frame, 
including fuel management and community engagement to encourage and accept 
fuel reduction activities29. Assumptions and predispositions toward this 
technocratic rationality were evident in technocratic interpretations of risk 
management that peppered many of the interviews and surveys [1-1], [1-17] [1-6]. 
It is not rocket science to understand that our fire management planning 
needs to be risk based; we need to plan collectively to manage and to 
develop treatment options to treat a risk, and it needs to be tenure blind [3-
7] 
With the best of intentions, State government have put in place various 
strategies and approaches to managing the affairs of government that have 
had an impact on our ability to build this team approach to emergency 
management [1-15] 
The concept of emergency or risk management seemed to serve as 
discursive glue that many of these bureaucrats rallied around, even if when pressed 
it turns out they have different understandings of the terms (Lees, 2004:102). While 
an EM master-frame may reflect a particular bureaucratic rationality that tends 
toward order and process, it may also reflect broader societal notions (and thereby 
demands of government) that with enough of ‘the right’ information, the ‘problem’ 
                                                 
29
 
The language of disaster risk reduction was not expressed throughout any of this data
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can be solved30. The following sub-sections expand upon this broad analysis by 
describing how attribution of different meanings to particular parts of the policy 
context, construct the EM master-frame. 
5.2.1.a Land (fuel) management 
In an EM framing, an emergency requires that assets (primarily people) be 
defended and management centres on reducing the source of the risk, in this case 
the fuel hazard or ‘the environment’. Through this sub-frame, fire risk is created 
when a landscape is not managed ‘for safety’. Using imagery of unmanaged lands, 
of mess and neglect, implies that the ‘solution’ is tidying up. Such a conception is 
likely derived from our colonial imaginings of Australia (Porter, 2007). 
Predispositions to this diagnostic framing were evident in the use of terms such as 
overgrown and fuel laden. Such conceptions draw on ‘wise use’ arguments often 
brought up in environmental debates (Hajer, 1995; Sabatier, 1999) and technocratic 
responses to issues of DRR (Blaikie, et al., 1994; Cannon, 2000). In this framing, the 
source of the risk is readily identifiable and therefore, the treatment equally 
obvious. Fuels directly influence fire behaviour (Cheney & Sullivan, 2008; Tolhurst 
& Cheney, 1999), thus fuel management is directly linked to reduced risk and 
increased safety. Several participants described a lack of fuel reduction as the causal 
issue and therefore an increase in fuel management (through burning) the solution.  
Fire’s the instrument to manage it [fuel] and the outcome is a safer 
community if we do that appropriately [1-1]  
It was from this perspective that a metaphor of imbalance was used in two 
ways. The first was that suppression, changes in land use and community 
preferences had removed fire from the landscape, which had allowed fuel hazards 
to increase. This had altered the natural ‘balance’.  
We aren’t getting enough burning done...We aren’t winning with the 
community.....Even when this is in place we’ll still have big fires......We’re 
almost going against nature by some of the things we’re doing [not 
burning] [1-9] 
                                                 
30 In this, fire management is not alone. Much of the climate change literature argues for production of ‘better’ science driven by the idea that 
this information would encourage action. 
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Some respondents used a typical framing device of numerical 
measurements to portray this imbalance, normatively implying a need for action 
and pressure to do something about it (Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2002a) – albeit 
necessarily measurable actions.  
Fire may be given several reasons to burn or not - timber, cultural, park, 
forest - and out of 10,000 ha we may only be able to burn 2,000 ha because 
of constraints, is that 10,000 treated for protection?? I have trouble with 
this concept [S1-10] 
The second use of an imbalance metaphor portrayed the ‘balance’ as being tipped 
away from fuel management, toward ecological conservation goals, and thus, away 
from the goal of safety.  
I'm as big a greenie as the next person..... [but] the dedication to green has 
taken over to the point where it's - the balance has been lost, and if it's 
green you can't touch it - like, it's just got - the pendulum's just swung in 
some places way too far that way, and there hasn't been enough work done 
to educate and to emphasise the benefit of different management regimes 
[3-7] 
It's people's perceptions of, you know, you can't do this because it's special 
and precious and otherwise, but you need to have that balance of, you 
know, do you do nothing and does that then become a bigger problem for, 
you know, specifically for fire and the likes? [3-11]...some areas are 
untouchable [s1-43]  
[Fire related issues are] too tied to environmental outcomes. E.g. always 
opposing views from environmental lobby to the political and/or fire 
management lobby [s1-12 my emphasis] 
Irrespective of the use of the metaphor, the underlying rhetoric was that 
application of fire is needed to ‘redress the balance’. Using the term balance implies 
that fuel reduction burning is logical, reasonable and natural. By implication, 
questioning or challenging of prescribed burning is framed as illogical, unreasonable 
or unnatural, but particularly as not being concerned about safety. Other corollaries 
of these arguments include framing those who question or challenge the argument 
as impractical or out-of-date. When portrayed as a question of morality, the 
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implication is that those who question or challenge fuel reduction and fuel 
reduction burning may be immoral – ‘choosing trees over people’.  
The main opposition will come from the pressure groups. Particularly the 
ones coming from the 80s and 90s like the [Xs] and whatever. The 
conservation groups and that, they equate fire with disturbance. They’re so 
anti anything, anti-roading, anti-logging, that type of thing, that they’ll 
react to that. They see it as tinkering. [Are there conservation groups that 
accept fire and want to see more fire?] Not really. They say they want to 
see the evidence and the science behind it [1-9]. 
A lot of our fire ecology work seems to be getting very much locked into 
age class, EVC type approach that is probably impractical [1-14] 
It can be seen how the argument in this sub-frame that the landscape needs 
more fire, influences one respondent’s conception of the ecological use of fire as a 
risk reduction tool.  
[Okay, does it [IFMP] include ecological burns?] It does, absolutely. This 
is where it is different in the fact that IFMP planning actually covers the 
four phases of emergency management, PPRR, where normally it doesn't. 
We are looking at the prevention preparedness side of things. So it is all 
encompassing. So it does look at treatments using prescribing burning and 
ecological burning [3-24].  
  
5.2.1.b Community awareness and engagement 
Within the emergency management (EM) master-frame, another diagnostic sub-
frame was that communities lack understanding or acceptance of bushfire risk and 
associated actions to reduce that risk. For some bureaucrats using an EM frame, 
people ‘choose’ to live in bushfire prone areas, therefore the onus is on such people 
to become aware of the risk, and to take responsibility for dealing with the risk 
because they ‘created’ the risk. In this causal sub-frame, community acceptance and 
management of fire risk was again linked directly with fuel management and 
suppression, reflecting the overall defensive tenor of the narrative of the master-
frame.  
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Trying to get people responsible for their own decision of living in a high 
risk area and then taking responsibility for same [is a fundamental 
challenge] [S2-9] [s1-38] They’ve got to accept the risk [3-12]...and then 
manage the bushfire risk [s1-5, s2-10, s2-13] 
Ultimately the public is responsible for their own safety. We only assist 
them when they can’t [s1-48] 
The notion of communities ‘acceptance of risk’ included acceptance of the 
limitations of fire agency capacity to suppress fires – particularly during extreme 
events – and of the very high probability that there will not be a fire appliance at 
every door during a bushfire. Any other expectations were framed as ‘impractical, 
unrealistic and illogical’ [s1-18, s1-26, s1-31]. These ‘unrealistic expectations’ were 
often attributed to people who moved from urban areas to rural or forested areas 
(‘tree-changers’), who were described as bringing their ‘urban-based ideas’ of 
service delivery to rural areas.  
You can't expect agencies to cocoon an individual. It’s impractical, you 
can't do it. I think one of the difficulties all of us will have to manage that 
expectation [3-4]  
This sub-frame drew again from the normative claim of the morality of 
human ‘safety’ and protection. Using this conception, means that those who deviate 
from the ‘norms’ of a secure way of life are seen as exposing others to risk can be 
branded delinquent and moral fervour roused against them. (Douglas 1966 in 
Kahan, 2011).  
A related prognostic sub-frame was the idea of ‘shared responsibility’ 
between government and communities. Here, community engagement was 
expressed in terms of partnership, of sharing risk and of ‘empowering’ community 
members to ‘take responsibility for choosing to live in high risk areas’. In an EM 
framing, the notion of shared risk particularly centred on ideas of sharing fuel 
management work across public and private land, as well as sharing knowledge 
about ‘appropriate’ responses to bushfires.  
Ideally we want the community to see themselves as part of the emergency 
response. If they’re going to be part of the response, they’ve got to be part 
of the preparedness [1-15] 
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Empower them to actually contribute to – to have a better understanding 
about their risk, number one; and, secondly, to empower them to see 
themselves as a participant and not a recipient [3-7] 
While the notion of shared, collective approaches is reflected in statements 
such as ‘listening to communities’ or ‘bringing the community along with the story’, 
in many cases, the underlying rhetoric was about acceptance of fuel reduction 
burning, such as where and when to conduct fuel management, not whether to 
undertake such activities.  
In terms of getting right up to empowerment, I don’t think we’ve ever been 
able to achieve that. That’s largely because of our legislative 
responsibilities that we can’t give up power over these things. We’ve got 
things that are non-negotiable, that we have to do. The other thing too, is 
that if you engage to the level of empowerment, it is very time consuming, 
very resource hungry and we just don’t have that resource commitment [1-
3 my emphasis]. 
Others argued that part of the reason for this ‘lack of engagement’ is that, 
compared with suppression activities, community engagement is undervalued in the 
sector [s1-7, 1-5].  
The notion that the ‘right information’ will lead to ‘desirable behaviour’ 
permeated this frame. Because action is supposed to follow logically and 
automatically from knowledge, any other action is taken to be at best intuitive and 
at worst blind (Wagenaar & Noam Cook, 2003:140). Expressed in the rhetoric of 
this frame, the need for more fire is obvious, therefore if the community 
understood ‘fire’s role in the landscape’ they would be in favour of the fuel 
reduction policy [s1-4]. In this conception, the solution is simply a matter of 
‘education’ (E.g. 3-7 above). One respondent showed some awareness of the power 
of deliberately framing this issue and the influence this has on policy acceptance:  
“We started by calling it a massive burning program but that’s going to 
scare the pants off……so [X] suggested calling it a massive effort on the 
burning program [1-9 – Pre Feb 7th] 
A more subtle driver of this prognostic sub-frame was of community 
engagement as a tool to manage post-event outrage: “The lack of outrage after the 
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’06 fires shows that the policy [FRB] and engagement is working” [1-9]. Only one 
participant was explicit about the deliberate management of community outrage:  
We also have underlying interest in them being resilient because the 
impacts and fall-out to us, because the impact of fire onto them and if they 
can handle it better, well the impacts and the political fallout is going to be 
less to us. Looking at it from that perspective is not one people would 
frequently articulate I would have thought [1-3].  
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5.2.2 Sustainability: humans as part of nature (A living with 
nature frame)  
The second master-frame portrayed fire management as a challenge involving an 
ongoing need to balance social and ecological objectives: to achieve sustainability. It 
conceived less of nature as something to protect humans from, but more as 
something of which humans are a part. The language of this frame was less 
defensive and more accommodating in its rhetoric. In this master-frame, the 
potential threat that fire can pose to life and assets was recognised, but it was 
viewed as equally legitimate as biodiversity and natural resource management goals. 
Threaded throughout its storyline was the idea that humans are a part of those 
systems and how we choose to live with them (or against them) influences not only 
our safety with respect to fire, but our overall well-being. In contrast to an EM 
framing, those employing a sustainability framing expressed less certainty, in that 
the ‘balance’ was an ideal, possibly unattainable state. In this master-frame, the 
diagnostic sub-frames suggested that causes underlying the sector’s policy context 
are not readily identifiable, that many are unknown. Therefore, there are no sole, 
simple, or permanent ‘solutions’.   
Achieving a balance between fire-safe and resilient human communities 
and sustainable and resilient ecosystems [S2-1], [s2-5], [s1-34].....between 
short-term and long-term objectives [1-8]...a bit like the Holy Grail…I 
don’t know how we’d do it, I really don’t, but I think that’s actually what 
management is about [1-10] 
Moreover, the choice of ‘solution’ is a question of value judgements and 
trade-offs. The inherently political nature of such trade-offs is how the idea of 
complexity was conveyed through this frame. Several respondents also suggested 
that these complexities are exacerbated because people want a simple solution.  
The struggle in all of this - it isn't a scientific question. It's a how much do 
we value this part over this part over this part. Where do we juggle, how 
do we make the decisions that juggle at different points on the landscape? 
[3-8] 
A lot of the issues and dilemmas that we’re going to be facing in the future 
are going to be about what we value, not what we know [1-11] 
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It’s this whole discussion about what is it we’re trying to achieve and I 
don’t think there’s one answer......the social debate that has to happen 
around that is the biggest issue [1-2] 
The morality claims of this frame surrounded both social and ecological 
justice. Social justice included human security enabled through an ability to live with 
fire, supported by an understanding of fire’s role in ecosystem dynamics and an 
overall improved appreciation for ‘the environment’. Ecological justice related both 
to fire’s role in many ecosystems but also to broader objectives of land and native 
vegetation conservation. This frame’s storyline was predicated on different 
assumptions to that of the EM framing, with respect to community knowledge, the 
range of values to be considered, and the complexities inherent in working with the 
underlying issues.  
We talk about fire risk, but we don’t necessarily – that’s people’s risk of, 
looking at, the risk of wildfire, but we don’t recognise that there’s risk in 
the treatments as well. We don’t acknowledge the risk of staying or risk of 
leaving and people’s perceptions of that risk [1 pre ’09 fires] 
Heinz 57 varieties [1-2] 
For several participants, the inherent struggle within the sector is a broader 
reflection of our struggle to understand and live with our environment and 
landscapes, including how we have changed them. 
“We are not living in a landscape the same as when Europeans turned up. 
The bush is no longer 'natural' because we have to put out lightning strikes 
to protect life and property. The presence of ‘man' has affected the type of 
landscape we live in forever and we have to understand that better” [s1-
35]. 
A sustainability framing conceived of fire management as more than an 
emergency (or risk) management issue. Consequently, the narrative was less one of 
defence, but rather one of living with an environment in which fire is one of a 
number of natural, albeit potentially life threatening, facets. Within the sustainability 
frame, the knowledge needed to achieve that goal is considered limited and the goal 
is perhaps unattainable. Parallels between the underlying rhetoric of much of this 
frame and the well-known ‘harmony with nature’ theme (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 
1993; Koenig, 2006) were obvious. Here there is clear divergence from the human: 
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nature duality, the defensive narrative of the EM frame. Just as the previous section 
discussed the key sub-frames that structured the EM frame, this section discusses 
the same for the sustainability frame. 
5.2.2.a Land management  
As in an EM framing, a sustainability master-frame conceived fire as an important 
process in our landscapes. ‘Good fire’ included both fuel reduction burning and 
ecological burning. However, the definition of ‘good fire’ was subtly different to 
that of the EM frame. Rather than a lack of fire causing ecological degradation, a 
lack of an ecological basis for burning was portrayed as the cause of that 
degradation. Consequently, a ‘solution’ was to use ecological indicators first [1-13, s1-
42] as a guide to FRB.  
The metaphor of imbalance was also used in this master-frame, but in direct 
contrast to some of the EM sub-frames. This frame portrayed the imbalance to be 
tipped away from conservation, ‘toward’ protection of humans and infrastructure.  
It’s all oriented around humans and buildings. Consequently the system’s 
got out of kilter. There’s a lot of burning around some areas and other 
zones just get left. We need to balance it a bit more [1-13].  
 [The goal’s about] the maintenance of appropriate fire regimes and 
equally, the protection of life and property from the adverse impacts of 
inappropriate fire. I probably should have said that one first, but everyone 
else says life and property [1-7]  
 The diagnostic sub-frame was that policies or programs that can be 
quantified or measured are given prominence, thus because biodiversity is more 
difficult to quantify, it is given less attention. For example, a handful of respondents 
argued that because area burnt can be measured, it is the preferred policy option. 
Whereas it is more difficult to measure ‘ecological health’ and therefore this policy 
options receives less support.  
Keeping the Leadbeater’s Possum as a thriving species for the next 
hundred years is a difficult thing to demonstrate. Whereas if you've got a 
target and you can show unequivocally that you met your target, then 
clearly you're doing a good job [3-16] 
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In this frame, ecological concerns were conceived as being ignored or 
treated as an afterthought. Such a conception may make sense if we consider that a 
particularly technocratic interpretation of risk management implies ready 
quantification and assessment of ‘risk’ and selection of ‘treatment’ options. 
Certainly, the logic underpinning the imbalance towards quantifiable options was 
argued to be a form of resistance to or prejudice against considering the 
environment.  
A lot of them say [the word environment] because they're expected to say 
it, but the underlying prejudices are still there.......they see forests and 
whatnots as resources, and they see greenies as something that you 
tolerate [3-9] 
I think it has changed. There is still a pocket, an undercurrent of resistance 
in that “it’s an added extra. We’re there to do a job, we don’t have time to 
think much, let alone think about the environment” [2-5] 
For some participants, although they stated that fuel reduction burning 
(FRB) is accepted and necessary, the underlying rhetoric was that FRB would 
involve loss. Using similarly moralistic language to the EM framing, areas in which 
FRB was undertaken were sometimes characterised as being sacrificed.  
[How is burning accepted in your area?] Oh it’s fine, but the conflict is 
that we need to establish areas that are sacrificed and decide that it’s OK 
to sacrifice them, because if you burn them as often as you need to, well the 
veg is going to change. There’s a lot of tension between the burning 
elsewhere as to whether in fact it does anything [to reduce risk] [2-4] 
The imagery of trying to find a balance and the difficulties of the inherent 
value-judgements and trade-offs within that was reflected in statements that framed 
others as presenting a choice between two overly simplistic extremes – burn or do 
not burn.  
Concerns of private land owners, in bush fire risk areas often with some 
alarmist views from local brigades, who often seek to blame public land 
managers for 'locking up' the bush and preventing 'sensible' fuel reduction.  
It all seems too often lead to a simplistic community perception that the 
brigades are the heroes and the greenies are the villains [s1-33]. 
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[The views that currently dominate] are the extreme views of minority 
groups such as Bushfire Taskforce (burn everything) and environment 
groups (don’t burn at all) [s1-13]  
For the last 10 or 15 years we’ve been engaging with either side of the 
spectrum – the ‘burn everything, log everything’ people or the ‘do 
absolutely nothing, leave everything to mother-nature’ people. We have 
those two extremes. 96% of people actually sit in the middle. The most 
important thing is what they value [1-4]. 
Finally, just as some using an emergency management framing co-opted 
ecological arguments, a couple of respondents using a sustainability frame, adopted 
risk management language to suggest that the FRB might increase fire risk.  
I'm just concerned that burning too frequently in areas that are wet, 
traditionally, will make them drier and therefore increase the risk. [3-15] 
We need to be a much clearer on our message about what really is a risk 
and how do we manage it. Often we’re not getting the outcomes that we 
want. We’re getting wholesale removal of vegetation under the banner of 
fire prevention. So there is still a lot work to be done in educating people, 
getting agencies to really work together under their legislative portfolios, 
and requirements and get a really positive outcome for all concerned [3-
10] bal. 
 
5.2.2.b Community awareness and engagement 
Through a sustainability master-frame, a major diagnostic sub-frame was 
characterisation of a ‘lack of community awareness’ about bushfire risk, was driven 
by a more general lack of environmental awareness [s1-22]. Such challenges were 
portrayed as symbolic of broader questions about understanding and living with our 
environment.  
It is about how do we come to grips with the environment we live in? It is 
fire, soil and water that shape us, if you like...the whole ecosystem. So, fire 
management is such a core element. Maybe I see it too strongly. I don’t 
think many people see it that way. [1-17] 
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Within this framing, there was an argument that a European cultural 
inheritance had contributed to a disconnection from the Victorian environment and 
therefore, the ecological place of fire in its landscape. This disconnection was 
characterised as giving rise to mythologies and directing defensive, technological 
approaches to dealing with the issues [1-10, 1-17].  
This diagnostic sub-frame also drew on claims similar to those of the 
emergency management frame regarding communities having unrealistic 
expectations of the capacity of fire agencies to suppress all fires, especially during 
extreme events [s1-9, s1-49]. For some of the respondents, these perceptions lead 
communities, media and governments to seek someone or something to blame 
when fires inevitably affect people and other assets [s1-1] – what some called ‘the 
blame game’. Expectations of suppression and protection were again, often 
attributed to people who move from urban areas into ‘rural’ or bushfire prone 
areas. Drawing on a living-with-nature narrative however, these expectations were 
depicted as underlain by a lack of environmental and thus, bushfire awareness.  
The general drift of people into bushfire prone areas without the 
generational knowledge of bushfire all mean the "ability to prepare" or 
"the ability to understand the environment" are all reduced [s1-6] 
For others it was a reflection of broader societal expectations of safety, 
which are fed by conceptions of a human-nature duality.  
[The issue is driven by] increasing urbanisation and marketing of 
technologies as solutions to 'protect us' from natural discomforts and a 
subsequent compounding of this by politicians, agencies and media. 
Because fire is at the nexus of many complex systems, both natural and 
anthropogenic, it is easy to 'blame' fire management as the 'cause' of 
failure in any of these spheres [S2-2], [s1-19] 
With respect to the concomitant prognostic sub-frame, responsibility for 
dealing with the issues was also conceived as being shared between communities 
and government. Yet in this frame, that responsibility was considered necessarily 
within the context of other values. Several participants recognised that bushfires are 
a relatively low likelihood event, albeit with highly significant potential 
consequences, and therefore may not be an issue of high priority for many people. 
From the perspective of a dialectic, value-based struggle between the broad agendas 
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of safety and conservation, the purpose of community engagement in this frame 
was defined as being about informing and making those choices, collectively. In this 
prognostic frame, community engagement was also couched in terms of needing to 
combine raising awareness of risk with a more general ‘living with the environment’ 
awareness [s1-25, 1-15] that incorporates acceptance of the ecological role of fire and 
thereby, the use of fire in land management, whether for fuel reduction or ecological 
purposes.  
Then it’s not just fuels, fire behaviour and houses burning down. Its sugar-
gliders and bandicoots and birds and stuff that they like [1-13] 
  
5.2.3 Land use planning and development - frame convergence 
(& some underlying divergence) 
In both the EM and sustainability master-frames, land use planning (LUP) was 
expressed as a key causal factor influencing the issues faced in the fire management 
sector. At this meta level and irrespective of the respondent’s professional role, 
there appeared to be frame convergence. However, analysis of the respective 
underlying rhetoric revealed a more complex story. This subject matter is a good 
example of how different people can construct different arguments out of similar 
narratives (Fischer, 2003:181).   
5.2.3.a The convergence 
The phrase ‘inappropriate development’ was used consistently throughout the data 
and irrespective of frame. The argument was that bushfire risk was created through 
placing people and their homes near ‘fuel hazards’. Consequently, avoiding creation 
of the problem in the first place, was the shared, preferred solution [3-12, S2-9, 1-6, 3-
16, 3-13]. There was also some frame convergence around descriptions of the 
challenge presented by the existing housing stock. For example, the idea of 
reclaiming certain areas of land was described as diabolical [3-16]. Another 
participant described the dilemma that while it may be what’s needed, propositions 
to reclaim land may be “a bit over the top”:  
“If we don't at least reflect that that is what we want to happen then we 
endorse what is happening” [3-19].  
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 One participant described the current state of development of the urban-rural 
interface as ‘a muddle’ [1-11], and another that ‘the damage is done in a whole lot of 
places and disasters will happen’ [1-6]. There was also convergence around 
conceptions of what is driving the situation, including the economics of 
development [3-9] [3-24].  
They have their time pressures and they’ve got the developed screaming at 
time saying “well can you approve my amendment”. Those issues always 
influence decisions, rightly or wrongly, but they always do. The money 
always speaks louder than the time available [3-13] 
The planners say no but the councillors don't because they want to develop 
the area at all costs [3-17]  
5.2.3.b An underlying divergence 
The divergence in the framing of land use planning as both cause and solution lay 
within the subject of ecological concerns. Through an EM master-frame, the need 
to consider ecological impacts within land-use planning (LUP) was portrayed as 
undermining or even, ignoring, safety objectives.  
You end up with....all of these sorts of things, which can impact ultimately 
on the fuel management process that we are trying to implement to....to 
protect the community [3-5]  
This perspective used an underlying rhetoric that drew again on the imagery 
of imbalance as interpreted in the EM frame – that too much consideration was 
given to environmental concerns, tipping ‘the balance’ away from the imperative of 
human safety. 
“Vegetation controls have completely overridden community and personal 
safety goals” [3-19]  
We have been left with a growing legacy of poor development.......The 
native vegetation framework is counter to sound fire protection works 
around settlements [s1-14] 
Unsurprisingly, through a sustainability frame, biodiversity was described as 
‘losing out’ when a choice eventually has to be made because of the fear of fire [3-
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15] – the balance is tipped away from environmental concerns. One participant 
framed the debate in terms of defence and justice. 
I just feel like I'm constantly trying to justify that vegetation is important 
and if you are living in the bush, you need to accept some level of 
responsibility and accept that you are living in the bush. You know, we're 
not going to have mineral earth breaks everywhere [3-3] 
In this particular respondent’s conception, the question of responsibility 
related to a moral responsibility toward the environment. While reflecting the 
general tenor of the two master-frames, these subtly different sub-frames reveal 
that these bureaucrats perceive that they have to justify policy positions based on 
morality rather than science. It also suggests that the discourse within the sector 
may be based on a blanket dichotomous choice between conservation and 
community safety, rather than those of more complex, variable decisions.  
5.2.3.c A converging divergence 
While acknowledging the conflict, irrespective of master, diagnostic or prognostic 
frame, not one respondent suggested that it was their organisation’s responsibility 
to address the land use planning situation. Whenever the issue was raised, 
responsibility for making relevant decisions or setting policy parameters was 
attributed to ‘another agency’ [3-19].  
It's almost like they will just put conditions on it and expect council to be 
the one at the end of the day to accept the liability of the risk if that house 
does burn down [3-3]  
Planners have failed to take adequate account of the potential effects of 
wildfire on development proposals in inappropriate areas [s1-47], [s1-20]  
Respondents who mentioned the issue consistently stated that there is a 
general lack of integration, coordination and sound guidance, often leading to 
debates around community safety and native vegetation conservation being 
thrashed out at an individual property level [3-8].  
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5.2.4 Bureaucratic framing of fire management 
Participating bureaucrats broadly framed fire management as an emergency 
management (EM) or sustainability (balancing social-ecological imperatives) 
challenge. Both are globally popular policy narratives. Through an EM master-
frame, policy options were about managing the hazard and reducing their risk is a 
moral choice. That frame emphasised the use of fairly instrumentalist approaches to 
risk management, implying objectivity and measurability. By connecting ideas of 
community awareness and fuel reduction burning to an overall safety imperative 
this frame tended to depict other considerations as undermining, impeding or 
complicating the safety imperative. The imagery of imbalance was regularly called 
upon. A perhaps not surprising example was the conception of environmental 
concerns as barriers to managing threats to human safety, depicting the balance as 
‘tipped toward’ environmental concerns, away from safety. The language of this 
frame referred to fuel, not vegetation or ecosystems. Simplification of ecosystems 
into fuel hazard was in strong contrast to those who talked of ecosystems as 
complex systems. By ‘making sense’ of the policy context through an emergency (or 
risk) management prism, this frame tended to direct attention to immediate, 
technocratic actions. A safety or ‘security from risk’ frame is a common policy 
frame (Beck, 1992; Koenig, 2006; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The utilitarian, 
anthropocentric nature of this master-frame contrasted with the ‘humans-as-part-
of-nature’ of the sustainability master-frame.  
Through a sustainability master-frame, the sector’s challenges were typified 
as being driven by a value-based struggle as opposed to a rational choice. This 
frame conveyed a much lesser sense of certainty than the EM frame. Bureaucrats 
using a sustainability frame did not argue that human-security - as a value – takes 
precedence a-priori. Consequently, ‘solutions’ to finding a balance between the 
social and ecological imperatives of fire management, rested on the idea of people 
understanding and ‘living with’ their environment, and of having dialogue about 
which values take precedence where. Characterising fire management as a 
sustainability challenge arguably reflects wider societal sensibilities regarding the 
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interconnectedness of human-environment systems (Hajer, 1995; Koenig, 2004; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993)31.  
It was hardly surprising that many bureaucrats were found to frame fire 
management as an issue of emergency management to be managed through a risk 
management approach, with its implied rationality and objectivity. There has been a 
strong theoretical movement from hazard to risk management within the disaster 
management literature and key guiding documents (E.g. ISDR 2005 Hyogo 
Framework and the State’s Bushfire Strategy 2008). However, there was less of a 
sense of vulnerability reduction in the interpretations of risk management found 
here, than that conveyed in the DRR literature and international documents such as 
the Hyogo Framework. Interpretations found here focussed more on hazard 
reduction and abilities to respond to events, and using whatever means necessary to 
achieve those purposes. Because the underlying drivers of these issues were 
conceived as clear and identifiable, part of its argument was that provision of this 
‘obvious’ knowledge is enough to lead to actions deemed appropriate. 
Consequently, the underlying rhetoric portrayed those who work in the sector (with 
the ‘right experience or knowledge’) as experts with knowledge to convey. An 
appeal to science and rationality and trust in expert systems, is a feature of 
modernity (Giddens, 1984).  
It was equally unsurprising that a sustainability master-frame existed 
alongside that of emergency management, given that fire management involves 
both DRR and natural resource management (NRM). The majority of bureaucrats 
who used a sustainability master-frame would often incorporate risk management 
terms in many of their prognostic (solution) sub-frames. While a sustainability 
framing might bridge the notions of risk management and ecological management, 
it may also present a cognitive barrier to those who conceive environmental 
concerns as restricting risk management objectives. Drawing upon the metaphor of 
‘balance’ may provide some initial space for exploring variations in the prioritisation 
of policy options. It may also help to convey the situation to be more dynamic and 
complex, replete with inherent value trade-offs. The notion of balancing may also 
encourage development of a learning capacity, as opposed to an overarching drive 
to solve ‘the problem’ (Hudson, 2007).  
                                                 
31
 
Arguably, it is also emblematic of a broader, ongoing struggle about how we live with the Australian continent.
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The subject of community engagement may be a subject upon which to 
initiate a frame reflexive conversation. While community engagement embodied a 
solution within both master-frames, subtle differences were found in relation to the 
validity respondents ascribed to different agency’s approaches. For several 
respondents, the ‘other agency’ does not engage in a dialogue with communities. 
‘They’ are described as being directive. Even more subtle, was that a handful of 
participants suggested that their organisation’s approach to community engagement 
was not as good as they thought it could be. These participants characterised 
community development as a complex policy area and that the understanding of it 
is underdeveloped within the sector as a whole. “On the social side I think it’s [fire 
management] still in nappies” [1-5].  
Each frame focused on particular aspects of the policy context. However, 
the sustainability framing seemingly attempted to bridge or include the emergency 
management frame. Both have fairly well reasoned bases for their internal logics, 
neither is more valid, and there is science and data that can support both. A key 
question for this research, was whether the advent of CC reinforces these frames, 
or does it provide an opportunity for exploration of alternative frames, an 
opportunity for re-framing? The next sub-section explores exactly that issue. 
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5.3 FRAMING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN ISSUE 
FOR FIRE MANAGEMENT 
This part of the frame analysis sought to identify: how the study’s participants 
frame climate change as a problem for the sector (if at all); and how they frame 
‘solutions’ to the issues they identified. Its purpose was to identify the influence of 
existing policy frames on concepts of climate change and adapting to it, and to 
explore whether the need to consider climate change is driving reflection upon 
existing policy frames. Interviewees were only directly asked about climate change 
where they had not mentioned it during their interview. Survey participants were 
asked to rank a number of issues, including climate change, in terms of most to 
least significant for the sector, or to provide some discussion around what they 
thought was the most significant issue for the sector. Interviewees were also asked 
how the issues they raised about climate change were being addressed in the sector. 
Analysis of the results is illustrated again through paraphrasing and use of quotes 
from the data.  
5.3.1 Climate change as an issue (or not) 
The first aspect of this frame analysis sought to identify how participating 
bureaucrats conceived of climate change (CC). Frame analysis regularly includes an 
exploration of the seriousness that actors place on an issue. This study 
distinguished two groups of actors with respect to how they frame climate change 
as a phenomenon. The first, smaller group argued that current climatic conditions 
(at that time, ‘the drought’) might be an aberration or part of ‘natural’ cycles [3-24]. 
For this group, climate change projections and the anthropogenic role in climate 
change were characterised as ambiguous [3-13]. For one of these bureaucrats, 
whether climate change needed to be considered was a matter of belief:  
“If you’re a believer in climate change, in the predictions.....We haven't 
been around long enough to know whether this is just an aberration in – in 
the whole thing. I'm not going to be here to worry about it” [3-5].  
For one respondent, the weather associated with the major bushfires of 
2009 brought cause for them to ‘reconsider’ climate change, describing the fires as 
potential ‘proof’. 
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“I thought it was just a bunch of scientists banging on about nothing. It’ll 
be something else next week. Now I'm starting, after having a big fire 
season and experiencing conditions that we never thought were 
imaginable.... I'm always very sceptical until it is proven and I'm starting 
to think that maybe there is something to it [3-2]  
For two other respondents, climate change was characterised as an issue for 
the sector because others suggest that it is [1-3, 1-5]. For the bulk of participants 
however, climate change was described as highly probable to certain. Most talked 
directly about the potential impacts and implications for the sector, as opposed to 
raising doubts or questions about climate change. Several participants described it 
as happening now (E.g. [1-11], [1-6]).  
[Climate change is] ‘Rapid and perhaps the damage has already been 
done...that without a doubt [it] has significant impact on fire agencies now 
and into the future [S1-8].  
Climate change is a significant threat to global community safety [s1-28] 32 
It’s risk management 101. What are the probabilities, what are the 
consequences? Probability: very high. Consequences: extreme. Put that on 
a matrix and it says you’re in trouble. It’s a no-brainer to me [1-12] 
Interviewees were asked if and how climate change is being addressed in the 
sector generally and their organisation specifically. Responses indicated that 
consideration of the implications of climate change is nascent in the sector, and that 
it is not engendering reflection upon underlying assumptions of policy options. 
Several participants suggested that while there was a fair degree of awareness about 
climate change within the sector, more detailed and complex considerations of its 
implications have yet to commence [1-2, s1-22, 1-1, 3-25, 3-16, s1-23, 1-8]. One 
respondent proposed that an underlying cause for limited consideration of climate 
change is that the industry is: 
“caught up in the day to day grind. There’s a bit of noise over here but you 
just don’t have time to look into that – what does it mean? Then next 
minute, shit. That’s what it means. I’ll give you an example: climate 
change” [2-3]. 
                                                 
32 The use of the word significant in survey responses is likely to have been driven by the fact that the survey used this word in asking 
respondents to order issues from most significant to least significant for the sector, and then to comment on why they thought their first choice 
was most significant. Thus the use of this word in relation to CC was not deemed to be weighty 
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5.3.2 Framing climate change – the implications & responses 
What it means for fire is, in two words, February seventh [3-7]  
The analysis found three broad dimensions to the way that participating bureaucrats 
frame the implications of climate change and responses to those implications: 
current approaches are justified irrespective of climate change; climate change will 
exacerbate many existing issues; and climate change will drive significant but 
uncertain change in the policy context. Overwhelmingly, the storylines surrounding 
climate change were largely negative and focussed on loss. While climate change 
was associated with biophysical impacts such as increasing drought, drier 
vegetation, longer fire seasons and more bushfires, the majority of respondents did 
not characterize the implications of climate change in biophysical terms.  
Interestingly, the implications of climate change for the sector were 
conceived mostly through an emergency frame. A predominantly negative, impact 
frame was used and linked directly to impacts on human safety. Where ecosystem 
impacts were described, these too were generally linked to human exposure to 
bushfires33. On rare occasion, a participant raised ecological implications and their 
association with the challenge of value judgements, similar to those expressed in the 
sustainability frame. Only one respondent used a more positive frame, albeit based 
on an argument that communities may have some resilience through their capacity 
to move from impacted areas.  
Just not as simple as the climate’s going to change so people are going to 
suffer. OK sure there’ll be less water, and you’re going have people doing 
it tough, and they do during drought and during fire........So you’ll get them 
moving somewhere else, and other areas that are getting more rainfall. 
They’re going to be having more intensive farming so that area’s going to 
be increasing in economic prosperity. They might become more resilient or 
less resilient depending on whether that’s linked [1-3] 
The next sub-sections outline how participating bureaucrats framed climate 
change as an issue for the sector.  
                                                 
33 This framing was irrespective of whether the data were collected before or post the fires of February 2009. 
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5.3.2.a Not too dissimilar to the current situation (Routine) 
Several respondents argued that existing policies and programs should be 
implemented irrespective of climate change issues. Hence, existing policies were 
framed in positive terms such as investment [1-11]. The argument was that people 
are already at risk and bushfires already occur. They also argued that even if there 
were increases in bushfire, the information, the ‘messages’, for communities would 
not change. In this argument, climate change was argued to exist in the context of 
other factors that drive existing challenges [1-10].  
[What do you reckon it will mean for you guys at [X]?] Probably not a 
great deal [3-24]  
I'm optimistic for the future of fire management despite the bogey of 
climate change!! [s1-46] 
It’s not like we’re building something against a possibility. We get them 
[storms and bushfires] all the time. The more we invest, the more we do, 
the greater will be the return on investment......Climate change is a 
variable, a factor that we need to include in the way we do business, short, 
medium and long term. It is not an issue in itself [1-16].  
I don't think it affects us because things are still going to burn. There's just 
going to be more fires more often and I think that's probably a good thing 
because it will give us more practice. In response and the community will 
be a bit more aware…. The policy needs to be there to address the fire risk 
whether you have more fires or not. [3-14] 
Occasionally, climate change was painted as a potential opportunity for 
increasing community ‘awareness’. Even where one respondent prefaced their 
response with ‘climate change is changing everything’, they argued for the notion of 
‘getting communities to accept a much higher level of responsibility for their own 
safety’ [3-20].  Through an EM frame this ‘opportunity’ related to increasing 
awareness of bushfire risk [s1-39]. Through a sustainability frame it meant increased 
general environmental awareness: 
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Climate change is bringing a pattern of environmental awareness which I 
think we can latch onto in fire safety. And turn it into an opportunity in 
terms of understanding fire [1]  
Alternatively, one respondent suggested that a focus on climate change 
makes getting action on fire management issues harder because it distracts from, or 
even, undermines the legitimacy of existing policies and programs. This perspective 
reflects a growing argument in the adaptation literature that a continued emphasis 
on the biophysical nature of climate change impacts ignores the cultural and 
societal contexts within which climate change plays out (Hulme, 2008, Jasanoff, 
2010). The challenges that climate change presents to current lifestyles and choices 
were portrayed as potentially undermining the intent of many fire management 
activities. Actions to reduce bushfire risks were framed as logical and useful, 
irrespective of climate change. Several participants argued therefore that climate 
change should not be treated as an issue unto itself.  
I think it's actually made it harder. It's not convenient for a lot of people 
not to believe it. Implies they might need to change something about their 
lifestyle, what they do, how they live, how things are done. I'm a believer 
myself…… I actually believe our whole idea of bushfire strategy and 
bushfire management shouldn't have to hang off that….So you need to say 
“this'll stand us in good stead if climate change – if the protagonists for it 
are correct - we'll still be in good shape”. Rather than saying “climate 
change is coming” [3-9] 
Whilst I fully acknowledge that we're probably going to have fires that are 
significant and more often, the impact of them potentially isn't going to be 
any different to what we've previously experienced. You can't use climate 
change as a reason for not doing something or for doing something. I 
mean, they should be doing it anyway [3-13] 
Drawing on the same narrative, there was some concern that climate change 
could be used as an excuse for (perceived) failure of current policies. Not 
considering what may have actually contributed to the ‘failure’ ignores a key tenet 
of the idea of vulnerability reduction in the DRR literature.  
It’s easier for governments to blame it on climate change because if you 
haven’t done anything since the last similar event then CC becomes a good 
reason. There’s a real worry for communities in that [1-16] 
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In this framing current policies and practice were argued to be justifiable 
regardless of climate change (Dovers, 2009). Framing climate change as not 
engendering a need for change in the policy context, parallels Handmer and 
Dovers’ (2008:94) concept of ‘routine’ disaster events where the sector is able to 
cope with some shift in events and disturbance but these are assumed to be within 
institutional and social memory.  
One participant suggested reflection upon the efficacy of current 
approaches, should be occurring irrespective of climate change. 
Whether we're just going through a natural phase in like a 150 year period 
or whether it is really changing. However I think we should be taking 
notice of what nature may be telling us. We probably need to get some 
decision – and it will come from other people than me - as to, are the 
things we're doing now going to stand us in good stead for the future? [3-
12] 
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5.3.2.b Excerbates existing issues (Non-routine) 
The majority of interviewees described climate change as exacerbating the sectors’ 
existing challenges. For example, climate change was framed as putting increased 
pressure on already limited capacities or abilities to manage the threat of bushfire to 
human safety. For example, for those with a personnel management role the 
potential for extended fire seasons was described as increasing pressures on an 
already fatigued workforce [1-1], reducing organisational capacity to respond to fires.  
I don't think we're going to be able to get ahead of the game, if that means 
even - I just don't see how with the current resources how we might be 
better prepared [3-25] 
The implications are huge. We’ve already got fatigued people. People who 
think “I don’t think I can survive in this industry” and their families saying 
“we don’t want you doing this anymore” [1-11] 
Similarly, through its projected impacts on rural demographics, climate 
change was also framed as exacerbating an already declining number of volunteers, 
linked to a reduction in organisational capacity for response. 
So climate change is going to be a double-whammy: more business and 
less capacity in some ways [1-2] 
For several participants, climate change has the potential to exacerbate 
tensions in current debates surrounding the various objectives and policy options 
within the sector [1-11]. One respondent was particularly concerned that this would 
increase ‘blame games’ [3-23] where communities, government, media and others 
search for someone or something (an agency) to ‘blame’ for negative consequences 
of a bushfire. Another characterised climate change as potentially overwhelming 
community willingness and capacity to prepare for bushfires.  
It may decrease [community] resilience in decreasing their desire to deal 
with it. It might, it [resultant bushfire] will physically overwhelm more 
people……If we’re going to get more intense fires then more people will be 
caught unprepared. There’s no doubt about that. [1-5] 
As was noted in the introduction to this sub-section, the implications of 
climate change were very much couched in terms of implications for emergency 
management capacity. For example, fuel reduction burning (FRB) was argued to be 
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an even more important solution, and concerns about the use of FRB under 
conditions more conducive for fire, were framed as risk averse. The rhetoric was 
that the consequences of not taking that risk would worsen the consequences of the 
risk FRB was directed toward reducing [1-1]. Use of phrases such as ‘investment in 
prevention’ implied that this policy option is valuable, and something in which to 
invest.  
If you look at climate change now and where should we be in 20 years 
time, in my view it’s a lot more investment in the prevention, which largely 
relates to prescribed burning in the landscape, it’s the major tool we’re 
talking about here....but at the same time governments and agencies and 
community have got to maintain its capability to deal with worst case 
scenarios in response....We have to shift our…be less risk averse. We 
actually have to take risks to keep up with CC. [1-6] 
Whatever it is, there’s something going…….The fire-climate change thing 
is in the media etc I don’t think there’s been a better time. Our polling is 
showing that 70 or 80% of the population is saying we need more burning. 
It’s all supportive. Everything’s pointing in the one direction. [1-9] 
Climate change was very much considered through an emergency 
management frame, evidenced in the use of the language of risk management 
permeating the way in which many respondents discussed the issue. Risk 
management was often couched as the most useful means to approach it because 
potential impacts could be quantified. Very often, the respondents focussed on the 
use of prescribed fire to ameliorate potential impacts of climate change on fuel 
conditions. One respondent described the use of FRB as useful in “stopping things 
going pear-shaped”.  
[They’ve] written a paper that’s exactly on that topic. It’s about doing risk 
analysis and what’s likely to happen, trying to reduce risk and 
consequences, to burn the right bits of the landscape at the right time to 
reduce something going pear-shaped later when the season’s more acute. 
That’s the approach they’re taking. They’ve developed all these criticality 
tables they call them. To look at what the various risks and consequences 
are for various elements, one of them being the environment. What could 
happen at various scales of fire and things going wrong [1-12] 
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Just as land-use planning (LUP) was framed as cause and solution, because 
climate change was considered to be shifting some ecosystems to a more bushfire 
prone nature, land use planning was framed as an increasingly justifiable and 
necessary approach to address climate change adaptation by avoiding creation of 
bushfire risk [3-15, 1-16]. For one respondent the issue was symbolic of broader 
priorities and intents. 
We will see areas that were probably temperate becoming more fire prone 
during the summer. .... So that means it has to be more critical that we get 
the landscape planning right first......if we don't at least reflect that that is 
what we want to happen then we endorse what is happening [3-19] 
The framing of climate change as exacerbating existing pressures, parallels 
conceptions of disaster events as non-routine, where there is a significantly 
exacerbated degree of variability and related impacts that are not outside human 
experience but very challenging (Handmer and Dovers, 2008:94). This framing 
however, drew primarily on an emergency management narrative, which was 
unsurprising given the emphasis on increased extreme events in climate change 
projections.  
5.3.2.c Changing the policy context (Unbounded and complex) 
The third, but least recurrent framing of climate change was as a driver of such 
significant change that the sector’s policy context was conceived as unbounded and 
increasingly complex. A repertoire of terms conveyed a sense of increase or impact 
by orders of magnitude such as huge, enormous, significant and extreme, alongside 
increasing complexities and uncertainties. Impacts were still most commonly linked 
to implications for human safety. In this framing however, water was given 
particular prominence, framed as becoming increasingly valuable and consequently 
its use during fire suppression activities may have to change. Through its 
connection with drought, reduced water availability was also framed as a multiplier 
of general community impacts that were then associated with community capacity 
to deal with bushfires. For example, reduced water availability may lower the 
financial viability of particular land uses, which in turn stresses communities and 
drives further land-use, demographic and social change [1-1]. These water-associated 
impacts were directly linked to the ability of communities and fire agencies to 
defend homes [1-7].  
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We’re going to have farmers with shot guns at their gates saying “don’t 
take my water”. It’s becoming that precious. [1-12] 
Maybe houses won’t be as important as they are now. People will say 
“stuff the house. We’ve got insurance, deal with the water. If you let all 
those things burn while you’re protecting our houses, we won’t have water, 
we won’t be able to live here anyway”. [1-4] 
For [my role] maybe not that much impact but [x] said to me “If [z 
community] don't get anything [rain] this year that's a landscape level 
change of people walking off their land that we probably haven't seen since 
the 20s” [3-19] 
We’ve realised as a fire service that you can’t just keep throwing water 
willy-nilly [2-2] 
For very few respondents, projections for an increasingly dry environment 
were also associated with potential shifts in some wet ecosystems to drier states. 
Such shifts were directly linked to a reduction in safety, because of a consequent 
reduced capacity for people to deal with an increased incidence of bushfires [3-23]. 
Although the term vulnerability was used, it was interpreted as physical exposure to 
a fuel hazard. Numerical measures were used to emphasise the degree of change, in 
this case, the degree of increased likelihood of a bushfire. 
The other thing of course is, those community’s who weren’t vulnerable 
before, are now becoming vulnerable.....We have had fires running through 
those rainforests at the top of the Strezleckis over the last 3 or 4 years, for 
the first time in many, many, many years. [1-15] 
With climate change and lack of water now some [areas] might have 
flipped over entirely and there’s only 2 years out of 10 when you can be 
relatively safe [1-14]  
It was really only within this conception of potentially unbounded impacts 
that most descriptions of potential implications for ecological management were 
raised and these were through a negative framing. This was reflected in the use of 
descriptors such as increasing the difficulties of ecological burning [1-13], having 
huge impacts on biodiversity [1-17] and making things more complex.  
It’s going to make a lot more complex because the ecosystem are already 
going to be challenged by…global warming and therefore they’re going to 
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be altered states anyway, and therefore the impact on fire on those 
ecosystems is going to be more of an unknown [1] 
Part of the narrative of increasing complexity was linked to an increase in having to 
make difficult and confronting choices, reflecting arguments used in a sustainability 
framing of fire management. 
The question is, we need to make the decision now not to actually try to 
protect [rare and threatened species] because they are gone regardless of 
our actions or inactions. I know that it’s hard to say but we’re talking here 
about the sustainable future of our kids, grandchildren, or whoever else [1-
4] 
For several respondents the challenge of difficult value judgments 
emphasized the import of community involvement in making those choices [1-12].  
Then also in terms of the way that we value the natural environment that 
we live within what does it mean for that? ......And because the likelihood 
of them [communities] being involved in fire has increased....So community 
needs to be involved in that thinking and understanding as well so that 
they’re able to input into these decisions on a local level that are the right 
sort of decisions [3-23]  
They need to have increased resilience to deal with the increased threat. 
And that comes back to things like, their environmental values, acceptance 
of....realities of climate change and fire and...their values in terms of 
balancing safety and environmental pressures........both physical and 
mental preparedness to deal with that risk.......they need to be able to 
participate in discussions and decisions about what affects them as an 
individual but...how it affects their communities and their broader society 
[1]. 
For another respondent, the uncertainty that climate change presents stems 
from the fact that climate change models cannot be downscaled to a regional level. 
Therefore, they argued, there is not enough information on which to base decisions 
or discussions with communities.  
My understanding, from our colleagues from the bureau and beyond, is 
that their science is not yet useful enough to us. In other words they can’t 
bring it down regionally, in a specific enough sense, for us to then start to 
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think about what it might mean to our current knowledge gap........ We 
can't have that discussion with the wider community based on “if the 
models are right, this is where it’s heading” [1-7] 
For other participating bureaucrats, while drawing from a similar narrative, 
the lack of certainty or ‘guiding data’ engendered by climate change was framed as 
removing known boundaries or understandings of the policy context.  
There is a general understanding and acknowledgement that we fully don't 
understand the risk and we certainly don't understand how to respond to 
the risk [3-10] [Not same argument] 
The effect of this is, it takes away all the...it pulls the rug out from ...all the 
assumed stability in how things are going to happen....We’re navigating 
without familiar bearings in perhaps, a chaotic environment [2].  
if we get to the stage where we're having five catastrophic days a summer, 
how do you deal with the super catastrophic day. That's a problem you've 
got with any sort of [gradated] system where you reach a threshold and 
you go to the next level. The thresholds are always in arbitrary places [3-
16] 
It's the culture..... whether it's the paramilitary, uniform, what's on your 
shoulder is important, hierarchical top down, we tell you what you need to 
know because we know what you need to know and, you know, until we 
move away from that, we'll have these consequences except they'll get 
worse as climate change gets worse and as there are more people moving 
out and retiring into country Victoria [3-20] 
One participant suggested that conceptualising climate change as creating a 
kind of unknown territory, engenders insight inertia where people ‘revert’ to what 
they know. 
So they've said it has changed people taking it more seriously, then we've 
got to pull our shit together and old ways aren't good enough anymore and 
we really need to change some stuff. So they go into, “oh how do we do 
that, it's all new, where's the bloody road map, we don't know exactly how 
to do it”. You get a lot of ignore that, ignore that. [3-26] 
Framing climate change as a complex, potentially unbounded problem 
reflects one of Handmer and Dovers’ (2008a) characterisations of disaster events as 
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being ‘beyond human experience and institutional memory’. As the participant 
above suggested, a response to such a framing may be a kind of insight inertia and 
thereby reversion to typical knowledge and actions. As some of the other 
bureaucrats and Dovers (2009) have proposed, it may be more fruitful to begin 
with familiar territory and from there build a picture of the complex terrain of 
adaptation. There were a handful of bureaucrats who framed climate change as 
cause for reflection upon current policies and management. They proposed 
consideration of potential fundamental changes to policies [1-12], thinking [1-8] and 
actions within the sector. Most of these drew on a sustainability framing of fire 
management. 
It cuts across everything. We’re dealing with the issues in isolation. When 
we should be saying, no, no this actually affects everything, so let’s 
actually look more broadly across what actually hits or impacts all of us, 
then what each portfolio should be doing about it…. I mean it’s huge. I 
don’t think we can fix it in a year’s time, but at the same time if we don’t 
start making some steps we’ll miss the boat. If we’re still talking about this 
in 10 years time, it will be too late [1-4] 
While the notion of ‘tenure-blind land management’ was not re-framed in 
any way, for another respondent there was a suggestion that addressing it in the 
context of climate change would require engaging ‘people that aren’t traditionally in 
the emergency management sector’ [1-16]. 
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5.4 DISCUSSION: BUREAUCRATIC FRAMING OF 
FIRE MANAGEMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE 
The above analysis showed how the bureaucrats involved in this study framed the 
policy issues of ‘fire management’ and ‘climate change’ in relation to their 
professional roles. Fire management was broadly framed in emergency management 
or sustainability terms. Climate change was framed as a routine, non-routine or 
complex issue for the sector. The analysis illustrated how differing conceptions of 
what is driving the issues of the policy context can lead to different conclusions and 
arguments for different policies and management approaches. It also evidenced that 
consideration of climate change within a policy sector tends to occur through 
existing policy frames and perhaps through one that seemingly proffers 
quantification and therefore implies reduced or even removed, uncertainty. For a 
small number of participating bureaucrats, climate change engenders a need to 
reflect on and even, reframe existing policy frames. 
Both frame convergence and dissonance was illuminated between the two 
dominant policy frames of fire management. While each master-frame depicted the 
sector as being ‘out of balance’, they diverge on how the direction of that imbalance 
was portrayed. These master-frames also diverged in terms of scope and explicit 
recognition of the challenge of value-based decisions. The strongest frame 
dissonance surrounded issues of ecological conservation and environmental values. 
Within a sustainability frame, environmental concerns were described as an equally 
legitimate component of the policy context as that of community safety. In this 
frame, finding a ‘balance’ between those objectives was the major challenge for the 
sector. In contrast, the underlying rhetoric of the emergency management frame 
was that human safety was the moral, rational and only priority. In this frame, the 
need to consider environmental concerns obstructs and undermines the safety 
objective because, alongside ‘education’, hazard management was conveyed as the 
major tool to reduce risk.  
Within both frames, community engagement was a crucial approach to 
achieving either agenda. Irrespective of frame, respondents suggested that their 
own organisations had the better approach to community engagement. In direct 
contrast to issues surrounding ecological concerns, there was strong frame 
convergence with respect to land-use planning and development as a major cause 
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of the issues facing the sector. While there was general agreement on the need to 
avoid development in ‘high risk areas’, there was divergence between the associated 
solution sub-frames as to how safety and conservation should be addressed in 
already developed areas. There was complete dissonance as to which agency/ies 
respondents identified as having responsibility for addressing the issue; usually it 
was ‘the other agency’. 
The implications of climate change for the sector were framed in three 
different ways. The first framing of implications revolved around a narrative that 
the future policy context would not be too dissimilar to the current situation. In 
this construction, climate change was just another factor to consider, therefore 
current policies and management are valuable and worthwhile. The second framing 
depicted climate change as exacerbating existing challenges within the policy sector, 
which increases the imperative for current approaches and included the need for 
more resourcing. The third framing of climate change was as a driver of such 
significant change that the sector’s policy context was described as becoming 
unbounded and increasingly complex. Associated uncertainties led some to argue 
that there was not enough certainty on which to base decisions. Very few others 
argued that the advent of climate change engenders the need for frame reflection.  
Irrespective of the general framing of climate change, its implications and 
approaches to dealing with it tended to be framed through a rational, reductionist 
risk management frame, seemingly as an effort to contain complexity. In these sorts 
of settings where there are uncertainties and disagreements about the 
characterisation of problems, there are strong temptations to eliminate such 
uncertainties by seeking to fit the full spectrum of the problems into a few familiar 
categories (Young, et al., 2002:174). This framing may also be a reflection of a 
‘bureaucratic rationality’ that is encouraged by broader emphasis in governments 
and public administration for order and structure. The implied objectivity and 
quantification implied by instrumentalist approaches to risk management seem to 
hold appeal in situations of uncertainty. This appeal may lie in an evocation of 
order, an ability to define measureable, discrete variables and responses (which 
clearly fits easily with budgetary reporting demands).  
In the context of adaptation however, the implication is that an emergency 
management frame tells only part of the story. For example, a stance that ‘disaster 
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preparedness’ is a matter of rational choice ignores the fact that there are multiple 
‘rational choices’ demanding resident’s attention. It does not encourage reflection 
upon why people choose to live where and how they do, nor how institutions 
allow, encourage or limit their options. At the very least, it ignores research findings 
that people tend to undertake disaster preparedness activities for reasons other than 
fire preparedness (Collins, 2005; Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; McGee, 2005; McGee 
& Russell, 2003; Rhodes & Odgers, 2003). While it is obvious that house and other 
assets located close to vegetated areas face a higher risk of bushfire than others, an 
emergency management framing can exclude people’s understanding of fire in 
relation to the broader contexts and issues of their lives. As Beck argues, the non-
acceptance of the scientific definitions of risks is not something to be reproached as 
‘irrationality’, but quite the contrary, it indicates that the cultural premises or 
acceptability contained in those scientific or technical statements on risks are wrong 
(1992:58). How we accept and manage ‘risks’ depends on ‘who’ we are – how we 
frame that risk in relation to all the other things we consider in our lives (Adams, 
2009). 
It was not surprising that an emergency/risk management frame exists in 
this policy sector. Arguably, the sector receives the bulk of its political, media and 
community attention as a result of emergencies or hazard events. Concurrently, 
emergency (risk) management and human security more generally, are strong 
discourses within the disaster risk reduction (DRR) field and associated policy 
sciences. Risk management in particular has become a very powerful framework for 
policy practitioners, researchers and scholars alike, in conceptualising ways to deal 
with the challenges of DRR. Because of an emphasis on increasing ‘extreme events’ 
in the climate change impact discourse, risk management is increasingly being taken 
up by the climate change adaptation community. Constraining the issue of fire 
management and adaptation within an emergency management framework directs 
attention to concepts such as threat, hazard, and danger. Such a frame validly leads 
to prioritisation of strategies and norms focussed on hazard and harm 
minimisation. However, without conscious effort, this framing tends to ignore the 
value judgements, choices and struggles that are inherent to both fire management 
and adaptation separately, let alone in combination. It also tends to ignore the 
underlying drivers of vulnerability to fire and impacts of climate change of social-
ecological systems. 
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However, the quest for order that a linear, reductionist risk management 
rationale implies may actually constrain conceptions and ideas for understanding 
and dealing with the challenges of fire management and adaptation more broadly. 
Idolatry of risk management assumes an objective and universal meaning of the 
overall issue, to the exclusion or subordination of all other dimensions of meaning 
with which fire and the broader environment may be invested (adapted from 
(Wynne, 2002:468). The dominant discourses of risk, for all they have taken on the 
trappings of liberal pluralism, remain firmly instrumentalist and reductionist (Lash 
& Wynne, 1992:4). Its appeal seemingly encourages a strong and sometimes sole 
focus on hazard management in the emergency management frame. This may be 
salutary to the evolution of the use of the concept of vulnerability reduction in the 
fire management sector. It is even more salutary, if the sector is to try to move 
toward a learning capacity rather than a problem solving capacity (in this it is 
certainly not alone). As Young (2002) argued, risk management tends to encourage 
transformation of uncertainties into manageable, calculable ‘risk factors’, arguably 
constraining opportunities for exploring a multitude of knowledge and values. This 
would constrain the basic premise of reflexive learning for an adaptive capacity.  
A sustainability frame might be able to use a language that could reconcile 
or work with previously antagonistic positions. However, human safety must be a 
central part of its storyline. The reality that bushfires can pose a very real threat to 
humans and that there is fairly good information that can inform options to reduce 
bushfire vulnerabilities cannot be lost. A transition or transformation frame, such as 
that proposed by Meadowcroft (2009) and Pelling (2010), holds potential to expand 
the range of supporters for risk reduction efforts by combining it with vulnerability 
reduction and ecological conservation goals. As a visioning perspective these 
frames may encourage conceptions of a learning capacity, rather than the fruitless 
drive for absolute problem solving. 
Overall, this frame analysis highlighted that multiple interpretations of a 
policy sector’s context and fundamental purpose can exist within a bureaucracy and 
that some aspects of those interpretations may be emphasised over others. 
Reflecting the work of Page (2006a) and others, these findings also challenge the 
strongly held notion of bureaucracies as unitary actors. This analysis may provide 
some explanation as to why, even with shared policy-words and documents, there 
remain contestations within the sector regarding ‘appropriate’ policy options. 
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Identification of these different bureaucratic policy frames aids in better 
understanding of perceived ‘silos’ and associated communicative barriers. The 
analysis has also identified places of shared meaning that might be used to 
transform circular debates between the various perspectives into a more broadly 
acceptable framework. The majority of participants expressed a profound sense of 
frustration that their perspective was not appreciated or understood by ‘others’ – 
communities, ‘government’, other agencies, groups, etc. In the face of the 
complexities and uncertainties of climate change, the overlap in framing of land use 
planning as a major driver of concern presents itself as a focal point for a broader 
discussion of collective action and of underlying policy frames.  
These findings raise several issues to which the research has turned. If there 
are at least two ways in which fire management is framed by participating 
bureaucrats why does the emergency management frame appear to dominate 
conceptions of responding to climate change? As suggested by the theoretical basis 
(Chapter 1), a diversity of frames can provide the sector a broader range of 
conceptions or ideas on how to deal with the policy challenges that climate change 
presents. Arguably, there exists potential for co-operative approaches that cross 
organisational, policy, and even, ideological boundaries. This brings us to some of 
the other research sub-questions: are there connections among people with 
different frames, or do these frames represent barriers to dialogue? The findings 
from this frame analysis are used in the subsequent chapters to explore questions 
surrounding bureaucratic networks and the sector’s institutional capacity for 
reflexive learning. Chapter 6 explores the institutional context of the sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning and thereby, adaptation, and Chapter 7 explores the 
influence of these policy frames on bureaucratic networks (and vice versa).  
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Chapter Six 
6 SOME INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE BUREAUCRACY  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter presented an analysis of how bureaucrats within the fire 
management sector frame the governance and policy subjects of fire management 
and climate change. This chapter presents an analysis of several informal 
institutions of the fire management sector. Underlying policy frames structure the 
governance, institutions, policies and practices that constitute a policy paradigm 
(Hall, 1993). The theoretical basis of this thesis (Chapter 2) argued that the degree 
of institutionalisation of policy frames is a major influence in a sector’s capacity for 
reflexive learning. Formal and informal institutions guide governance and policy 
decision-making behaviours such as knowledge selection and use. The more 
institutions of a policy sector reflect the tenets of a particular policy frame, the 
higher the degree of frame institutionalisation. Equally, institutions influence a 
sector’s ability to reflect upon the basis of governance and policy decisions and 
actions – the underlying frames. The following discusses an analysis of policy frame 
institutionalisation and institutions that may influence a capacity for reflexive 
learning. 
As described in the Research Approach (Section 3.2.2.b), identification of 
informal institutions used a modified version of the Institutional Analysis 
Development Framework’s (IADF) grammar tool (Ostrom, 2005), alongside an 
analysis of patterns in the descriptions participating actors gave to expectations 
regarding individual and collective policy practices. These expectations related to 
the conduct of policy administration generally, as well as more specifically to 
obtaining and sharing knowledge, and to questioning of the existing policy 
paradigm and its various components. The identified informal institutions are first 
summarised, then each institution is deconstructed and its implications for reflexive 
learning discussed. The chapter concludes by drawing these findings together into a 
short discussion on the role of the sector’s informal institutions in its capacity for 
reflexive learning. 
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6.2 INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE 
BUREAUCRACY  
As discussed in Chapter 2, informal institutions are norm patterns that shape 
behaviour and structure collective actions (Balzer in Lauth, 2000:23). These 
patterns are known, practised and accepted (if not necessarily approved) by actors 
who expect to continue interacting under those rules (O’Donnell in ibid). 
Consequently, institutions bring an obligatory dimension to the behaviours of 
actors within a policy sector (Scharpf, 2000). As was noted earlier, by defining what 
constitutes ‘legitimate knowledge’ (Considine, 2005), institutions can also delimit 
the constellations of actors that may participate in governance and policy processes, 
alongside their modes of interaction (Ostrom, 2005; Scharpf, 2000:775). Broader 
political philosophies and cultural, societal rationalities also condition institutions 
within governance of public policy sectors (Schmidt, 2008).  
This analysis suggested that participating bureaucrats share a sense that the 
fire management sector is obliged to be demonstrably responsive and make 
infallible decisions. Perceived as constraints on decision-making, these seemingly 
externally imposed institutions appeared drawn from a broader societal rationality 
of control and the still dominant rational model of public administration. Both 
these themes were identified as institutions because the data suggested they are 
based on shared expectations surrounding behaviour (decision-making). Viewing 
governance and policy decision-making through this lens enabled an appreciation 
for the presence of a scientism institution: that science, as the ultimate, neutral 
arbiter, can provide ‘the solution’. This institutional analysis also reinforced that 
within this sector, knowledge of fire fighting and fuel management is bestowed 
greater legitimacy than other bodies of knowledge. Akin to ‘conventional wisdom’, 
it was clear that this institution sits comfortably with both a reductionist, rationalist 
approach to science and a similar interpretation of the risk management frame that 
appears to dominate the sector. Collectively, these institutions can be seen as 
various expressions of a broader rational model of public administration and a 
societal rationality of control over nature. What follows is a detailed discussion of 
each of these informal institutions, with a focus on policy frame institutionalisation 
and broader implications for reflexive learning. 
  
156 
6.2.1 The sector “must be demonstrably reactive” 
One of the strongest patterns of expectations among these bureaucrats was an 
argument that the sector is obliged to ‘be seen to be doing’. Even if an actor does 
not accept an institution, they obey it to avoid some form of social exclusion or 
because there may not be any real behavioural alternatives (Lauth, 2000:24; Powell 
& DiMaggio, 1991:11). Application of the modified IADF’s ADICO grammar tool 
(Section 3.2.2.b) identified the obligatory, rule-like character of this informal 
institution: 
A (Attributes to which the rule applies) – The sector 
D (Deontic: modal verbs) – Must/ is obliged 
I (Aim: the particular actions or outcomes to which the Deontic is applied) 
–Be seen to be doing 
C (Conditions: when and where the rule applies) – Implication that this is 
perpetual  
O (Consequence or No alterative) – No alternative was implied. However, 
one senior bureaucrat was attempting to initiate a process that may allow 
for reflection in recognition of this constraint. 
This institution was not simply about government or the sector being 
responsive to particular issues or areas of state responsibility, it was that responses 
had to be demonstrable and that this equated to visible, quantifiable actions or 
outputs. For example, one bureaucrat described the division of budgets as 
occurring on a symbolic rather than an analytical basis [3-20]. Along with a 
colleague, this bureaucrat also argued that following any major bushfire, monies are 
directed toward what they described as more visible, easily quantified activities [3-20, 
3-23]. Similarly, a very senior bureaucrat portrayed the issue as a budget sales pitch: 
Then there’s toys for the boys, the I want, the me too, factor, particularly in 
Operations, is so high that it’s dragging money from where we should be 
preparing for significant behavioural change in our community.......It’s a 
lot harder to sell [1-12] 
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Drawing upon imagery of large-scale resources, yet another participant’s 
argument suggested that a focus on visibility tends to reduce consideration of more 
complex underlying drivers of the issues facing the sector: 
In fire I think it’s still very much that first bit is about how many fire trucks 
and all that sort of stuff. I don’t think we move to understand the social and 
psychological issues as quickly as we should and could. [How come?] I 
think it’s more a culture..... [Of?] Of the big response agencies. I think 
fire’s big. It’s not in a malicious way. It’s just, there’s a lot of effort put at 
the front to worry about their big resources and the big agencies [2-6 
Interviewee’s emphasis]  
These statements indicated that respondents associate this perceived focus 
to less support for less quantifiable policies and programs such as community 
development based programs. Similarly to respondent 2-6 above, these participants 
also identified resources such as fire-fighting equipment, fire-fighter numbers and 
area of land burnt as ‘more visible’ actions . However, in contrast to most 
participants, one survey participant responded to a question about the sector’s 
unwritten and unquestioned rules with: it is easier to get resources for suppression 
than for fire prevention [s4]. 
Several participants raised a particular example that centred upon 
‘incorporation’ of firebreaks constructed in response to an emergency event, into a 
plan that was then labelled strategic [1-4, 2, 1-7, 1-13, 2-4]. The quotes below exemplify 
the underlying drive of this process as the desire ‘to be seen to’ give a constructive 
or proactive response, despite advice that the response was scientifically and 
practically tenuous. These respondents argued that the point of the activity was 
simply that the government appeared proactive. 
I suppose that that’s a policy decision that we’re going to have these things 
and is entirely triggered by the fact that we created of lot of them during 
the recent fires over summer..... perhaps a political need to be seen to give 
a constructive response to such a terrible event? ... I’m not convinced that 
there was much thought about what strategic meant, or went into that 
[strategic planning], or what the technical merits were. [2, my emphasis] 
It is just stupid, technically and scientifically. Presumably someone’s made 
the judgement that it looks good; protecting assets. Did the bureaucrats 
provide fearless advice? Hopefully they did. ...... Was it ignored? By the 
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sound of it, it was. It’s ultimately the Minister wants to be seen to be 
proactive, or the government does, that’s what they’ve done, but at fair 
cost to biodiversity and little benefit I would argue technically in terms of 
the fire management strategy [1-7, my emphasis] 
AuCoin argues that politics abhors a vacuum and faced with a major event 
like a bushfire, politicians cannot (be seen to) sit idly by. They must get out ‘the 
good wrench’ and fix the problem (2006:68). In this study, a senior figure defined 
such actions as ‘guided political interventions’: 
[That’s an interesting term ‘guided political intervention’. What do you 
mean by that?] I was trying to be nice, I guess, to say that there are a lot of 
political interventions that are purely there for a particular smaller group. 
... It’s doing an intervention that’s setting you in good stead that if 
something happens you can say you’ve done something. Otherwise, what 
else do you say? [1-14, my emphasis]. 
Unsurprisingly, numerous participants attributed the need for demonstrable 
reactivity to political demands, specifically related to either a major bushfire, media 
attention, or a particularly vocal or influential group [2, 1-3, 1-7].  
The longer term view that you have to take for land and resource 
management suffers, because it’s got to be more immediate: “I need a 
press release tomorrow. I need to be seen to be moving on this now” [1-7] 
In general we are becoming a more reactionary society –the most 
important issues are the ones in the papers today. This really impairs 
longer term planning [s6] 
Popular opinion drives policy and there’s very little attempt to dispute this 
[s1]. 
When asked how the sector might get past this constraint, to find a 
behavioural alternative, one participant implied that it is just par-for-course within 
any policy sector because of the need for ‘popular’ actions: 
I don't believe we can [get past it] - it's not a human trait for starters. And 
- it is not politically expedient for all levels of government to do that, and 
as I said, it - the - the popular issue tends to be the - the issue that gets the 
money [3-5] 
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In appreciating the driver of political expediency, it was understandable that 
a couple of participants characterised political (ministerial and executive) support 
for their work as somewhat capricious [1-17, s1-49]. One respondent suggested that 
attempts to establish a Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre (CRC) may not have 
been ultimately successful if it were not for the major bushfires that affected 
Canberra and Sydney in the preceding summer. In a similar vein, numerous 
bureaucrats argued that as time between bushfire events lengthens, funding 
decreases until there is another large bushfire after which budgets are increased [1-1, 
1-16, s18, s1-8, 3-20]. One very senior public servant stated: 
If we, by some good luck, went into a wet cycle for a decade you’d find the 
pressure would come right off and disinvestment would happen, then you’d 
get caught out again [1-6] 
Alongside political expediency, a couple of participating bureaucrats also 
attributed the imperative for visible reactivity to the fact that the sector’s emergency 
management component requires a response capacity. That capacity relates both to 
responding to a range of emergencies beyond just fire, and the opportunistic use of 
fire whether ecological or fuel management because it is so weather dependent. As 
identified by numerous participants however, a challenge for the sector lies in 
maintaining this particular responsive capacity alongside a strategic planning and 
learning capacity, and the time and space that this requires. This challenge, they 
argued, is increasing in the light of climate change. 
We gathered our breath over winter, then no rain in last winter, straight 
into summer. So we had virtually no time to navel gaze or whatever, or get 
together. Now we’re on the same page with Parks and whatever. It hasn’t 
been really super-formal. It’s been really informal, opportunistic. All of us 
knowing that something quantum-leapy had to be done [1-9] 
In a lot of ways we’re in the middle of it [climate change]..... We’re not 
having many years off.... You’re either fighting fires for two months or 
really severe fire seasons, or call them record fire seasons, but they’re just 
building on each other. That’s followed by extensive and demanding 
recovery and rehabilitation programs [1-6] 
Institutionalised reactive decision-making that demands actions be 
quantifiable has several implications for reflexive learning within a policy sector. 
One implication perceived by most participants was a constraint on time available 
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for reflection and learning, whether individually or collectively. Many bureaucrats 
talked of limited time to consider a more comprehensive picture or to incorporate 
new information [1-11, 3-17, 3-4, 3-13, 3-3]. Several argued that dialogue and reflection 
would help achieve the sector’s broader goals [s51, 3-2. 3-4, 2-1, 3-12] but their capacity 
to have such dialogue and reflection was constrained by ongoing reactivity. 
Metaphors such as “bogged down in the day-to-day”, “flat tack”, “treading water”, 
and “caught up in the busy loop” portrayed this sense of limited time for reflection 
[3-2, 3-4, 3-21, 2-2, 3-12].   
I can give you an easy answer which is we don't want to rock the boat and 
make ourselves have to get on the working party and spend more time. ...... 
I know I don't spend enough time [to actually look at things], because I 
don't have enough time to spend [3-19] 
We’re in an era where the agencies are lean and mean. The people that are 
in them are flat out just trying to get through the day. It’s a problem for the 
CRC bringing new research into that environment. People haven’t got time 
[1-7] 
We don’t get nearly as much opportunity to pursue things proactively as 
we would like because we’re too busy being reactive to all the people who 
are grumbling [1-15] 
Particularly instructive to exploration of the sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning was an argument raised by several participants that the constraint of time - 
perceived or otherwise - meant people relied upon existing systems and approaches. 
In this way, the institution of being demonstrably reactive appeared to set up path 
dependent decisions and even a situation where policy options started with 
‘solution’ – albeit that the solution had to visible or rather, quantifiable. Boscarino  
(2009) has called this a solution ‘surfing for problems’. 
It’s [the strategy] about burning. That’s the whole thrust of it [2-7]... an 
undying affinity to fuel reduction burning [2-2, 3-9] 
I think questions are asked but usually with a hedge around saying that 
there's room for fine tuning here and here and here but the underlying 
premises are set. So we're going to burn five per cent of the state this year 
but you can talk to us about which five per cent it should be [3-16]  
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We have our non-negotiables but there is a range of negotiables that can 
be built in so that we can add value for the community so they can have 
participation in the planning or the burn itself ......but we've gone back to 
the community and said, okay the non-negotiable is the burn has to 
happen. However, we have got a whole range of things that we can work 
with you about your concerns [3-21] 
The person that was in the role, I got on really well with and I've got a lot 
of respect for. But when it comes to saying it black and white when it 
comes to fire and it was very hard to get him to agree to say changing the 
burn. ....So at least we'll have some refuges and things like that. It will 
depend on the individual [Why do you think there was that reticence?] I 
think pressure from Melbourne to burn, burn, burn [3-17]  
They just do what they have to [3-26, 3-21], rather than looking for a new 
approach or demanding time for more reflexive or strategic dialogue.  
I'm going to do it the way I know how. Why would I go and try something 
new, unless it comes from really up on high that this is the way we're going 
to do it? ..... there's just not the scope, I think, within the current structure 
or timelines that we have to meet to be able to experiment. .......I think our 
core business is hard to change when we're about, not just fire, but where I 
work is predominantly about fire, let alone some of these new concepts [3-
25] 
People have bureaucracies that they have to work with. Instead of saying 
"Well, we'll make an exception here", or "We'll make a variation here", 
they get stuck in their rigidity, and I think that again comes back to the 
basis of the organisations [3-4]. 
Consequently, the institutionalised reactive nature of the fire management 
sector is likely to shape many decisions along already well-worn and trusted paths. 
The imperative for visible reactivity appears to be very much driven by this sector’s 
emergency management role34. A reactive capacity might even be argued to lend a 
sector some flexibility in response. However, without an underlying appreciation of 
the broader context and different frames and ideas, an obligation to be reactive may 
                                                 
34 Here the role of the media is a likely influence. This author would argue that we (society and our governments) should challenge the 
demands of the 24hr news cycle rather than succumbing to it. Equally, emergency management sectors seek out such media attention – often as 
a means of ‘spreading the message’. This is a challenging symbiotic relationship. This discussion however, is well beyond the realms of this 
thesis. 
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simply drive responses down well-worn paths without consideration of whether 
those paths are effective, equitable or sustainable.  
Equally, the demonstrable or ‘visibility’ component of this institution 
arguably stems from a rationale that numbers epitomize facts, with associated 
connotations of transparency, impartiality and therefore, the bedrock of systematic 
knowledge (Poovey, 1998:xii & 5; Stone, 2002a). The question of how science (and 
what sciences) are used within the sector is discussed in sub-section 6.2.3 below. 
Quantifiable actions sit very comfortably with linear, quantifiable applications of a 
risk management approach. The dominant risk management discourse still draws 
upon naturalist, scientific efforts of modernity that attempt to understand and 
manage different components of our complex social-ecological systems in isolation 
from one another (Beck, 1992). In a field, which purportedly combines principles 
of DRR and natural resource management (NRM), a nuanced appreciation is 
required of drivers of vulnerability and adaptive capacity, and of the challenges in 
making value-based (political) judgements. Within such a context, blunt application 
of quantitative measures alone fails to recognise the contested nature of policy 
choice and implementation, and the changeable and context-specific nature of 
those choices and implementation. 
Some of the smaller ones are probably alright, but they are not the big 
ticket items. I think everyone is running away from making policy that will 
tackle some of the big issues. [Why?] Because it will be hard to deliver. If 
you turn those policies into some measurable thing, it might fail. That’s the 
one thing I’ve seen in this department is that everyone is running away 
from making decisions. [Because it might fail?] Yep We’re just going in 
circles [1-4]   
Therefore, the need for governance of policy sectors to be responsive to 
society’s challenges is not in question, nor are the ideas of transparency and 
accountability that may lie behind notions of demonstrable actions. At issue is that 
reactive decision-making without some underpinning reflection, may limit policy 
options to those already known and used. Moreover, if demonstrable reactivity 
focuses policies and governance solely on quantifiable ‘outputs’, a sector’s capacity 
for adaptive governance will likely be constrained. For example, within policy 
sectors that have DRR as a large part of their remit, hazard events are often touted 
as ‘windows of opportunity’ for learning. However, such events only provide true 
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opportunities for adaptation and learning when the ‘learning’ process is girded by 
genuine attempts to appreciate the underlying drivers of vulnerabilities, lack of 
sustainability and overarching objectives. This is even if the reflection suggests that 
the current paradigm provides a robust policy suite at that point in time. The same 
arguments could apply to ideas that emerge from a dialogue between actors who 
use different policy frames. As this study indicates, without a frame reflective basis, 
so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ may simply serve to reinforce existing policy 
paradigms.  
An institution of ‘demonstrable reactivity’ based on political expediency 
appeared to be in direct conflict with the intent of reflexive learning and thereby, 
likely constrains this policy sector’s capacity for adaptive approaches to its 
governance. The institution seemed to restrict the time bureaucrats have for 
reflection on policies, let alone underlying policy frames. Importantly, it appeared 
that this institution drives the use of well-worn decision paths, which can hinder 
exploration of complementary or alternate options. In the face of projections that 
climate change will increase the number of fire weather events and thus the 
potential for increased bushfire impacts, the reactive nature of this policy sector is 
likely to increase. The goal of developing appropriately open and learning-
orientated policy systems is likely to be especially challenging in settings in which 
political incentives are crafted to emphasises short-term perspectives (Arentsen, et 
al., 2000:609) – a major theme in public administration debates. Without concerted 
efforts to address an institutionalised need for demonstrable reactivity, based on 
ideas of quantifiable actions and the rational model of policy administration, the 
constraints on a capacity for reflexive learning already facing this sector may be 
exacerbated. 
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6.2.2 “Decisions must be infallible” (Rationality of control) 
Another pattern within the responses provided by participants was a perception 
that the agencies are expected to always know ‘what to do’ and that any decisions 
must always be correct. Concomitant with the institution of demonstrable 
reactivity, this institution appeared to be institutionalisation of a perceived 
expectation that society and government has of the sector. While expressions of 
this informal institution varied, many of the participating bureaucrats shared an 
expectation of blame or even legal sanction if their organisations did not at least 
appear to make the right decision. Use of the modified IADF institutional grammar 
tool (ADICO) aided in both identification of the institution and in illustration of its 
construction: 
A (Attribute) - you (bureaucrats collectively) 
D (Deontic, modal verbs) - are expected (must, are obliged) 
I (aIm) - to get it right 
C (Conditions of when or where) - all the time  
O (Sanction/ No option) - we’ll end up in court, or will be blamed [1-16, 2] 
In a similar vein of fear of litigation, a survey participant wrote that legal 
accountability overly influences fire management decision-making [s23]. One 
interviewee stated flatly, “we’re not allowed to make a wrong decision” [1]. In 
response to the question about what views currently dominate debates and 
discussions around fire management, survey respondents wrote statements such as: 
government can solve the problem [s1-19], agencies have all the knowledge [s1-28] 
and the view that we can control nature and prevent large fires [s1-29]. The 
following quote represents another construction of this institutionalised perception:  
The job that’s been done in the last 15 years or so isn’t perfect by a long 
way, but it’s getting tougher. The political lack of forgiveness, I mean 
they’re meant to get it perfect or else, so we tend not to take the calculated 
risks that are inherent in properly managing fire regimes, because of fear 
of legal sanction. [1-7 my emphasis]  
Institutionalisation of the notion of ‘infallible decisions’ likely circumscribes 
scope for experimentation and making mistakes, and thus for learning generally. 
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One respondent maintained that the sector is generally unwilling to admit mistakes 
or uncertainty because of this fear of blame or legal sanction and consequently, it is 
not typically open to reflexive practice. 
We are very reluctant to open our doors and let people have a good look in 
and say “well, this is what we want out of the fire service”. We dictate to 
people what you’re going to get. “We’re the fire service, want to join us?” 
...... Other sectors of the organisation are used to command and control 
systems. That doesn’t lend itself to blank page thinking. It’s hard to step 
back from that and expose yourself if people might throw rocks at you. As 
an organisation we’re very averse to having rocks thrown at us. Generally, 
when it happens it’s in the Coroner’s court or parliament and somebody’s 
saying “you stuffed up”. Nobody likes that [2-2] 
The above quote also suggests a resonance with a risk management framing 
of the sector, itself an expression of a broader societal rationality of control over 
nature and our place in it. In Australia, this rationality is embedded in our dominant 
colonial imaginings of place (Porter, 2007), which sees us “still settling this land” 
(Dovers, 2007). These utilitarian and romantic (and threat) imaginings constitute 
powerful Euro-centric philosophies of our landscape (Porter, 2007) and seem to 
encourage us to return to the modernity promise of control (Lupton, 1999). 
Appreciating that an institutionalised perception of having to make infallible 
decisions was likely a derivative of a rationality of control provided some insight 
into the presence of command-control approaches and identities outside of 
emergency events. This was implied by descriptions a couple of participants gave of 
some of their colleagues.  
We've been running joint leadership meetings with [everyone] for the last 
12 months to get them up so they will take this commitment on with IFMP. 
The first meeting with a [X] chair, he crows on about [X] are charged to 
lead, deputy chair from [Z] looking at me, going...(rolling eyes)....they still 
think leading is knowing what to do, telling everyone else what to do [3-
26] 
They were probably a bit surprised at the level of [our] willingness to 
engage with the community. [Why is that?] Well...I guess they see 
themselves as being the authority therefore they will dictate and tell [3-21] 
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The nature of our organisation is an aggressive organisation. It’s 
traditionally been a very domineering organisation, its discipline, 
maleness, and generally where you get that occurring you get dominance 
issues, a lot of power wrangling happening. People try and exert authority 
[2-2] 
Descriptions such as these, also suggested that behavioural expressions of 
command-control outside of emergency situations are conceived as authoritarian 
and whether inadvertently or deliberately, do not support a dialogue among diverse 
perspectives upon which reflexive learning depends (see Chapter 7). Arguably, 
institutionalisation of the perceived need for ‘infallible decisions’ is not likely to 
engender the kind of reflexive and adaptive practice that depends on interactions 
between diverse perspectives.  
As in any area of public administration, in this fire management sector an 
institutionalised perception of a need for ‘infallible decisions’ also likely stems from 
the well-worn rational model of public administration. This model “presupposes 
that the world is knowable (or unknowable) as a place populated by narrowly 
interest-motivated individuals who are predictable most of the time using rationalist 
models and quantitative methods” (Blyth & Schmidt, 2009:166). The rational model 
implies that there is ‘a solution’ for issues facing public policy administrators, and 
that therefore managing the issue is just a matter of making the rational, ‘right’ 
decision. In this fire management case, the collective perception seemed to be that 
decisions were rational where they were demonstrable and centred on protection of 
humans and control of the hazard. Here again, a rationality of control raised its 
head. 
Pelling et al. (2008) argued that institutions in public administration such as 
the efficiency imperative and tendency for centralised and top-down decision-
making are in danger of restricting incentives for experimentation, reducing 
flexibility and capacity to adapt under the uncertainty of climate change. Arguably, 
this also applies to the rational choice model of public administration and its 
various expressions such as the notion of infallible decisions. Besides being 
unrealistic, this institution seemed to exclude admission of uncertainties and create 
a perception that experimentation is discouraged because ‘mistakes’ may occur and 
perceptions of ‘guaranteed’ protection and control may be revealed to be illusory. A 
broader understanding of institutionalised perceptions of a need for demonstrable 
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reactivity and infallible decisions helped to contextualise the presence of several 
other informal institutions within this sector. Yet as Chapman (2004:71) states, 
“while failure is unacceptable, learning is not possible – with the paradoxical result 
that failures will continue”. 
6.2.3 “Science is the neutral arbiter” (Scientism) 
Several research participants enlisted a supposed neutrality of science to justify their 
policy position/s. Many of their arguments presented ‘science’ as akin to a final 
arbiter on policy decisions or choices. The concomitant implication of using ‘the 
science’ is an informed, rational position, painted as irrational, those who may 
disagree with a particular ‘scientifically-supported’ position. Irrespective of the 
approach argued for, many participants had a certain confidence that ‘science’ 
would support their position.  
I thought "Okay, this is ridiculous". I need to inject a note of, you know, 
just reason and science and just try and give the organisation, the 
decision-makers, some rational - try and give them a rational 
understanding of just fire behaviour 101 for starters [3-1] 
We’re here to listen to stakeholders but we have to make sure that some 
are not overstepping what we need to achieve or work with. Rather than 
grovel in a 10 page response, she gets the same response as any other 
community member. We use the science! [3-21] 
Community politics rather than scientific knowledge [dominates current 
debates] [s1-22]  
This was an unsurprising finding. Co-option of the idea of science as arbiter 
permeates most areas of public policy, recalling the oft-touted concept of ‘evidence-
based policy’ (EBP), which has the same commonsensical appeal (John, 2002; 
Mulgan, 2005; Young, et al., 2002). The “idea that any question that can be 
answered at all can best be answered by science”, is what Dupre (2001:2) calls 
‘scientism’. With a shared inheritance from the medical sciences, EBP and scientism 
reside comfortably within the concept of the rational choice model of public 
administration (Marston & Watts, 2003:145). Unfortunately, this institution ignores 
the difficult reality that where choices involve giving preference to one value over 
another, science can inform different choices but it cannot make the choices. The 
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situation becomes even more challenging with an expectation that science can 
provide an ‘answer’, rather than recognising that science can often only give us 
insights into parts of the complex, dynamic system that is our social-ecological 
world. Several participant statements exemplified this dilemma. 
Put 10 scientists around this table and you’ll probably come up with 9 
different ways of doing fuel reduction burning. I don’t think that there is a 
strongly agreed position on how much, how often and what pattern [1-16] 
We went back and looked into all available science as to what’s actually 
appropriate. We found that there is not much in the science! [1-4] 
There is also an assumption that the scientists are right. This concerns me 
as many scientists have differing views on the heat and embers generated 
by wildfires.[s1-5] 
The institution of science as arbiter within this sector recalls the appeal of 
quantifiable outcomes and the rationality of control that seemed to permeate the 
other informal institutions. “The idea of intelligent choice is a central idea of 
modern ideology, and political institutions are dedicated to that vision of life” 
(March & Olsen, 1989:50). Repetition of themes that resonated with a risk 
management framing of fire management suggested that this policy frame is highly 
institutionalised. Risk management frames tend to support and encourage 
technocratic approaches (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009), because they are typically used 
in a very process-orientated, reductionist manner. Scientism and blunt applications 
of risk management are likely to appear politically useful where there are 
expectations of ‘solution’, control and visible reactions. However, a capacity for 
reflexive learning may be constrained by this institution, particularly where the 
emphasis falls on a reductionist type of science. It may ignore the reality that many 
policy issues involve value judgments and could exclude other knowledge that is 
not considered ‘hard science’ or quantifiable. To question and challenge this 
institution is to ask what constitutes evidence in ‘evidence-based policy’.  
This is not a new challenge for public administrators and researchers (See 
for example: Lane, 2000; Marston & Watts, 2003; Mulgan, 2005; Parsons, 2002; 
Pawson, 2006). “It would be wrong to give the impression that just because 
evidence-based policy operates via a competitive to-ing and fro-ing of ideas, the 
playing field is level in that particular clash….decision-making is, to recall 
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Mintzberg et al.’s (1976) phrase, a ‘recursive discontinuous process involving many 
different steps and a host of dynamic factors over a considerable period of time’. 
Accordingly, evidence can enter this complex realm – by stealth, through 
persistence, in small doses, in selected venues, and in the right guise – and, despite 
all, via the pursuit of reasoning” (Pawson, 2006:174-5). Moreover, the capacity to 
absorb complex information dwindles by the bullet point (ibid:175). Reflexive 
learning demands that questions are asked about what evidence, and whose 
evidence informs policy35. It demands exploration of whether the knowledge upon 
which policy choices are made, and the directions of policy-relevant research, are 
biased toward one discipline or field of knowledge. It requires an exploration of 
whether the underlying frames and institutions of a sector direct attention to 
particular fields of knowledge.  
                                                 
35 It also raises another long-held debate within the public administration and policy sciences about policy-based evidence (Young et al 2002). 
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6.2.4 Demarcation of ‘legitimate’ knowledge 
Institutions direct attention to important versus unimportant issues or desirable 
versus undesirable behaviours, what is inside and outside the realms of possibility, 
and define the kinds of facts to be accepted as relevant (Considine, 2005). The 
degree to which such knowledge resonates or conflicts with underlying policy 
frames influences institutionalisation of demarcations of what constitutes legitimate 
knowledge. The strength of these definitions is therefore also indicative of the 
degree of institutionalisation of underlying policy frames. 
This analysis indicated a high degree of institutionalisation of knowledge 
centred upon the planning and conduct of fire-suppression or fuel management. 
The preceding frame and institutional analyses offered some insight why these 
particular ‘types’ of knowledge are bestowed greater claims of legitimacy. Several 
participants suggested that the legitimacy of knowledge is defined by skills or 
experience primarily associated with fuel management or fire suppression, 
dependent on the organisation in question. Thus, the recurrent pattern of this claim 
throughout the data arguably indicated a specific emphasis on hazard management 
within the sector. An emphasis on hazard management resonates with the 
risk/emergency management frame. 
Analysis of the arguments and stories participants relayed about knowledge 
sharing and policy processes suggested several reasons for the presence of this 
institution. Several interviewees argued that for much of the sector’s history, it had 
been necessary to have a forestry background to attain a certain level of seniority 
within the government department responsible for land and fire management [3-20, 
3-5, 2-3]. Application of the ADICO grammar tool to one interviewees statement 
highlights the prescriptive nature of this institution:  
A - You (anyone) 
D - Had to (were obliged) 
I – To be: white, Anglo-Saxon, male, over 40 with a forestry background  
C - In the past (generally);  
O - Or else you did not get anywhere in fire and emergency management  
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And I'm most probably a practical example of that. .... I was there for 11 
years - still had difficulty in accepting my expertise because of my 
background. I wasn't a forester [3-5] 
Descriptions such as ‘old school’, ‘the old frame of reference’ or ‘old fire 
management’ implied that these participants thought that only considering fire 
suppression and fuel management was obsolete. The statement below exemplified 
this perspective. It also intimated that these participants had a sense of otherness; 
of exclusion based on a perceived lack of the ‘legitimate’ knowledge and experience. 
They are ‘old’ fire management. Policy people, community engagement, 
business improvement didn’t exist 20 years ago. So “they’re fire 
management and they know how to put fires out”, so they’re the only ones 
who know anything. I know that’s a bit harsh, but that’s a perception that 
we get. With some personalities in there, it was like, you walk in as a new 
staff member, and they’d just turn their back on you. You are also dealing 
with people who are, you know the old school are old school. .....It’s a boys 
club. You’ve got younger, university educated, often females coming in and 
reviewing what these guys are doing.....the point is that business 
improvement doesn’t need to know about fire, they need to know about 
process. So, it’s just two completely different mindsets [2-7]  
Statements made by bureaucrats who identified themselves with these 
‘criteria’ supported the contentions of several other participants regarding the 
existence of this institution.  
You can’t put a wise head on a younger body. Fire never, no two fires are 
ever the same. No two emergencies are the same. They all operate 
differently and you need to be able to have a wealth of experience to apply 
the experience....To plan for war  you need to, you don’t have to have 
experienced it, but you need to have had some similarities [3-5]. 
Analysis of another statement using the ADICO grammar tool showed 
another construction of this institution.  
A - They/many current employees 
D – Have not (implies they should have) 
I - Done the hard-nosed, hard ground experience 
C – Now (unlike in the past) 
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O – “Very experienced in government but not very experienced in what 
actually needs to be done....we’re here to protect the community”[1-9] (The ‘or else’ 
component being the implication that the community was not protected because 
fuel reduction burning was constrained). 
In a similar vein, other interviewees suggested that operational (fire fighting) 
experience was a similar credibility criterion within the sector’s statutory authority – 
CFA. The breakdown of the following two statements illustrated this institution:  
(A) – People 
(D) – Will 
(I) - listen to you or consider you competent 
(C)- If you have so many stripes on your shoulders, or you have been 
‘proper operational people’, good bloke on station 
(O)- (implied) You will not be listened to or considered competent [3-25, 3-
20 and 3-9].  
There were numerous examples of the level of credibility given to fire-
fighting or fuel management knowledge compared to other knowledge. Arguably 
fire-fighting and fuel management is an incredibly important part of the knowledge 
that contributes to the objectives of the sector. However, such narrow definitions 
of ‘credible knowledge’ likely excludes other knowledge and experiences not only 
from particular roles but also from the broader ideas and frames that underpin the 
sector’s overall policy paradigm. For example, one interviewee with extensive 
knowledge in community engagement, project management and policy 
development, stated that they did not feel qualified to answer the question ‘what do 
you think the fundamental goal of fire management should be’ because they 
considered themselves not to be ‘a bushfire management expert’ [1-3].  
As discussed in the conceptual basis of this thesis, collective, tacit 
agreement on compliance maintains informal institutions. Thus, while a large 
number of research participants felt that fuel management or fire suppression 
knowledge dominated the ‘struggles over policy ideas’, some of those who might be 
considered to hold such knowledge expressed a sense that this knowledge is being 
lost, or at least, ignored. While a solitary statement to this effect, the following 
quote is worth noting as its defensive reasoning hinted that challenges to the 
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institutionalisation of this particular body of knowledge are occurring within the 
sector:  
Fire related views are accepted and pushed by people who have a 
particular perception and often don’t come from a fire background. They 
don’t understand the fire business from a suppression nor prevention 
perspective they are more involved in policy and budget related tasks and 
just follow policy when it comes to the nitty gritty. I think people are too 
frightened that they will get their head cut off if they stick their neck out, 
mainly because minority groups that are damaging and vocal seem to be 
able to influence thinking. Managers are frightened to explore outside the 
square and sometimes when they do they are shot down in flames [s18] 
It seemed that this respondent does not feel that they can voice dissenting 
or potentially unpopular views even if others consider such views to be old but 
dominant. The statement is included here as it is salutary for those using the 
emerging discourse of sustainability. Room is needed for alternative and dissenting 
perspectives to participate in any policy discourse, particularly if the sector’s policy 
paradigm is changing its governance and policy discourses. 
A focus on fire-fighting and fuel management as the most legitimate 
knowledge fields suggested a high degree of institutionalisation of the framing of 
fire management as a risk/emergency management issue. Indeed, as well as being 
an informal institution, data from several interviews also suggested that a 
preference for knowledge surrounding fire suppression is formally institutionalised 
in the industrial arrangements of CFA [3-20, 3-25] This ‘conventional wisdom’ clearly 
interconnects with the institutions of visible reactivity and infallible decisions. As 
discussed earlier in the analysis, these institutions operate within the context of a 
rational model of public administration and a societal rationality of control. All of 
which also contributed to an appreciation for the perception that technocratic 
‘solutions’ directed at controlling the hazard and protecting communities currently 
dominate policies, research and practice. 
However, in the context of exploring a capacity for reflexive learning, the 
subject matter of this institution is not of concern. ‘Development of ‘epistemic 
communities’ can facilitate the forging of expert consensus” (Haas, 1992), and give 
evidentiary weight to particular policies. However, it also runs the risk of creating 
ideological echo-chambers. As Marston and Watts (2003:145) argue, if knowledge 
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operates hierarchically, far from being a neutral concept, evidence-based policy can 
be a powerful metaphor in shaping what forms of knowledge, including what and 
whose science, are considered closer to the ‘truth’ in decision-making processes and 
policy argument. This has implications for research agendas (Young, 2002a). 
Moreover, any tightly demarcated conception of legitimate knowledge also signifies 
illegitimate or irrelevant knowledge. If a single epistemic community dominates the 
knowledge basis of a sector’s policy paradigm, different perspectives and 
disciplinary evidence can be excluded, even that which may be complementary to 
existing approaches. The exclusory nature of tight demarcation of legitimate 
knowledge is antithetical to a key principle of reflexive learning: that of considering 
a wide range of perspectives and knowledge.  
  
6.2.4.a Taboo subjects (Illegitimate or conflicting knowledge) 
“There is nothing a government hates more than to be well informed; for it 
makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and 
difficult" (Keynes in Young et al. 2002) 
The corollary of defining legitimate or credible knowledge is the 
signification of invalid, irrational or irrelevant knowledge. As the preceding 
discussion highlighted, the rational model of public administration and a rationality 
of control, both imply a measurable ‘solution’ to the subject and challenges of fire 
management. The implications of this for the fire management sector seemed to be 
that ideas of variation, admissions of limited knowledge or opening up to questions 
and issues of complexity were constrained.  
Application of the ADICO grammar to statements such as the one below 
assisted in identification of this sub-institution, which can be summarised as: you 
(A), are not allowed/there’s no permission (D), to say X (I), ever (C). The following 
quote outlined two subjects for which open discussion across the sector, or at least 
with the general public, is discouraged: the limits of suppression, and the technical 
and value-based difficulties inherent to fuel-reduction burning.  
It seems like it’s a parallel with not being able to stand up and say there 
are physical limits to suppression. To be able to say basically that fuel 
reduction burning is hard for all these reasons. .....Because there is no 
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right answer. It is based on a number of different people’s objectives and 
quite different values. ......There’s no permission to have that conversation. 
The last person I saw say that aircraft don’t work for certain fires, stood 
up and said it in a coroners court and wasn’t allowed to come back.....They 
were not allowed to come back by his own organisation. It’s almost stifling 
of the...there are some things you’re just not allowed to talk about. 
......Thing is, how do we actually build in, how do you get permission to 
talk about that? [1-8].   
Some interviewees suggested that discussions about more complex issues 
are unaccepted because they would challenge organisational identities. For example, 
one very senior bureaucrat suggested that they were deliberately excluded from 
certain policy dialogues because of their insights into the limitations and 
complexities of the issues that their previous organisation faced. This was despite 
the fact collaboration between their current and previous organisations occurred to 
a certain perfunctory level: 
Sometimes I think I can actually disadvantage that [discussion of more 
challenging issues] because I know their business too much. There have 
been a couple of projects that we have been left out of and I’m sure it was 
because they just wanted to do it their way and didn’t have another 
smartarse like me in the room [2-6] 
Another maintained: 
Wildfire is going to happen in SE Australia. We need to say to people “and 
people may still die. Fires will still burn and houses may be lost”. That’s 
just accepting facts. [But] We have a hero mentality here that we can save 
the world. Well, you can’t save the world. It’s not very well accepted 
because it’s an anathema to our thinking in this organisation that anybody 
could die or we could lose anything [2-2] 
The above statement also reflects an institution of competition for 
reputational capital. Discussed in the next sub-section, that institution is arguably 
also based on an organisational identity surrounding which agency is better able to 
‘protect’ the community. It seemed therefore, that informal constraints on what 
cannot be discussed publicly are also based in attempts to maintain this identity for 
the sector as a whole.  
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Generally agencies are not able to adapt quickly which is one of the 
fundamental challenges facing the industry going forward. [Why do you 
think they’re not able to?] Because they’re trying to control their 
information and they’re trying to control things too much. They’re worried 
about what people might do with the information. That’s’ coming from the 
long and glooooorious history of the command and control structure 
[interviewee emphasis] [2-3] 
As intimated in the preceding sub-section, exclusion of ideas of uncertainty 
and limits to knowledge does not support a capacity for reflexive learning. Such 
institutional constraints would limit experimentation and hunts for alternatives or 
complements, trapping the sector in the ideological echo-chamber and insight 
inertia of which Zuckerman (2008) and Godkin (2010) warned. Perhaps worse for a 
public policy sector, is that it reinforces the fallacy of ‘a solution’ and control, which 
sets up the sector for ‘failure’. If limitations of current capacities cannot be 
discussed, it is difficult to see how efforts aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities of 
our social and ecological systems to altered fire regimes and the impacts of climate 
change will gain much more than lip-service support. If the fallacies of solution and 
control are not discussed in broader community and societal debates, they will be 
increasingly revealed when, if as is projected, climate change increases weather 
extremes. This is not adaptive. 
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6.2.5 Competition for reputational capital 
“To govern is to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority” 
(Rose in Mulgan 2005). 
By reinforcing definitions of legitimate knowledge, institutions also define 
whose knowledge (individuals, groups and organisations) warrants legitimacy. Faced 
with conflicting opinions from the experts, politicians have to decide whom to 
regard as authoritative, and this can engender a contest for authority amongst the 
policy community (Hall, 1993:280).  
Arguing between various organisations involved with fire over roles - a lot 
of energy is wasted through this egotistical process  [s1-24] 
In the fire management sector, research participants regularly referred to the 
level of trust the community and politicians had for their organisation relative to 
other organisations within the sector. A perceived ‘hierarchy’ of reputational capital  
was common across the interviews and survey36. One interviewee, who had worked 
for each of these organisations within the policy subsystem, described the situation 
as follows: 
I worked with CFA for nearly 20 years, and everybody loved me in the 
community because “CFA's volunteers”, so the community loves CFA. I 
worked for DSE. 50% of the people love DSE.....people love the Fire and 
Emergency Management role. You join council - and everybody hates you. 
No matter what your role is, everybody is suspicious of council 
employees.... Trust me, the people who work here will not tell people they 
work for council [3-5] 
In general, CFA was perceived to be more trusted than DSE or local 
governments, on the basis that a large proportion of CFA’s fire-fighters volunteer 
to ‘protect’ their local community. Several participants maintained that there is 
deliberate reinforcement of this reputation at the field level such that issues are 
handled so as not to contradict the perception.  
I'm also a 26 years CFA member myself, and they want to be seen as the 
good guys. They don't want to be going getting you to cut your 
                                                 
36 More than 50% of survey respondents identified CFA as the most influential organisation in the sector, followed by DSE and with local 
government barely rating a mention. 
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block.....That sort of might undermine the community goodwill towards 
them. Council are always the baddies, so we'll just bump it on to them [3-
11], [3-20] 
Within CFA we often talk about having a yes culture...that’s a practice a 
lot people fall for because they don’t want to deal with conflict. [Where 
does that culture come from?] From our community spirit, our volunteer 
fire brigades [3-13]. 
Certainly subscription to that perception was evident in a statement recited, 
almost mantra-like: “A strong brigade is a strong community”. We actually know 
that [1-1]. Yet several other participants argued that while that impression may 
apply in some communities, it is unlikely to be true in all communities, and brigade 
health is not necessarily an indicator of community health:  
Through the [X] project we actually came to understand that we had no 
idea what communities are. Our perception of community is through our 
brigades [3-20] 
Another aspect of the reputation competition, was highlighted by a 
respondent who suggested that governments would not publicly discipline a 
volunteer-based organisation because that volunteer base “represents a large 
swinging vote” in rural Victoria [3-9]. Maintaining a perception of credibility due to 
a volunteer workforce is undoubtedly beneficial in the popularity stakes. However, 
it may contribute to a conception of bureaucrats as faceless members of the black 
box of government rather people who are members of communities, who may well 
work and/or volunteer to defend their community from fire risks.  
There’s an assumption that brigades represent the community. They’re not. 
They’re a unique collection of fantastic individuals in any community, but 
in no way do they reflect any community I’ve ever lived in, nor do they 
reflect the broader community [1-11] 
Despite a handful of participants arguing that the antagonism has lessened 
between agencies and areas within organisations [1, 1-9, 2-2], a greater number of 
statements provided evidence for the presence of a perceived hierarchy of 
reputational capital. For example, several DSE personnel stated that ‘the 
community don’t trust us’, attributing this distrust to being unable to achieve fuel 
reduction targets. Considering the rationality of control that underpinned the other 
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informal institutions, it seemed that because DSE have responsibility for fuel 
management on public land (a very visible part of the landscape) when targets are 
not achieved or more influentially, when a prescribed burn escapes, the 
organisation is held out to be untrustworthy [1-9].  
We’ve got plenty of surveys in town that we’ve done and they’re just say, 
3,000 random people across Victoria, and the CFA is loved by everybody.  
I’m not sure if Parks Vic gets a mention in the questions, but people don’t 
trust us (DSE) as much as the CFA has that community element.  .....We set 
ourselves up to do all this stuff [fuel reduction targets] and we can’t 
deliver on it, and once again DSE is seen as untrustworthy, which is what 
politicians generally think of us. They don’t trust us..... [Why?] Because we 
do stuff that’s unpopular with a lot of the community...We’re very easy to 
bash I think [2-7] 
[So you feel constrained by state level policies?] Not constrained, but 
amused. 300K target but we’re lucky if we get to 50K p.a. With such a 
target though we get hand claps from those who want to see more burning, 
and sighs from those who want to see less. I tell them that nothing will 
change because of the weather [3-21]  
The emphasis of the rationality of control is on the idea of controlling the 
risk or hazard, not managing it. Thus, it could be argued that a broader societal 
rationality of control may also drive the ‘competition’ for reputational capital 
between organisations and sections within those organisations; that the notion of 
control compels organisations or areas within agencies to demonstrate they can best 
protect communities, that they have ‘the solution’. It also appeared that this 
institution and that of demonstrable reactivity are entwined. The ADICO grammar 
tool was again useful in illustrating the construction of this informal institution and 
its connection to another institution: 
A – We (sector, organisation and policy actors within) 
D – Must (are obliged) 
I – Show (demonstrable) that we can protect the community/ will not put 
community at risk (the control rationality) 
C – All the time (implied) 
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O - The community and politicians will not trust us, funding will be 
reduced and personal satisfaction in work limited 
This perceived hierarchy of reputation, based on a notion of ‘community 
trust’, was shared across organisations: 
Government would know from its constituents, every time there’s a fire, the 
public land manager is criticised. It’s well established that there’s a 
culture of scrutiny and despair about the public land manager and they’re 
used to it.  [2-1] 
They get blamed for everything. It's almost like that old song; “Blame it on 
the Kellys”. Whenever there's a bushfire or something, it has to be partly 
DSE's fault - so I think they've - I reckon they've actually become part of 
their own story and their paranoia has been justified by the way public 
opinion treats them [3-9] 
Several participant statements indicated that the ‘popularity contest’ 
combines with competitive budgeting to bolster antagonism between the agencies 
and proponents of particular policies or programs: 
We, over in the community area think that the dollar is best spent in the 
prevention end. They [operational, fire-fighting] still believe in putting 
trucks in stations. Never the twain shall meet.... We all want less people to 
die in fires and less property lost, but the inputs are where we totally 
disagree because we [all] have limited budgets and we [all] have pressure 
of being the golden child [2-2]  
There's a lot of culture and a lot of organisational issues or ownership 
issues around whose job it is to manage this. Historically - I mean 10 years 
ago you couldn't have the X, Y and Z all around the table in the one room 
at the same time, it just wouldn't have happened. [Why not?] Parochialism, 
I think, mainly; like, "My little bikkie barrel and my money, I get to manage 
my part of it, it is mine, mine, mine, mine [3-7]. 
The following quote indicated that the rationality of control, which 
appeared to drive an institutionalisation of a perceived need for infallible decisions 
and its associated ‘fear’ of legal action, might also contribute to the ‘popularity 
contest’. 
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There's a real threat mentality at the moment that "We don't want so-and-
so to talk because they do a bit better than us and we don't want to be 
shown up because we might be liable". That's not learning, you know [3-
4]. 
The informal hierarchy of reputational capital, based on ideas of community 
protection from hazard, appeared so well-recognised within the sector that 
respondents spoke of its use to legitimise positions or interpretation of policy in 
implementation.  
We were only invited as a tag along ‘cause they wanted the legitimacy of 
us. .......There were actually some little snide comments made, that they 
really would have preferred not to have to suffer us. [Why?] Because that's 
what they really thought it was all about; the bushfire strategy was about 
prescribed burning......They needed the legitimacy of [our organisation] 
but they didn't really like us there [3-9] 
He has got credibility because he comes from X so that’s why I go out with 
him actually. So that people we are going to see , obviously someone with a 
X badge they are more likely to be reassured by him saying something than 
me saying something. He has got that credibility in the landowner’s eyes 
[3-1] 
In fact, several respondents argued that the hierarchy of reputational capital 
is deliberately girded by public relations activities of the different organisations, 
rather than via the work that they do [1]. 
I think X is seen as media tarts sometimes and I think it’s with some 
justification..... X has had a history of promoting itself over and above 
other people. Some of us are still trying to that maybe we should stop 
trying to do that and take a more collegiate approach. Because when we do 
that [promote one organisation over another], we antagonise those who 
are supposed to be our partners [3-9]. 
Many participants argued that there are serious implications of the 
‘popularity contest’. They suggested that promotion of any organisation as having 
‘the solution’ excludes communication of more complex information surrounding 
community safety in bushfires and the ecological role of fire, because this would 
entail admission that there is not a ‘solution’ and, that total control with its implied 
risk free environment, is a fallacy (Consider the taboo subjects discussed above). 
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One of the threats to the formulation of effective fire management policy in 
Victoria is that at the moment bushfire seems sexy to be involved with, and 
everyone wants a piece of it. That’s a real danger because they behave 
competitively, not collaboratively...........It’s the usual tension between 
good PR for government versus the sound community messages [1-8]. 
Some of the [Xs] were actually told not to talk to the [Y] about [z 
program]. I don’t think it was a formal directive but that’s what they were 
told from head office. There has always been a conflict between 
communications and community engagement because they’re government 
communications people. We’re community engagement people. We’ve got 
to tell the truth [2-7]. 
The pressure to be a fire agency rather than the pressure to actually do 
anything for the community.... [these actions are] not leading to 
environmental sustainability or safer communities. They’re leading to, um, 
organisational image, game playing, petty politics [1]. 
An ‘institutionalised psychology of antagonism’ is a well-known poison to 
collaborative efforts (Ansell & Gash, 2008:553). Like the earlier mentioned ‘devil 
shift’, an institutionalised psychology of antagonism can create or maintain a barrier 
to institutional learning because the knowledge that each party has is not likely to be 
viewed as useful by the others. This is because, as was argued earlier, to be 
considered usable, knowledge must be considered credible, legitimate, and salient 
(Haas, 2004:587). Whether or not we consider information to be these things, is 
often be influenced by our frames. Similarly, ‘silo mentalities’ or ideological echo-
chambers reduce the likelihood of communication about the need to innovate 
within the silos and militates against successful dissemination of innovative ideas 
and practices (Koch & Hauknes, 2005:40). 
Not only did it appear that the competition for reputation engenders a 
dialogue of the deaf (Sabatier, 1999), instilling antagonism between the agencies, it 
also appeared to exclude discussion and even identification of more difficult issues 
(Section 6.2.4a). Excluding issues that fall outside the bounds of apparently 
treatable or solvable (less complex) situations is not an approach that indicates a 
capacity for reflexive learning. It indicates again, a tendency for what Godkin (2010) 
labelled ‘insight inertia’. Although quite lengthy, the following quote illustrated the 
issue quite well: 
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The role, the world externally for fire is changing really fast, really fast. 
Organisations change really slow. Right? The old ways are no longer good 
enough, right? ....They're unclear, very uncertain about new ways, because 
there's no road map. There's no road map to the new ways, right, and there 
has to be a level of trust. .....So within your agency, you know not to go and 
tell the public we reckon this, this and this.... Do not talk about, right? For 
a good reason, because it [internal discussions] can be open and honest. 
When you start to try and do a risk assessment around the room, around 
multi-agency, are we going to get risks that are put on table that we’re 
[already] dealing with? Mm hm [shakes head no], because that’s the level 
of exposure we are open to. Okay, we know this is a high risk, however, 
we’re doing this and this. ....How do we uncover the risks that are gaps? 
The gaps that are high risk. If they don’t know if they [others in group] can 
be trusted because if they expose something you’re not doing, it’s a pretty 
hard call. ...We’ve done it and all it’s done is open up a can of worms. ..If I 
wasn’t in that role, that would have dropped off into the too hard basket, 
and that’s what it’s done in the last 10 years [3-26]. 
As discussed in the preceding sub-section, not considering complexities and 
uncertainties is contrary to the intent of reflexive learning and adaptive governance. 
A premise of adaptive governance is that it provides policy actors a means of 
working with, rather than against, complexity and uncertainty (Brunner, et al., 
2005:25). Competition for reputation creates and maintains the problem of 
defensive reasoning (Argyris, 2004; van Buuren, et al., 2004) where each party is 
defending their position based on different assumptions using different parameters 
from those of their colleagues. One participant described it as ‘the siege mentality’ 
[2-1]. The data also indicated that this antagonistic ‘competition’ has implications for 
reflexive learning. Analysis suggested that admitting a lack of knowledge or 
uncertainty is an anathema to the entwined institutions of legitimate knowledge and 
reputational capital, buttressed as they are by a societal rationality of control. 
Consequently, these institutions could be argued to contribute to insight inertia, a 
constraint on reflexive learning within the fire management sector. Like the ‘devil 
shift’ described in Chapter 2, an institutionalised psychology of antagonism can 
create or maintain a barrier to reflexive learning where the knowledge of one group 
is viewed as illegitimate by others. 
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6.3 DISCUSSION: INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS & 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR REFLEXIVE 
LEARNING 
This analysis identified some informal institutions of the policy sector of fire 
management. In doing so, it identified a high degree of institutionalisation of a risk 
management framing of the fire management sector. The analysis also suggested 
that there are a number of institutional constraints on the sector’s capacity for 
reflexive learning. Like much of the subject matter of this thesis, the identified 
institutions were closely entwined.  
Institutionalisation of a perceived need for ‘demonstrable reactivity’ and 
‘infallible decisions’, alongside ‘science as arbiter’ each contained an assumption 
that factors contributing to the challenges and decisions are readily calculable. A 
risk management frame also entails an implicit depiction of hazards as amenable to 
conventional procedures of calculation, management and control within the 
capacities of established institutions (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009:679). Therefore, the 
presence of these informal institutions indicated a high degree of institutionalisation 
of the emergency management frame. Implications for a capacity for reflexive 
learning lay in the inherent tendency of these sorts of institutionalised frameworks 
to neglect the systemic nature of contemporary hazards (Koenig, Undated)that are 
embedded in dynamic, complex social-ecological systems. Institutions that draw 
upon reductionist, positivist perspectives often exclude many social, ecological and 
political considerations. This is often because underlying factors or consequences 
that lie outside prevailing scientific risk-knowledge are conceived to be 
indescribable, unamenable to use of probability calculations or cost-benefit analyses 
so often used in risk management, consequently such factors are simply not given 
any standing (Connor & Dovers, 2004; Wynne, 2002:469) (Jasanoff, 1993).  
Viewed from this perspective, it became apparent as to why fire-fighting 
and fuel management knowledge may be conceived to have a greater level of 
legitimacy than other knowledge. However, as was discussed in the analysis, it was 
not the subject matter per se that had implications for reflexive learning, rather it 
was that tight demarcation of legitimate knowledge, irrespective of the matter, 
could exclude other knowledge, and this conflicts with the concept of reflexive 
learning. A rationality of control (protection and safety) also seemed to contribute 
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to the creation of a competition for reputational capital or perceived ‘ownership’ of 
the conventional wisdom. This competition seemed exacerbated by stochastic 
budgeting. More importantly, institutionalisation of a narrow body of ‘policy-
relevant’ knowledge constrained potential for reflexive learning by excluding 
‘invalid’ yet potentially useful knowledge and excluding open (public) discussions 
about the practical and conceptual limits of the ‘conventional wisdom’. A 
consequence for fire management of this broader cultural institution is a likely 
focus on dealing with ‘the hazard’ as opposed to underlying social and ecological 
vulnerabilities to fire. Again, this is a constraint on a reflexive learning intent. 
These institutions seem drawn from the rational choice model of public 
administration; where machine-like, public administrators simply need to use ‘the 
right information’ to produce ‘the right solution’ and control could be achieved. It 
appeared that both the rational model of public administration and a societal 
rationality of control not only circumscribe the dominant way bureaucrats frame 
the sector’s challenges, but they also heavily influence the informal institutions of 
this sector. In the preceding chapter, climate change was framed by most of the 
participating bureaucrats as exacerbating existing issues, and while challenging, it is 
not outside the capacity of existing institutions – if they received more support and 
funding. This frame drew primarily on a risk/emergency management narrative, 
which is unsurprising given the emphasis on increased extreme events in climate 
change projections. The dominance of this frame and the above informal 
institutions goes someway to appreciating the context with which concepts 
surrounding adaptation must intersect.  
If the fire management sector continues to focus on or require a capacity 
for quantifiable actions only, because of assumptions of predictability and control, 
its adaptive capacity will be limited. In considering climate change adaptation, a 
continued sole focus on implications for a response capacity will not seek to 
question the underlying frames and institutions that currently guide approaches to 
governance and policy within the sector; to consider whether they are adaptive. 
Deliberate reflection upon these institutions would be required to bolster the 
sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. However, institutions are rarely created from 
scratch; they are drawn from underlying policy frames and often stem from existing 
institutions. Any challenge or change to a sector’s informal institutions will have to 
resonate with or also change those underlying policy frames. Making underlying 
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policy frames explicit and engendering frame reflection may therefore encourage 
some institutional change and improve the adaptive capacity of this policy sector.  
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Chapter Seven 
7 BUREAUCRATIC NETWORKS  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Adaptive governance demands a capacity for reflexive learning. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, processes of policy administration and governance and of learning in 
policy sectors occur through webs of social networks among a myriad of actors. 
The structure and function of these networks are among a range of indicators of a 
capacity for reflexive learning within a sector, as they both influence and are 
influenced by policy frames and informal institutions. This research focused on ‘the 
bureaucratic network’ as one network among a web of networks in a policy sector, 
and as an important conduit of learning.  
The bureaucratic network is an arena in which the bureau-politics 
(Rosenthal, et al., 1991) and coordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2008) of policy-
making and governance takes place. As such, this network can constrain or expand 
the ideas, information and perspectives considered within a policy sector. A dense, 
self-referential network may reinforce particular policy frames through echo-
chambers of ‘communities of practice’, or discourse coalitions. It can also enable 
interactions across sector and between levels to stimulate frame reflection. Through 
similar processes, network structure and function can also influence the institutions 
of a policy sector. Equally, the institutions of a policy sector may influence the 
structure, but particularly the function of its networks.  
More positivist disciplines suggest that the actions, attitudes and behaviours 
of actors in organisations can be explained in terms of their position in networks of 
relationships (Nohria in Agranoff, 2007). However, a more interpretivist 
perspective suggests that networks, like institutions, can be influential but they are 
not the sole determinants of social phenomena. As Giddens’ (1984) structuration 
theory reminds us, structures and culture are part of broader social forces that 
enable and constrain social action but human agency can shape and reshape them. 
It was from this perspective of interacting structure and agency that this part of the 
research sought to explore the structure and function of the bureaucratic network 
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of fire management as a factor that interacts with both policy frames and 
institutions to influence the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. 
Composed of three sections, this chapter discusses an analysis of a network 
of bureaucrats found in the state of Victoria’s fire management sector. The first 
section of the chapter discusses the basic, quantitative network analysis used in the 
case study. Standard social network analysis (SNA) techniques examined the 
network of information and advice sharing. Drawing two components of the 
analytical framework together, the analysis also explored the role of policy frames in 
the network’s structure. The chapter’s second section then discusses an 
interpretative understanding of the network’s structure and function from the 
perspectives of its participants – the bureaucrats. The third and concluding section 
discusses the implications of the quantitative and qualitative findings for the 
sector’s capacity for reflexive learning, with specific consideration of the research 
sub-question:  
How might the structure and function of the bureaucratic 
network influence the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning? 
 
7.2 NETWORK STRUCTURE – A QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
This section describes a quantitative analysis of the structural properties of the 
network of participating bureaucrats. The analysis used mathematical calculations 
of selected network characteristics, as well as the basic descriptive indices of degree 
centrality, betweenness, and their combination. Inferences drawn from this analysis 
were necessarily limited because the identified network’s edges were not the 
boundary of the sector’s entire bureaucratic network. Consequently, the network 
analysed here is one action situation (Ostrom, 2005) or discourse arena within a 
broader network that is itself embedded within a web of networks. In addition, 67 
people responded to the survey but only 57 provided usable network data. Data 
from the 53 interviews was also utilised. Seventy-four percent (74.5%) of all 
respondents had a role predominantly focused within the sector of fire 
management, whether on response, recovery, fire prevention planning, community 
engagement, or fire ecology. This result may be a reflection of interest in the subject 
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matter that others may have felt they did not have ‘the expertise’ to participate, or 
simply a reflection of the network tapped into by this research. 
Interviewees were not limited in the number of people they could identify 
as important sources of information and advice. In fact, many listed more than five. 
This may have been because while asked to differentiate between people they go to 
for information and those they go to for advice (See Appendix II for the survey 
questions), the majority of respondents identified a large range of people who 
played both roles. The following sub-section discusses results from a quantitative 
social network analysis (SNA). 
  
7.2.1 Basic network features – connectivity, density & distance 
Network characteristics of connectivity, density and distance provide some solid, 
basic insight into the structure and function of the network. The size of a network 
is important to its function as a conduit of information and learning, simply 
because in smaller networks, information can move quickly through the network’s 
entirety. This identified network totalled a size of 315 individuals. Even though it is 
only a portion of the entire bureaucratic network in the fire management sector, it 
would be extremely difficult for any bureaucrat to know all others (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2011a:341). The density of a network can also provide insight into the ease 
with which information can move through it (ibid). 
This network is a connected graph, which means that it was possible for 
each bureaucrat to ‘reach’ every other bureaucrat in the network, although the 
‘path’ required may be very long. Nonetheless, the results indicated a network that, 
while not densely connected, was reasonably well connected. This is because the 
research found only 1,101 or 1.5%. of a possible 73,400 one-to-one connections. 
Yet the average shortest possible path between two people within the network was 
4.608. An average of 4.6 “degrees of separation” between these individuals 
suggested that information can move fairly easily through this symmetrical 
network37. Table 4 (over page) lists the frequencies of the network’s geodesic 
distances – the distances between every pair of actors in the network. It shows, for 
                                                 
37 A tie is either present or it is not 
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example, that of all possible two step connections, only 6.1% were present, while 
24-25% of all four and five step connections were present. The fact that only 1.5% 
of all possible one-to-one connections were present, also suggests that the 2, 3 4 
and even 5 step connections could be important in the movement of information 
through this network.  
Table 4 Frequencies of geodesic distances 
No. of 
geodesic 
distances 
Freq Proportion Interpretation 
1 1,101 0.015 
1.5% of all possible single node connections 
present 
2 4,567 0.061 6.1% of all possible two node connections present 
3 11,583 0.155 15.5% of all possible three node connections 
4 18,351 0.245 24.5% of all possible four node connections 
5 19,070 0.255 25.5% of all possible five node connections 
6 12,544 0.168 16.8% of all possible six node connections 
7 5,520 0.074 7.4% of all possible seven node connections 
8 1,582 0.021 2.1% of all possible eight node connections 
9 366 0.005 0.5% of all possible nine node connections 
10 85 0.001 0.1 of all possible ten node connections 
11 19 0.000 <0.1% of all possible eleven node connections 
12 1 0.000 <0.1% of all possible twelve node connections 
 Visualising graphs can sometimes better portray the structure and features 
of a network. The NetDraw program that comes as part of the UCINeT program 
was used to generate social network graphs – sociograms – that are presented here. 
For each graph the ‘spring-embedded’ graph theoretic was used. This theoretic is an 
algorithm that uses iterative fitting to try to locate the nodes with the smallest path 
lengths (number of connections) closest together in a visual diagram (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2011b). To illustrate, Figure 5 below is a sociogram that depicts the 
network, colour coded by organisation. This graph simply shows that, while 
dominated by the red and green organisations, there is still some diversity of 
organisational representation within the network.  
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 Figure 3 Bureaucratic network by organisational affiliation 
 
 
                                                 
38
 For simplicity of communication only the top five organisations (by number of identified connections), are identified here. The purpose of the graph is simply to illustrate a fairly diffuse 
spread of connections within the sector.  
Organisation38 Colour 
Department of Sustainability and Environment  
Country Fire Authority  
Parks Victoria  
Local Government  
Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities 
Council (AFAC) 
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7.2.2 ‘Group’ characteristics 
7.2.2.a Connections between frames (Block density) 
By dividing the data into three sub-populations based on master-frames of 
sustainability, emergency management and unknown, an exploration of the 
connectivity within and between these groups was made. Table 5 portrays the 
number and percentage of ties within each group of master-frame and between the 
master-frame groups. It also tabulates the percentage of all possible ties that were 
actually identified through this study. The highest percentage is that of people using 
an emergency management master-frame where 4.2% of all possible ties were 
identified. This small percentage indicates a loosely connected network, rather than 
a tight, insular one. 
Table 5 Connections between master-frames 
Master-frame Sustainability Emergency 
Management 
Unknown 
Sustainability 146 (3.4% of all possible) 77 (2.7%) 176 (1.3%) 
Emergency 
Management 
77 (2.7%) 80 (4.2%) 131 (1.5%) 
Unknown 176 (1.3%) 131 (1.5%) 406 (1%) 
These results also indicate that while there is a proportional tendency for 
people to connect with those who share their master-frame, this is only a slight 
tendency. While there are a greater number of actual connections amongst the 
sustainability ‘group’, this was likely a reflection of their greater numbers in the 
network as a whole. 
7.2.2.b Cutpoints (potential boundary spanners) 
The cutpoint equation was also used in an attempt to identify the network’s ‘weak 
points’ (Hanneman & Riddle, 2011b:354). These are the nodes (individuals) that if 
removed may ‘disconnect’ the network. Because they connect disparate parts of the 
network these individuals might be considered boundary spanners. The cutpoint 
calculation found 51 such individuals. While such a high number of ‘cutpoints’ 
might indicate a network with a high potential for ‘break down’, it is probably more 
a reflection of the relatively small sample size from an extremely large network. 
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This calculation becomes more insightful when combined with the calculation of 
actor centrality. These aspects are discussed below.   
7.2.3 Individual features (centrality) 
Like most network studies, this one also tried to identify the most important actors 
within its network (Everett & Borgatti, 2005). Centrality is a useful measure of 
‘where the action is’, because actors with numerous ties may have several ways to 
access information, to call on more of the resources of the network, and they may 
be deal-makers in exchanges among others (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994:179).  
7.2.3.a Degree centrality 
On average, the bureaucrats in this network have a (Freeman’s39) degree centrality 
of 4.4. That is, on average, they have 4.4 ties or connections. However, a standard 
deviation of 4.2 and variance of 17.7 indicates that this average is quite variable. 
That variability could be explained by the fact that 63% of the bureaucrats in this 
network had < four ties (connections), 27% had 5 - 10 ties, and the remaining 10% 
had more than 10.  
Figure 4 depicts the degree centrality of the bureaucrats identified in this 
study, with larger nodes in the Sociogram indicating a higher degree centrality.  
Figure 4 Degree centrality of individual bureaucrats – larger node indicates a greater degree 
centrality 
 
                                                 
39
 
This basic measure of centrality is named after its creator – Linton Freeman (Hanneman & Riddle 2011)
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Using the NetDraw program, the centrality of each node or bureaucrat was 
then examined in relation to key attributes of organisation, role, seniority and policy 
master-frame. These attributes are listed for the ten most central bureaucrats in 
Table 6. That table also illustrates that these bureaucrats were spread across 
different roles within different organisations, suggesting that not one organisation 
had a greater degree of influence than any other organisation, with respect to the 
bureaucratic network revealed here.  
This data also shows the relative ‘influence’ of these particular bureaucrats 
in the structure and function of the network. For example, node 249 has 23 ties. 
Because these data were undirected – a tie was either present or not – we cannot 
tell if it is because they can go to 23 others, because 23 people come to them or, 
mostly likely, because of a mix of the two situations.   
Table 6 ‘Attributes’ of the 10 bureaucrats with highest degree centrality 
Node No. Degree Org Frame Level 
249 23 DSE – Environment Sustainability Officer 
207 22 CFA – Community Safety Unknown Team leader 
218 20 Local government – fire EM Officer 
29 19 Parks Vic Sustainability Officer 
227 18 CFA – Operations Unknown Officer 
217 18 DSE – Fire Sustainability Team leader 
221 16 CFA – Operations Sustainability Executive / Director 
287 16 CFA – Community Safety Sustainability Team leader 
149 16 CFA – Community Safety Unknown Officer 
75 16 DHS EM Executive / Director 
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Figure 5 indicates that within this network, bureaucrats with higher 
centralities have roles that equate to a team leader or officer level. This result may 
reflect a limitation of the time that those at more senior levels have available for the 
maintenance of networks, or even time to participate in research. It may also be a 
reflection of a more hierarchical nature of the sector.  
Figure 5  Centrality by level of seniority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of particular relevance to this study was the question of whether policy 
frame influenced network structure. Figure 6 over the page depicts each actor’s 
degree centrality and their policy master-frame (purple represents the sustainability 
frame and green the emergency management frame. Grey was for all the 
unknowns). Only 110 of the 315 nodes in this network could be ‘classified’ because 
the remaining 205 bureaucrats did not directly participate in the research – they 
were nominated as a contact by those who did participate. Of the 110 bureaucrats 
who participated in this research, 44 (40%) were ‘classified’ as predominantly 
holding an emergency management frame, while 66 (60%) were ‘classified’ as 
Seniority Colour 
Executive 
 
 
Senior Management – 
manages a number of teams 
 
Team Leader –  
manages a number of officers 
 
Officer 
 
 
Volunteer 
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having a sustainability frame. From a purely visual perspective, Figure 8 suggests 
that the two identified policy frames appear relatively evenly distributed throughout 
this network and there are connections between people who tend to hold one 
frame over the other.   
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  Figure 6 Degree centrality (node size) by master-frame 
FRAME COLOUR 
Sustainability  
Emergency 
Mgt 
 
Unknown  
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7.2.3.b Between-ness centrality  
Betweenness centrality views an actor as being in a favoured position to the extent 
that the actor falls on the geodesic path between other pairs of actors (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005:67). The more people that depend on an actor to make connections, 
the more power they have (ibid). There is a very large variation in actor betweenness 
in this network, from zero to 13,699, with a massive standard deviation of 1,755.  
Nonetheless, these results (Table 7) indicated that a similar set of 
bureaucrats may have a great deal of influence on this network’s function. For 
example, node 249 falls on the shortest (geodesic) pathway between 13 pairs of 
actors. Because these 13 pairs may depend on this bureaucrat to conduct 
exchanges, such an actor could translate this broker role into power (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005:70). As noted, except for the nodes written in ‘grey’, this group 
includes a similar set of actors to those with the highest centrality. This suggests 
once again, that a number of these individuals are quite influential in the movement 
of information through the network. The presence of nodes 3, 232 and 102 in these 
results indicate however, that some of the influence is shared. 
Table 7 Top twelve betweenness centralities 
Node no. Betweenness nBetweenness 
(Between X no of pairs) 
249 13,699 13.94 
29 11,394 11.59 
207 10,388 10.57 
149 8,787 8.94 
75 7,478 7.61 
287 7,393 7.52 
217 6,994 7.12 
3 6,721 6.84 
232 6,572 6.69 
218 5,880 5.98 
227 5,275 5.37 
102 5,009 5.10 
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7.2.3.c Combined centrality & betweenness 
Examining the combined centrality and betweenness of each actor identified nine 
individuals as potentially the most influential bureaucrats in the network found 
during this study. Figure 7 depicts their collective ‘ego-network’, with their degree 
of centrality highlighted by larger sized nodes. Policy frames are denoted green for 
emergency management and purple for sustainability respectively. Grey again 
equates to unknown. While the image suggests a small degree of clustering based on 
master-frame, this is not a strong pattern. 
Figure 7 Ego-network of most influential ‘nodes’ by centrality and policy frame 
 
To move beyond a visual analysis, the individual ego-networks of the ten 
bureaucrats with the highest centralities were also depicted using NetDraw 
(Appendix III). Alongside the cutpoint analysis (sub-section 7.2.2b) and Figure 9 
above, those individual ego-networks also indicated that policy frame does 
influence connections at an individual scale, but collectively there was not a distinct 
pattern either way. 
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7.3 NETWORK FUNCTION – A QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
I'm not sure if you can legislate to have a cup of tea with everybody, before 
you sit down to start, but maybe there should be something like that, a tea 
clause. [Interviewee 3-15]. 
The preceding social network analysis (SNA) used a quantitative analysis to describe 
the structure of the identified bureaucratic network. This section builds upon that 
analysis by discussing an interpretative understanding of the network from the 
perspectives of the network participants. This qualitative analysis sought to identify 
how these bureaucrats conceive of their networks (E.g. as ‘solutions’ or barriers), 
whether frames and institutions influenced and were influenced by this informal 
network, and whether there was evidence that this network performed a role in the 
sector’s reflexive learning capacity.  
7.3.1 Drivers of informal networks 
The majority of participants indicated that they have an informal network they use 
in support of their work. The analysis also showed that these bureaucrats have 
standard conceptions of how their informal network supports their work.  
As responses to the first question listed in Table 8 below indicate, many 
respondents felt having such a network was necessary. Both the survey results and 
the SNA indicated that the participating bureaucrats have networks that are both 
internal and external to their own organisations. Responses to the last question 
listed in Table 1 below indicated that participants were divided in whether or not 
they would turn to people outside of fields related to ‘fire management’ for fire-
related advice. This division in responses may well have been influenced by the 
sector’s institutionalised demarcations of legitimate knowledge – that of fire 
fighting or fuel management knowledge – as actors outside fields related to ‘fire 
management’ are not likely to be perceived to have such ‘credible’ knowledge.  
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Table 8 Responses to survey questions about informal networks 
Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following 
statements 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Having a personal network or 
'grapevine' is absolutely necessary in 
getting any fire-related work done well 
31 13 8 5 0 
I have an informal network of 
colleagues within my organisation that I 
can turn to when I have a question or 
need help with a fire-related issue  
30 21 5 1 0 
I have an informal network of 
colleagues that includes people from other 
organisations that I can turn to when I 
have a question or need help with a 
fire-related issue 
30 22 4 1 0 
I often seek the advice of friends who 
are completely outside of any field 
related to fire, when I have to deal 
with a complex or difficult fire-related 
issue 
4 18 16 14 5 
 
7.3.1.a Part of ‘good’ governance 
To a very large extent, the idea of finding a solution to many public policy 
‘problems’ drives ideas of joined-up, whole-of-government approaches. Such ideas 
were regularly expressed throughout the interviews and surveys. One bureaucrat 
suggested that Ministers rely on the organisations to be across all the information 
and that this drives the need for a consistent approach, “rather than many views” 
[1-4]. Several other participants similarly argued that government and communities 
simply expect the organisations involved in fire management to work together.  
Development of the OESC  and the various big fires, it has really put the 
pressure back on the agencies to work together, otherwise someone will 
make us work together [1-8]  
[We are working together because of] a strong desire by the agencies to 
work, well, in some ways encouragement by government and 
community....... They don’t want to see parochialism and ridiculous turf 
wars, like some of the things that have happened in the past [1-16]  
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7.3.1.b Pragmatism 
A handful of respondents suggested that the need to work together was driven by 
an increasing recognition of the complexity of the issues and fatigue with an 
antagonism between the various organisations and issues.  
[So you say it’s changing…what’s enabling that change?] Recognition I 
think, that the issues are bigger and beyond a single agency trying to deal 
with it on their own.  You have to work together. People are becoming a bit 
tired of - they’re battle weary of trying to protect their turf [2-3]  
Another bureaucrat pragmatically suggested that because ‘the problem’ 
was never going to go away, there is no option: “we've got to work 
together here” [3-13].  
If you are doing any part of your business in a silo, you, without looking 
beyond, you know, outside the square of your own little box, you are taking 
a risk right there. [3-7]  
Others simply argued that co-operation and good relationships are 
necessary and useful to their work, because a better outcome is generally conveyed 
through doing so [2-1, 3-3]. Another respondent framed co-operation as the 
responsible thing for all involved to do [3-2].  
Let's make this better together otherwise what's the purpose of doing this?  
We're better off ..... although everyone knows it takes a bit longer to do 
that. [3-26] 
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7.3.2 Frame and institutional influences on networks (& vice 
versa) 
7.3.2.a The influence of frames 
When combined with the preceding SNA results, the qualitative analysis suggests 
that while there is a diversity of connections between the various organisations in 
the sector, policy frame is likely to influence an individual’s choice of contacts. 
a.1 Shared frame = trust 
The network literature identifies trust as a key influencing factor in network 
function. Unsurprisingly, trust was also found to be an important factor in the 
social relations found throughout this study. However, of particular relevance to 
this work was that participants defined trust in terms of trusting those whom 
shared their values or frames.  
By now I’ve got a pretty good feel for who is trustworthy. ......has to be, in 
part, shared values and problems. There’s also a way of looking at the 
world that’s personal. ...It’s a way of finding the same stupid things funny 
[2-1]  
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I think I find the [X] people fantastic ...probably because we are both [Ys] 
and, you know, we have an understanding the way it works or our view of 
the world is shared [3-1].(Node 150) 
 
 
 
 
I trust the [X] because I’m part of that....if you build that relationship, 
you’ve gone through some the hard decisions with people and you know 
what’s motivating them. [2-7] 
 
 
 
 
 
Combining the above statements with these participant’s ego networks, 
indicated that these three participants were more inclined to connect with (trust) 
people who shared some part of their policy frame. 
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a.2 Networks are for reinforcing frames 
Several respondents used the rhetoric that networked, integrated 
approaches are valuable, but the underlying argument was about getting acceptance 
of their position or policy frame. For example, one participant raised concerns that 
their organisation’s capacity for networking was reduced because of a decreasing 
public workforce that is increasingly concentrated in urban areas. However, the 
concern was raised in the context of a reduced ability to achieve fuel management 
across land tenures and to provide a fire-fighting capacity. 
We’re shrinking back in and that’s having a huge impact on the capability 
to deliver fire management side of it. We’re losing out on the opportunity 
of private people doing work in conjunction with the public land 
management people [1-17] 
Drawing on a similar rhetoric, several respondents argued that co-operative, 
networked approaches were important to enable risk management; the 
interpretation of which centred upon fuel management across all land tenures. 
Moreover, compelling words and phrases such as imperative, strongly support and 
‘I hang my hat on the panacea’ were used as if to underline the importance of a 
collective approach to the singular goal of increased fuel reduction burning. This 
reflects a central prognostic sub-frame of the emergency management (EM) master-
frame, which again suggested, that the EM frame is highly institutionalised within 
the sector. 
Have a collaborative approach there in fuel reduction, whether it is 
burning or whether it is mechanical [3-24] 
It is imperative that fire agencies work collaboratively ....to ensure a 
coherent, community-minded PPRR [planning, preparedness, response & 
recovery] perspective to fire management [s1-7] 
I hang my hat on the panacea of the Integrated Fire Mgt Planning process 
to better manage the hazard by identifying the risk appropriately and 
identifying the appropriate treatments. [1-1] 
I’d be very strongly in support of government getting the frameworks right.  
All agencies, all risks, all landscapes. ....The answer’s in my view, all the 
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players in the community who have a vested interested in the values at risk, 
should be a part of the solution [1-6] 
In another example of networks used to reinforce frames, an old incumbent 
provided a new incumbent their network contacts. The new incumbent viewed this 
as facilitating access to the knowledge within that network and a giving of ‘a stamp 
of approval’. This respondent suggested that it may also have been a means of 
influencing their perspective, although they stated “they blended in quite nicely”. 
He very much opened doors to an informal network when I started, that I 
happily cultivated since.  It’s almost like “OK guys, he’s one of us, let him 
in the room”.  ...It helped knock out a lot of time building up that trust 
factor with others. .....There would have been a professional reason for 
why it was being done. I think he deliberately wanted me to hang around 
with peers that would have a positive influence on what he expected from a 
[manager] in this region. It just so happened that those peers blended in 
quite nicely [2-2] 
While these findings reflect other work showing that policy frames can 
influence choices of network contacts (see for example Weible, et al., 2004) they 
also suggest a more subtle interpretation. That is that policy frames can drive 
conceptions of the purpose of networks or co-operative approaches. In many of 
the examples above, networks are conceived through a frame and therefore as a 
means of reinforcing that frame, not as a means of connecting different frames or 
perspectives.  
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7.3.2.b Institutional constraints 
From a qualitative analysis of the data, it appeared that the institution of 
demonstrable reactivity influenced network function. These constraints centred 
particularly on the idea of measurement that coloured the institution of the sector 
needing to be demonstrably reactive.  
b.1 Hierarchy 
In a sector with a long history (and remaining culture?) of a command:control 
hierarchy is an obvious form of network and formal institution. Such structures 
may be imminently practical during response to crises or major hazard events 
(Moynihan & Pandey, 2008), but they may be less useful in supporting a reflexive 
learning process. Perceptions of hierarchy constraining learning were reflected in 
descriptions of a head-office:regional divide, a ubiquitous description across all 
agencies. In these depictions, those with a direct role in policy development were 
described as being out of touch with the ‘real world’ of implementation and of 
having the control of policy development and change. While not referred to in the 
specific, the derided roles were usually associated with a head office and referred to 
as masters, gatekeepers or rule-makers. Somewhat ironically, this storyline, told by 
bureaucrats, reflects a broader societal discourse that views government as a ‘black 
box’ from which policy emerges.  
Within this same narrative, many ‘street-level’ bureaucrats framed 
themselves as working at the coal face, the pointy end, with the nitty gritty, arguing 
that they have a better sense of the ‘realities’ of policy implementation, than ‘the 
masters’.  
“Everyone is pretty close to the problem. So it’s, you know, you can see it, 
touch it, smell it, feel it” [3-7].  
The implication was that State level policies and programs are not realistic 
and need adjustment because those policies and programs are not based in ‘real’, 
field knowledge.  
We're at the regional level, we're in between these policy people in 
Melbourne and the real practitioners on the ground. It's trying to take what 
they do and distil that into something that can be used [3-25] 
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Part of the state level or headquarters level ‘being out of touch with reality’ 
was defined in relation to impacts ‘at the coal face’ [3-13], such as on field staff 
workloads [2-2, 3-10], not being recognised by those who make decisions at the state 
level. The challenge described by several street-level bureaucrats lay in keeping what 
had been learnt at the ‘coal face’ relevant, once it had been absorbed into broader 
programs and policy frameworks. 
You’ve got to have the expert group that can actually write the policy but I 
think ...the challenge is to actually get the policy people to be able to 
experience and feel it. ......I’m not saying that everyone has to be 
decentralised, but I think the connection out is really a key part of it [2-6] 
The challenge is ...maintaining the relevance of the – of planning that's 
been done at community level, not getting bogged down at strategic level, 
and ceasing to have relevance down at the bottom level. In other words, 
that policy-makers not getting hold of it and running with it to the extent 
where it ceases to bear any resemblance to what it needs to – or it ceases 
to deliver deliverables on the ground that are going to make a difference 
[3-7]  
These statements are interesting of their own accord because in describing 
those who work at the strategic level as a general group of ‘policymakers’, arguably, 
these bureaucrats reinforce the notion of government and its generic ‘policy-
makers’ as faceless. With respect to the concept of reflexive learning relying on a 
dialogue around underpinning institutions and frames, some officer-level 
bureaucrats suggested that there are particular senior personnel that they felt could 
not use as informal contacts because they are “too good a political animal operating 
at a higher level. So you’ll get the smiles, the reassurance but [they] can’t get into 
the discussion about culture” [2-1]. 
Several ‘street-level’ or officer-level bureaucrats also described themselves 
as not being empowered or able to ‘go beyond their level’ [3-10]. This storyline drew 
on ideas of seniority dictating who could ask questions, who would be listened to, 
and that decisions are made at higher levels.   
[Do ideas ever go the other way - up?] Yes, it does.....but I guess there is a 
feeling I get that there is a bit of resentment about that in head office 
[Why?] That that's their role to develop this stuff.....This is not all people 
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but there is a sort of general feeling you get that, “look, that's nice”.  
Maybe just the more function of me being younger.  If it's a senior [x] 
officer speaking to someone there in Melbourne, then it will get more 
accepted.  But it’s very much a bit of a command structure [3-25] 
There is the manager’s [X] group get together, so that’s the regional 
sharing. I’m not in that group focus – I’m below the management line [3-
23] 
Some of my cohorts talk to CEOs whereas ....if I want to influence a CEO I 
talk to [Y] and get him to do it as opposed to me thinking that it is my level 
of operations as I don't think it is. But there are some I could talk to but I 
get the impression sometimes that they don't think that I operate at their 
level [3-19] 
Several field staff portrayed themselves as having little influence on policy 
and programs. They used phrases such as lower than shark shit [3-12], way down the 
bottom of the list [3-2], and bottom of the food chain [3-11]. They suggested that 
strategic level decision-makers considered the challenges faced by field practitioners 
as small, inconsequential details.  
[those above] “would just see it as this peripheral little program...I don’t 
think they saw the link.... maybe they did see it, but it just wasn’t on the 
radar, too busy, wasn’t a priority [2-7] 
Maybe they think they are the State government, we are the little old local 
government and why should they take much notice of us........it is hard for 
them to sort of turn their big important minds to little details but little 
details all around the place are us trying to implement their big picture 
stuff [3-1] 
Many of these ‘street-level’ bureaucrats argued that a lack of connection 
between themselves and the strategic, policy level, meant that their knowledge and 
experience does not inform policy or programs. Moreover, a number suggested that 
they were not aware of how they could input into more strategic issues or even get 
feedback on what they’re doing [3-13, 3-14, 3-15]. Some suggested that they are not 
asked for their input [3-13, 3-23], rather that they are just told what to do. This can be 
seen in phrases such as “it’s all pointed downward” [3-11], and “it’s a dictatorial 
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thing” [3-14].  One respondent suggested that a local network had been set-up 
specifically to form a group response to state level directives. 
We don't want these guys to talk while we’re talking. .... They'd say well 
local government will do that without any consultation. ..... It’s a 
dictatorial thing. Really [x network] started by saying “hang on, you can’t 
tell us what to do”. They’re starting to realise that they need to talk to us 
[3-14] 
This qualitative analysis suggested some disjunction between the strategic 
and local levels within parts of the sector. It provides a similar view to that of the 
quantitative SNA, which suggested that although this network was connected and 
information might move easily through it, there was a slight disjunction between 
senior management (middle) and team leader/officer (street-level) bureaucrats.  
Interestingly, perspectives from some of those at a strategic policy level also 
gave expression to the institutionalised constraint of hierarchy on networks as a 
conduit of learning. Rather than considering a diversity of approaches as a source 
of testing and learning, there again appeared to be an underlying driver of the need 
for consistent and measurable (demonstrable) actions. For example: 
My level of initiative is quite properly stifled’ because we (A) cannot (D) 
have the boss say we’re going on a different route or initiate different 
things (I), because “we’re government, not private enterprise” (C), or else 
we’d end up with different fiefdoms without any sort of central 
coordination, and with no consistency, we have no best practice to adopt 
because everyone is doing their own thing (O) [2-2]  
Another respondent argued that being able to measure the cumulative 
impact or outcome of policies is an important consideration for justifying particular 
policies or programs.  
You can have all these wonderful local solutions and good ideas, but 
somehow you have to be able to anchor that into the broader context to be 
able to demonstrate what is it that you’re trying to achieve and how you’re 
trying to achieve it. You can measure one local initiative in isolation, but 
it’s not very significant at a State level [1-8]   
Yet another perspective illustrated the important role of a level of strategic 
coordination or oversight. For example, not addressing complexity at state or 
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constitutional levels can create difficulties at the operational or implementation 
levels: 
If you try changing at the pointy end you're fighting against this 
massive...almost like a massive animal that's made up of multiple agencies 
if you like. You could throw as many spears at it as you like, you're not 
going to kill this animal unless you deal with it on a bigger level [3-13]  
Another perspective also highlighted the need for some boundaries, and 
guidance thereof, in applying policy in a flexible or adaptive manner. 
I'm all for compromise, but sometimes compromise isn't always the best 
policy, and if that means, in my situation, if you're compromising certain 
policies or certain planning controls all the time, where do you draw the 
line? I mean, so that's the difficulty. It's how, there's one sort of school that 
says, well, you can't be totally inflexible with these controls, but if you 
make them too flexible, they almost become completely inadequate [3-15] 
The challenge is that the concept of adaptive governance is that a variety of 
local initiatives, undertaken in a reflexive learning manner, can provide a wealth of 
information through application of similar approaches in different locations. They 
present a particular challenge to the experimental and flexibility concepts of 
adaptive governance. A coordinative function expressed through hierarchy 
however, is unlikely to be conducive to reflexive learning. 
212 
b.2 During major events the sector is demonstrably reactive 
Participants suggested that during fire suppression efforts, the different 
organisations and groups work well together. Several stated that it is outside of 
times when the agencies are responding to a major event that misunderstandings 
become apparent. Statements such as these suggested that when responding to 
major events, the bureaucracy as a whole is able to ‘meet’ the institution of being 
demonstrably reactive – at no other time is it likely to be so. However, such a 
distinct view of the sector’s purpose dissipates once the actors return to their 
substantive roles and likely, their more diverse policy frames. The day-to-day work 
of public administration requires consideration of a more diverse range of issues, 
which, in the context of a demonstrable and reactive imperative, splinters the focus 
(the frame) and thereby creates tensions. Certainly, several participants argued that 
antagonism between agencies and groups within agencies is because the different 
groups do not understand each other’s work [3-14, 2-2]. One respondent’s story 
exemplified this issue: 
We said “Hey we want to do this”. We’ve created expectation. It became 
an issue when we’d say we’re going to go to these meetings, then we had 
50 lightning strikes in the Alps and everybody disappeared. So we didn’t 
go to any. [So they didn’t appreciate or understand that?]  No, because the 
organisations are set up differently. [X] doesn’t have to worry about 
whether his presenters are going to disappear or not. He’s always got that 
resource there; whereas we all have, at minimum, dual roles. [2-7] 
Consequent for networks and their role in reflexive learning, is that 
networks rely on good relationships. The perceived antagonism between groups 
expressed by several respondents highlighted what may be an even more 
fundamental issue. While appreciating different frames is vital for adaptation, 
appreciating the work requirements of colleagues is even more basic for adaptive 
responses. Several authors argue that frame conflicts can present a barrier to 
reflexive learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978, 1996; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). If 
perceptual barriers already surround fundamental work roles and capacities, the 
willingness to begin a conversation surrounding the purpose of the sector may be 
even more difficult. 
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It’s a very diverse group in fire, within agencies. You know there are 
massive differences in values, and interests and objectives across the 
people working in agencies and in fire. So that makes it hard to get cross-
fertilisation of ideas [1]. 
b.3 Time and space for networks 
Another challenge repeatedly identified by participants was that for networks to 
provide the space for discussion and learning, time and space is required for 
network development and function. Respondents often described time as a barrier 
to establishing and maintaining dialogue and working networks, particularly where 
networks were aimed at involving people and groups with different policy frames. 
The relationships and the networks are just as important, possibly more 
important than any structure.....we need to create enough space in our life, 
our work life, that we can build and nurture those things [3-8]. 
It's a bit of silo not because maybe people are trying - a deliberate thing, 
it's more just they don't know what else is out there because we don't 
maybe have good ways of sharing the knowledge or come together [3-25]. 
They needed time. That's the other thing ......all our performance based 
assessment of people's performance - I'm sure [x] would have sighed at me 
sometimes, “shit, are you still going on with this bloody [xx] forum? Still 
hasn't produced the goods”. .......it took a long time – [but] finally got to a 
point where we could say, we can all live with the compromises that this 
represents. The really good thing was we all got to understand other 
people's point of view much more clearly [3-9]. 
The theme of lack of time and space was also raised with respect to not 
being able to reflect upon more strategic issues, let alone feed into them [3-13]. The 
lack of time and space was attributed to formal institutions such as business 
performance measurements, and the responsive nature of much of the emergency 
management responsibilities of the sector. 
 [Z] isn't immune to it, we're as guilty as anyone else - just operate in our 
own little world. While everything's going alright we just get the work in, 
pump it out. A lot more interaction and dialogue and broader 
understanding of all our issues.....probably could be strengthened [3-12] 
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In apparent recognition of the currently competitive and guarded approach 
to discussing more complex situations, several respondents argued for creating a 
space for such dialogue, but that space was more than just temporal or physical. 
Several respondents described a conceptual or even, a ‘safe’ emotional space 
outside of the institutionalised competition for reputational capital, and the demand 
for infallible decisions. The following statement reflects this perspective as well as 
recognition that increasing the number of actors involved in decision-making would 
also increase the number of perspectives considered – a fundamental of reflexive 
learning. 
The biggest challenge is creating a playing field where all of the players 
can come and have, from a sense of comfort and share without feeling 
threatened or competitive, that they have to get there and best at it. It’s 
about changing the mentality within the culture of all those organisations 
to say that “well, we are all in this together. Let’s do it together” and it’s 
not about measuring who’s doing the biggest bit, or who’s doing that bit, 
it’s about us. It’s about building a team not just responders, but everybody 
that’s got any degree of responsibility for fire management, however 
small.....And opening it up you go...straight away from having one orange 
in your fruit basket to having a hundred...The challenge is in keeping the 
playing field open and inclusive [3-7] 
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7.3.3 Network influences on reflexive learning capacity 
The final component of the qualitative analysis of this policy sector’s bureaucratic 
network attempted to ascertain what role, if any, the network plays in the sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning. The following discusses this analysis, the results of 
which suggest that networks among this sector’s bureaucrats can and do play a role 
in reflexive learning in several ways. 
7.3.3.a Test veracity of formal information (complementary) 
Several participating bureaucrats described using their informal networks to test the 
veracity and agenda of official information. As highlighted in both institutional and 
network analyses literature, the informal processes of organisations often provide 
better insight into how things are actually done. Some responses suggested that 
participants do use their networks by which to question current frames. 
I use my informal links when I want considered, learned advice. Sometimes 
in the best world, the informal and formal link is the same person. That’s 
the ideal world for me. But there are some circumstances where it’s not ...I 
need to do something that needs a tick from somebody, I use the formal 
link, but in making my decision I’m going to get advice from another 
source [2-2] 
In this research, many participants depicted the informal advice they 
received or sought as being more useful and informed than what they received 
through formal channels.  This was evidenced in responses to the survey questions, 
as listed in Table 10.  
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Table 9 Responses to survey questions about the value of official channels for information 
and learning 
Please indicate your level of agreement 
with the following statements 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I often discuss any information I 
receive from official sources (E.g. in 
meetings, training, newsletters, official 
communications, etc) with those in my 
informal network  
10 30 10 5 1 
Official channels are useful for 
information and answers for any 
questions about fire & related policies 
3 13 18 18 4 
Formal activities (E.g. Official 
meetings, training, etc) are generally 
enough to understand an issue & learn 
about different ways to deal with it 
4 14 15 18 5 
  
While used for testing the veracity of formal information, informal 
networks were also described as playing a complementary role to formal 
information, as opposed to outright substitution. Informal sources of information 
playing a supplementary role to formal sources of information reflects findings of 
other studies on informal networks (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003; High, et al., 2007). 
This was particularly evident in cases where official advice was unclear or 
contradictory. For example, one respondent described using their informal network 
to develop guidance on addressing requirements of two intersecting policies where 
formal guidance was non-existent. Through this network, they were able to draft a 
position that was used by both their own organisation and several of their contacts 
[3-1]. 
So I wrote this two-page draft of how we were going to interpret it.  I 
emailed it and I rang [X organisation], spoke to my friends and said "Do 
you realise - you know, there are all inconsistencies and issues.  You guys 
have got to look at [x]" and they said "Yes, yes, you are right. Shoot us a 
copy, thanks".  There was a bit of toing-and-froing.  They then took them to 
the manager and the word on high from the manager - and I couldn't talk 
to the manager, of course - and the word from up high was “Well, just deal 
with it”, you know, “We are not interested.  Big deal”.  So I said "Well 
that's ridiculous. Okay, fair enough.  We will go off and do our own thing”. 
So we came up with one [3-1].   
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7.3.3.b Obtain new information/ ideas 
With respect to the fundamental role of networks as a source of new ideas or 
frames, the data were clear that the informal bureaucratic network was a conduit of 
learning. Several respondents indicated that people in their informal network 
provided them information they were unlikely to have heard about without the 
network [2-3, 2-7, 3-17]. Another strong storyline throughout the interviews was that 
informal networks provide temporal and cognitive space for discussions and 
learning [3-23]. This was both in terms of what is currently occurring, as well as 
providing the space in which to discuss new ideas and approaches.  
He explained it in very simple terms and I go that's a fair point. I said I 
never...I wouldn't consider that.  I'm looking at a clump as fuel, as an 
emitter of radiant heat [laughs], not the fact that there is actually 
something living in that clump of fuel [3-13]. 
Several of the research participants talked about learning engendered 
through network interactions. They discussed finding new and more varied 
management options, as well as removal of perceived constraints. Reflexive learning 
can occur within the interactive, context-orientated space of constant give-and-take 
of practice  (Wagenaar & Noam Cook, 2003).  
The fire safety group under [y] was quite an eye opener for me ....I found 
out that they cared......I’ve been at so many forums with [X organisation 
and y] in the days of that joint project....I see them [conservation and fire 
safety requirements] as incredibly complementary and more powerful 
together than by themselves [2-4] 
[Working with them] in the promotion of biodiversity and habitat has been 
great. I’ve really enjoyed. I’ve learnt a lot from those people and I’m not 
saying it has made me a greenie at all, because I’m still pretty fuel 
conscious, but I think there’s a real balance about fuel modification versus 
fuel removal [3-4] 
Over recent time my personal views have shifted.... [What stimulated that?] 
I think discussions - well, one thing is [x], who's an individual who has 
good knowledge of some of these issues and has proved practical in-- has 
provided more balance. ...so if he's coming in and saying, "Hey, we can do 
more to balance these things better," you sort of go, "Yeah that's - well 
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that's good." Then ....we've got people from [Y] and [Z] that are over there 
learning to talk about that issue, you realise that there is room to move [3-
6] 
For one respondent, interactions with someone of a different perspective 
revealed increased complexity for the issue with which they were dealing. However, 
this understanding then seemed to enable them to both to deal with that complexity 
in an ongoing manner. This outcome is indicative of the type of adaptive potential 
provided through social networks. 
I know now it’s not as simple as me saying “well you either got this; A or 
B. It’s not black and white anymore .........It's about finding the solution 
that will still achieve our objectives but equally meets his objectives. So by 
having that dialogue, straight away, I myself became more appreciative of 
the other issues and equally he became appreciative of what we potentially 
would be able to consider in meeting his objectives.....by building that 
relationship up with those people you then know they can go off and talk 
about both their issues and your issues in their forum. [3-13] 
Construction of informal networks was also described as being important in 
developing support for new ideas to approaching policy issues. One respondent 
used imagery of creating a network as weaving and trying multiple paths ‘to go 
around blocks’ [1-4].  
There's always two ways around the mountain, so you go directly the first 
time, and you keep chipping away, but at the same time you raise the 
profile of the issue...at, say, regional level. If I had an issue in my patch, I 
would raise it with my neighbour - and try and build, you know - a bit of a 
team, applied pressure [3-7] 
It appeared that numerous bureaucrats conceived of their network as a ‘safe 
space’ for testing new ideas, and for working around some institutional barriers. 
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7.3.3.c Boundary (frame) spanners 
As discussed in the theoretical basis, for a network to function in the sharing of 
ideas and information, does not require that all actors have to be connected to one 
another. Rather, that groups of people are connected and this highlighted the 
importance of people the network literature might describe as boundary spanners. 
Several interviewees talked about specific individuals as enabling networks that 
provided a space for dialogue and learning.   
For a couple of years I was on the [XX] Group, so that's mostly [Y 
organisations] down here. Due to a change in [Y] personnel - the person 
that ran that ran off to a different job in Melbourne - it's lapsed for a 
couple of years but now it's restarted. So that's a bit more of a chance to 
work at a landscape level with [Y], flora and fauna and fire people to 
actually look at, whilst it's fire ecology, it does look at landscape, 
ecological fire and other issues. I think that sort of dialogue has got to be 
more helpful than not, in getting to try and understand what we're trying to 
achieve. I think that would probably be improved if we had some planning 
systems people on it, you know, the DPCD to understand at a planning 
level what we're trying to achieve as well as just that an ecological and 
environmental level [3-19] 
Reciprocity is repeatedly recognised as having an influence on network 
structure and function. Rather than the notion of sharing a frame however, in a 
reflexive learning context reciprocity is about respecting and providing space for 
different perspectives. Two respondents, who were identified by others as working 
across organisational boundaries, presented personal stories that exemplified a 
personal norm of reciprocity.  
The fire people have a value set that’s different to mine but is able to 
recognise that my value set has a right to be. That their value set must take 
it into consideration. It’s exactly the same in biodiversity. I understand that 
fires have to be managed. There are certain things that in a perfect world 
are unpalatable to my value set but I have to make allowances for that, 
particularly when they are bending over backwards to make it as palatable 
to my value set [3-10]. 
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Interviews with some of the people identified by others as boundary 
spanners, revealed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that they while they see their role as 
important, they also find it difficult and potentially thankless. Both highlighted the 
challenge of connecting across organisations, groups and frames.  
They work in the same region and they've never met. For 10 bloody years 
and never met, and I, it's just, oh well let's go have a coffee.....that's taken 
me a year.  ..... “Oh do we have to?” Just going there [to another’s 
workplace] is like going outside the comfort zone.....just different cultures, 
different focus.   .....How do I convince that one or that one, you know, 
trying to facilitate that cross pollination ....I'm like the keeper, but it's all 
behind the scenes. So some people who are being sarcastic could think I 
don't do much work but I do a bloody lot of work. I'm almost like an 
advisor or a keeper [3-26] 
I understand that they've got different needs, and I understand that they've 
got different capacities often....I liken it, I guess, to being like a parent.  
You just - it's about keeping them all happy.  Sometimes that means Tim 
Tams - this one likes Tim Tams, this one has raisins, this one won't eat 
broccoli.  It's a bit like that.  So I guess for me, it's about just being able to 
dip into that bag of deep understanding [3-7] 
In relation to physical space, one participant suggested that interactions 
across different policy portfolios were enabled by as simple a factor as the office 
layout, where the fire prevention and environmental sections of their organisation 
were part of the same department and worked in the same office.  
You never say these things are perfect and there's always room for 
improvement, but, in general, the - the foundation is a much stronger one 
to deal with those problems than – than you would have if they were 
completely separate or operating in different ways [3-6] 
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7.3.3.d Address institutional constraints 
This analysis also found that this bureaucratic network appears to provide some a 
capacity to question dominant frames and institutions – an important aspect of 
reflexive learning. This capacity is outlined below.  
d.1 Local has more flexibility that state level 
An alternate conception of the strategic-local interaction to that of hierarchy 
constraining local-level initiative, was one in which the State level was conceived as 
being constrained and less flexible. In this conception, rather than the State 
deliberately ignoring field practitioners, it is more that those at field or local levels 
have capacity to try different approaches. In contrast to those who perceived 
hierarchy as constraining, several other participants considered vertical connections 
important. These participants did not consider that the State dismissed locally 
derived knowledge. A person of some seniority described this capacity for faster, 
more dexterous responses at the local level as: 
Where we’re going by State level to do things a certain way, those 
constraints don’t apply for my local government colleagues. I’m blessed 
that I have [x] officers and similar, that are prepared to give things a 
crack. We can give them the advice, the support, the weight of our 
organisation in getting them involved in their communities, but they have 
fairly unfettered ability to have a play around. Then what they find we can 
then feed back into head office. They are the test tubes out there. Some of 
them are pretty good at it [2-2]  
I think the crucial thing is, giving people the authority to do things. So it’s 
local knowledge again but it’s putting decision-making down to the most 
appropriate, lowest possible level. But it challenges it [the command 
control nature of the fire agencies] substantially [1-16]  
In a similar vein, one street-level bureaucrat felt empowered to share their 
experience and knowledge with senior management, and confident that that 
knowledge would be included into broader policy deliberations. 
We can feed things up through channels up through [C] and he feeds it 
in..... he listens yes. .....He knows very well there's a lot more - just because 
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you are management it doesn't mean that you are less intelligent or more 
intelligent [3-17]  
Taking a similar tangent, another respondent argued that it takes longer for 
overarching policy frameworks to change in comparison with the field, because of 
formal institutions such as business planning and budgets [3-7]. Another respondent 
of fairly high seniority suggested that a disjunction between the strategic level and 
regional or local levels that seemed to frustrate others, actually provides them 
‘freedom’ to achieve their agenda. The implication is that consultation restricts their 
ability to achieve their pre-defined goal. From this perspective, without the state 
level ‘restrictions’ that require consultation, they can control who is involved and 
with what ‘rights’, even though they are ‘committed to’ a whole of government 
approach. 
When you start looking at a whole government approach, which we're 
committed to, and you look at a state level of politics that you need to play 
out in terms of your consultation. .......that's got strengths, but it also slows 
the process down. Whereas we're not restricted by that, so we can actually 
trial stuff, still involve the other agencies but at an admissible level, and at 
a local level, take a lead role, they still have the input and then present it 
for state considerations. [3-20, my emphasis]  
Just as there appears to be a level of miscomprehension in the sector about 
how each organisation functions, there may be a similar misunderstanding 
regarding the different demands and therefore, knowledge requirements at different 
levels of the bureaucracy. At the very least this stresses the importance of vertical 
and horizontal networks within bureaucracies. 
d.2 Safe space to admit a lack of understanding and test new ideas 
Informal networks were also portrayed as safe spaces in which to admit a lack of 
understanding or knowledge, and through which to seek that knowledge. The 
implication was that questioning, and learning by making mistakes were seen as 
weaknesses and that there may be repercussions for such weakness.  
It’s one thing to ask a mate ...what they think and be totally honest with 
them, knowing there’s no repercussions, rather than going to somebody 
who has control over you. You necessarily hold something back at times, 
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especially where it may weaken your position at times. How open are you 
going to be with the boss, when you might be showing a weakness in your 
decision-making process or your professional efficacy? [2-2] 
Pretty open, frank discussion going on and, you know, a spade's a spade 
…..There's good trust both ways and we know that we can say stuff 
between us and that's where it, all of it sits [3-11]  
The need for a ‘safe space’ in which to admit a lack of knowledge or 
mistakes, recalls the sense of constraint through having to make infallible decisions 
(Chapter 6). However, it also indicated that informal networks may well be used to 
circumvent that institutional constraint. Similarly, a handful of participants 
described using their network as a kind of barometer for testing new ideas [3-4] and 
for assessing ‘palatable’ responses to particularly sensitive or ‘tricky’ policy issues [2-
3]. Although subtle, these statements indicate that networks are also likely used to 
test institutional ‘fit’ of new ideas or perspectives. 
d.3 Develop trust and reciprocity – address reputation competition 
A very senior respondent described deliberately trying to build communication 
networks so as to manage perceptions of ‘territory invasion’ or undermining the 
position of new contacts. Such perceptions may be driven by the institutionalised 
competition for reputational capital identified in Chapter 6.  
We’ve got to give them the confidence that we’re not there trying to take 
their turf over cos there’s a lot happening. ......That’s why the chat today 
with [Y], it’s about “this is what we’re doing. Don’t feel threatened by it”. 
......We’ve got people here that we’re building to have [networks] ...that 
they’re able to pick up the phone and say “look, you got that wrong”. So 
that they don’t feel that it’s a threat or it’ll escalate to a formal thing......I 
thought the worst thing I can do is put pressure from [Y] to [X], then 
they’ll think that we’ve been talking to [Y] and gone around them [2-6]. 
Although only one, the statement above intimated that informal networks 
may be influential in challenging and perhaps breaking down this particular 
institution. 
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d.4 Cope with reactionary decision-making – demonstrably reactive 
A person of relative high seniority also suggested that informal networks act as a 
buffer against actions from above, which they described as ad-hoc.  
You work with the community, with the people who have an interest in 
those things. If you try and do it genuinely and try and come up with a 
result, you’re in a much better position to try and deal with some of the ad-
hocery that can come in from above [1-7] 
Along similar lines, several other respondents talked about how their 
network was particularly important in the face of management instability, because:  
“People have been acting in a position for 18 months and because they’re 
acting, the person in their role is acting and the person behind them [2-
1]...so it’s hard to know where to go [3-2] 
Both of these statements indicate informal bureaucratic networks provide 
some form of stability. The first statement hints at the idea that trust is built 
through these networks and that that trust can provide some buffering to potential 
negative impacts of reactive decision-making (the institutionalised demonstrable 
reactivity). 
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7.4 DISCUSSION: A BUREAUCRATIC NETWORK & 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REFLEXIVE 
LEARNING 
This chapter discussed an exploration of the bureaucratic network found through 
use of an online survey and semi-structured interviews. Using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, the analysis sought to explore this network as an indicator of 
the sector’s capacity for reflexive learning, based upon the diversity of connections 
within and across organisations, levels of seniority, and policy frames.  
The quantitative network analysis suggested that the bureaucratic network 
found here while not densely connected, was reasonably well-connected because it 
had an average 4.6 “degrees of separation” between individuals. This suggested that 
theoretically, information can move fairly easily through this bureaucratic network. 
The SNA also indicated that bureaucrats with team leader or officer roles tended to 
have higher centralities – more connections. This may reflect a limitation of the 
time that those at more senior levels have available for the maintenance of 
networks. However, it may also simply reflect that those of more senior levels have 
even less time to participate in research, or a more hierarchical nature of the sector. 
The quantitative analysis also indicated that role and organisation did not seem to 
influence an actor’s centrality.  
As to the question of whether policy frame influences network structure, 
interpretations of several sociograms indicated that policy master-frames were fairly 
evenly distributed throughout the network. Analysis of the frames of the ten most 
‘influential’ bureaucrats within the network was less clearly indicative. While six of 
these twelve were ‘classified’ as holding a sustainability master-frame, the fact that 
the frames of three of the twelve were unknown meant that a definitive statement 
about the distribution of frames cannot be made. However, examination of the 
ego-network of the ten most influential actors suggested that policy master-frame 
does play some role in structuring the networks of most individuals. 
The qualitative analysis of network participants perspectives, suggested that 
informal networks are an important part of the work of the participating 
bureaucrats. They described using their networks to create or test new ideas, and to 
provide a buffer or support in light of unclear or contradictory formal advice. They 
also described their networks in terms of ascertaining whether there is value in 
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voicing concerns or attempting to change current approaches – for resonance with 
an institutionalised frame. Building support for an argument or position is also 
another way these bureaucrats rely on their networks, and as the literature suggests 
may provide the sector some capacity for reflexive learning. 
There were two distinct storylines surrounding the influence of field 
experience on the strategic policy processes. One centred on the rhetoric of 
hierarchy – formal and informal – as controlling or limiting the flow of knowledge 
and information. The second conceived the State level as being more constrained 
and less flexible than local levels, rather than hierarchy controlling the flow of 
knowledge. The disconnection expressed in these narratives, reflected the SNA 
results that indicated a slight disjunction between more senior levels and those at 
team leader or officer levels. 
Drawing together the ideas of government/community expectations, 
pragmatism for making the work easier, and networks as a means of reinforcing 
frames suggests that there is a strong narrative in this sector about having to have a 
consistent story. Moreover, these results indicate that networks are a useful tool by 
which to create this consistent story, including advice to Ministers, government and 
communities. From a reflexive learning, adaptive governance perspective however, 
it would be better to present the different views, and the difficulties and 
complexities of making value judgements and choice. At least, that the sector 
presents a consistent view that there is not a consistent view and why. These results 
also lead to a consideration that seeking the advice of others who share a policy 
frame is a kind of learning. It may engender adaptive management, where what is 
currently being done can be assessed as to whether it is working. However, working 
‘inside’ a frame is unlikely to engender reflexive learning. Reflexive learning asks 
how well we appreciate a situation and how our particular perspective on that 
situation influences the actions we choose (or support). The data do suggest 
however, that several bureaucrats in this network have experienced interactions 
with those of a different policy perspective that have engendered some kind of 
frame reflection.  
Most interestingly for this study, both the quantitative and qualitative 
network analyses suggested that policy frames influence network structure. 
However, the qualitative analysis provided a more subtle insight into this influence, 
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based on perceptions of network actors as to the purpose of their networks. For 
several participants networks were a means of reinforcing or supporting a particular 
policy frame, in particular of convincing others of the validity of a particular 
perspective, or frame.  This appears to be a very rationalist interpretation of the 
purpose of social networks, as a means to achieve a solution. This also suggests 
that, without deliberative reflection, networks may be driven by a search for 
ideological echoes.  
The subsequent and final chapter draws these findings together with those 
from the preceding analyses of policy frames and informal institutions in a 
discussion of the capacity for reflexive learning of the fire management sector in 
relation to the wider literature described in the thesis’ theoretical basis (Chapter 1). 
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Chapter Eight 
8 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION & 
REFLECTING FORWARD 
8.1 DISCUSSION 
8.1.1 Introduction 
The central concern of this thesis was an exploration of the capacity for reflexive 
learning in a public policy sector because reflexive learning was considered key to 
adaptation in public policy sectors. Rather than seeking to develop another suite of 
recommendations for process or structure, this thesis sought to examine the 
existing capacity for reflexive learning within a case study policy sector. The entry 
point for that exploration was the role of public administrators/bureaucrats as 
influential but often overlooked actors who are central to processes of governance 
and administration, and essential to the requisite reflexive learning of adaptive 
governance. Synthesising a broad range of literature, this thesis identified frames, 
informal institutions and networks as influential factors in processes of governance, 
policy, and reflexive learning. The selected case was the policy sector of fire 
management in the state of Victoria, Australia. Taking its perspective from the 
bureaucrats of that sector, this thesis explored the frames, informal institutions and 
networks of those bureaucrats. The theoretical basis of the research also guided the 
use of a triangulated analytical framework.  
This final chapter draws together the research findings into a discussion and 
conclusion regarding the capacity for reflexive learning in the policy sector of fire 
management in Victoria. The chapter has five sections. Because substantive 
research results depend upon the analytical framework used to attain them and the 
theoretical perspectives that guide those frameworks, the first and second sections 
discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions of the study. The third 
section discusses the substantive results of each analysis and closes with a synthesis 
of the main arguments and findings, relating them to the research questions. The 
fourth section presents the study’s conclusion regarding the question of the studied 
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sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of 
potential areas of future research. 
8.1.2 Theoretical contribution 
This was problem driven research rather than that driven by a particular theory or 
methodology. It sought to enhance understanding of the challenge of climate 
change adaptation in the administration of public policy sectors through application 
of a combination of concepts to the particular case of fire management (Greene & 
Caracelli, 2003:103). The thesis’ theoretical contribution centred on an argument 
that the kind of learning required for adaptive governance for adaptation, relies as 
much on the often overlooked work of bureaucrats as other key communities 
within a policy sector. It was therefore posited that to better understand and 
actually facilitate adaptive governance, it is important to appreciate the role of 
policy administrators in a sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. This overarching 
rationale has its roots in a wide-ranging body of literature, a synthesis of which 
provided the thesis its tripartite theoretical basis. 
The first component of the theoretical basis drew on ideas of adaptive 
governance requiring a kind of reflexive learning, understood as being composed of 
three orders of learning. First and second orders of learning involve changes to 
existing policies or dominant policy instruments within the existing institutional 
landscape (Hall, 1993), mirroring ideas of single and double-loop learning (Sabatier, 
1999; Schön & Rein, 1994). These first two orders of learning parallel ideas of 
‘learning by doing’ so often described in references to the concept of adaptive 
management. However, the literature review highlighted that adaptive governance 
requires an additional, third order of learning. There are numerous monikers given 
to this kind of learning, including triple-loop, deutero, institutional, social and even 
reflexive learning, but at its core lies the intent of frame reflection (Ison, 2005; 
Schön & Rein, 1994). In the context of governance and the administration of public 
policy, reflexive learning demands that influential actors reflect upon (and possibly 
expand) the frames and informal institutions40  that structure a sector’s paradigm - 
                                                 
40 Recalling that institutions are defined here as formal and informal conventions that influence behaviour and which in turn shape collective 
actions (Lauth, 2000; Scott, 1995) 
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its governance, policies and practices (Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hall, 
1993; Hendriks & Grin, 2007; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Schön & Rein, 1994).  
The second component of the theoretical basis was therefore concerned 
with concepts of frames and informal institutions in the structuring of a sector’s 
paradigm and influencing a sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. The literature 
review highlighted that frames and informal institutions have complex and 
interrelated roles in these processes. Frames influence a sector’s capacity for 
reflexive learning through the breadth of perspectives considered within a policy 
sector, and the lenses through which new frames or ideas such as adaptation are 
likely to be conceptualised. Institutionalised frames influence the structure of a 
sector’s paradigm. “The degree and type of institutionalisation is a key aspect of the 
‘cognitive map’ that filters and shapes the conduct of actors in any policy system” 
(Considine, 2005:70), including policy choices and governance approaches. It is 
here that frames and institutions were argued to be separate but closely related 
concepts. As ideas, frames are the blueprints behind institutions, the media out of 
which they are constructed(Blyth, 2008). Shared frames through which meanings 
are made, are the cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions (Scott, 2001). Therefore, 
cognisance of the policy frames of a sector’s bureaucrats could provide some 
insight into the breadth of perspectives considered in policy processes, a sector’s 
informal institutions, and the prisms through which adaptation might be 
conceptualised.  
Equally, as reflections of broader cultural contexts, institutions influence 
which frame/s structure a sector’s paradigm at any particular point in time. The 
institutions of interest to this thesis were the informal ‘rules in use’, the normative 
and cognitive counterparts to the more visible and formal regulatory institutions. 
Informal institutions were of particular interest because again the literature 
suggested that they influence a sector’s capacity for reflexive learning by not only 
defining whether reflection upon underlying frames and institutions can occur, they 
also define what questions can be asked, by whom and whose answers might be 
considered authoritative. Institutions not only lay tracks for policymakers in seeking 
decisions on issues, they generate different incentives for raising certain issues or 
for leaving others aside (Considine, 2005:70). Concurrently, while institutions may 
impose broader cultural logics upon behaviour, they are never fully determining of 
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a reflexive actor’s conduct (Gofas & Hay, 2009:43; Scharpf, 2000:764). As was 
argued earlier, institutions are path-shaping rather than path-determining (Hay, 2006a). 
This is because institutions are both the context within which agents think, speak 
and act, and the constructs that result from agents’ thoughts, words and actions 
(Schmidt, 2009-8). It is when frames and institutions become trapped in mutual-
reinforcement that a capacity or desire for reflexive learning is constrained. 
Decision paths become ruts and insight inertia manifests (Godkin, 2010). Here is 
where human agency is crucial. 
Frames and institutions are social constructions; created and maintained by 
people either tacitly or deliberately. Therefore, as free agents, people are equally 
capable of reflecting upon these frames and institutions. Changing their collective 
nature is much more challenging. However, interaction between actors with 
different ideas, perspectives or frames is one mechanism that could support the 
transformation of a tight feedback loop between frames and institutions. In wide-
ranging literature, much has been made of the idea of learning enabled through 
interactive, iterative and networked approaches (Christie, et al., 2009:86; Pahl-Wostl, 
2007; Pelling & High, 2005a:7; Valente, 2005). Collaborative learning amongst peers 
is believed to facilitate faster and deeper learning compared with learning received 
through the transmissions of an instructor (Elwyn et. al, 2001 in Pelling, et al., 
2008). These ideas are particularly germane to the collective intent of adaptive 
governance. Governments have a lot of knowledge, but they rarely know what they 
know (Huber, 1991:100). Without inter and intra-networks, decisions can be made 
without the involvement of anyone that has a deep knowledge of the issue (Mulgan, 
2009) or the utilisation of different and potentially fruitful alternate perspectives on 
the issue. From the perspective of reflexive learning for adaptive governance, access 
to alternate or complementary frames widens policy and practice options, thus 
facilitating greater adaptive capacity.  
Networks are clearly important, but both the network and organisational 
learning literature indicated that just as frames and institutions are interrelated, they 
also mediate the structure and function of networks. Our very human tendency to 
commune with those who share our values and frames has consequences for 
network structure and function. If there is greater connectivity among a sector’s 
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bureaucrats who share a frame, such as a single discursive group or epistemic41  
community (Haas, 1992; Hall, 1993; Sabatier, 1999; Scharpf, 2000; Schmidt, 2008), 
information may move freely within the sector, but the information that moves is 
reinforcing an ideological echo-chamber (Zuckerman, 2008). The network literature 
highlights that if institutions reinforce these closed circuits, it may be difficult to 
introduce new ideas or frames, thus restricting a sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning. Clearly, frames, informal institutions and networks have the potential to 
be mutually reinforcing. Social networks are also likely to be a key source of new 
and alternate frames.  
The third component of the thesis’ theoretical perspective was the 
fundamental argument that processes underlying public administration are an 
integral but often overlooked part of the challenge of climate change adaptation. IN 
was argued that policy and governance are shaped as much by formal structures and 
processes, as they are by informal networks of communication between 
practitioners that are in turn the products of values and norms embedded in an 
organisation [or sector] (Jordan & O'Riordan, 2005; van Nieuwaal, et al., 2009). 
Public administrators are thereby key actors in those processes, influenced by and 
influencing the frames, informal institutions and networks of a policy sector. Public 
administrative practice involves “people sometimes assumed to be rather routine 
workers in bureaucracy but who are extremely important for making it work” 
(Page, 2006a:4). These people often work with very broad guidance, have to use 
their own judgement and knowledge, and draw on a range of inputs and processes 
in administrating policy and contributing to governance efforts (ibid). 
Yet the adaptation literature often treats public administration as part of 
‘the amorphous black box of government’; conflating ‘policymakers’, public 
administrators, policy processes, politicians and issues of governance. As was 
discussed in this thesis’ theoretical basis, the state is rarely unitary in its framing of a 
public policy issue. This is because the state an amalgamation of different branches, 
agencies, and political factions, each focusing on many problems and making 
choices according to various conceptions of community, organisational, and 
personal interests (Allison & Halperin, 1972:43; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). When 
treating governments, departments or agencies as monolithic actors in adaptation 
                                                 
41 Akin to a community of practice or shared knowledge, or whose claim to legitimacy or power is based in a particular body of knowledge  
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research and planning, order is overemphasized and elements underemphasized; 
when described as mere aggregates, elements are overemphasized and order 
underemphasized (Brown & Duguid, 2001). Overemphasising order, such as 
viewing governance arrangements as simply a set of formal couplings between 
different levels of organisation, risks regarding real-life actors as external to those 
processes of choice, and in the worst case, only regarded as attributes to formally 
decided power-sharing agreements (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005:73). Extending these 
considerations into questions of reflexive learning for adaptive governance 
identified bureaucrats as a key community in the structure and agency of a sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning. Consequently, by exploring their frames, informal 
institutions and networks, this research deliberately focussed on the perspectives of 
the selected sector’s middle and street-level bureaucrats(Crozier, 1964; Page, 2006a, 
2007). 
In weaving the preceding three components together, the theoretical basis 
directed attention to interactions between frames, informal institutions and 
networks of bureaucrats as key factors in a policy sector’s capacity for reflexive 
learning. A focus on the role of bureaucrats in adaptation was not to advocate for 
centrist, top-down approaches to governance of public sectors. Rather, it was to 
highlight that for the participatory democratic intent of (adaptive) governance to be 
realised, a reflexive capacity is also needed within the bureaucracies of public 
administration. If those processes are not reflective, community perspectives, for 
example, could be interpreted as conflicting with or even threatening a sector’s 
paradigm. 
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8.1.3 Methodological contribution 
The theoretical basis of the research highlighted that although frames, informal 
institutions and networks might be analytically separable, they are not causally 
separable (Archer 1995 in Gofas & Hay, 2009). A key methodological contribution 
of this research was the practical application of an analytical framework that 
enabled separate and combined examination of these key factors. Many studies 
have looked at the influence of one of these factors in adaptation (usually within 
communities), but few, if any, have examined them in combination within the 
bureaucracy of a policy sector. The analytical framework used frame, institutional 
and network analyses.  
Working with these multiple analytical perspectives and reflecting on 
interactions among the findings, provided a nuanced, multi-faceted understanding 
of the capacity for reflexive learning within the fire management sector than would 
application of a single perspective. In terms of methodological guidance, the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) was one of 
the clearest analytic approaches, tested through use by numerous researchers. Yet 
Hajer (1995)and Fischer (2003) critique neo-positivist applications of the network-
analysis-based ACF for being too analytically thin to explain why and how changes 
in policy come about. This current study was concerned with capacity for policy 
and frame change. Hence this study drew upon the ACF to guide key interview and 
survey questions to identify frames and networks, but used the more interpretative 
frame and institutional analyses to explore why and how policy and governance 
changes might be facilitated or constrained within the sector.  
The literature review also highlighted that it would be necessary and useful 
to separately analyse frames and institutions. Analysing policy frames provides 
potential explanatory insights into institutions; particularly those that represent 
institutionalised frames (see Chapter 2). Frame analysis is also helpful in 
appreciating the diversity of perspectives within a policy sector and conceptions of 
new ideas such as adaptation. How and if such ideas might be enacted within policy 
processes however, is strongly influenced by a sector’s institutional landscape. As 
the ‘rules in use’, informal institutions strongly contribute to defining which frames 
and aspects therein, structure the sector’s paradigm – its governance, policies and 
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programs. Then to come full circle, by exploring the influence of frames and 
institutions on networks and of networks on the potential diversity of frames, the 
analytical framework sought to identify the capacity for frame and thereby 
institutional, reflection and change. A key challenge in this analysis lay in the teasing 
apart of the frames and institutions.  
Consequently, a second methodological contribution of this study was the 
explicit and hopefully clear description of the approach taken in both the frame and 
institutional analyses; something very few published studies seem to provide. The 
ability to separately identify frames and institutions, which are generally only subtly 
different, drew upon the syntheses of various literature. The frame analytic 
approach used here (Chapter 3) drew heavily from Schön and Rein (1994), Hajer  
(2003a; 1993, 1995, 2003b, 2006a, 2006b), Hajer & Versteeg (2005); Hajer & 
Wagenaar (2003) Benford and Snow (2000), Fischer (2003), Fischer and Forester 
(1993), and  Koenig (2004, 2005, 2006). Through a reading of their collective 
works, this research approached the frame analysis as an unpacking of the 
conceptual scaffolding participants used in describing the issues of fire management 
and climate change (Benford & Snow, 2000). In practice, the analysis used 
discourse analytic techniques to interpret how actors conceive of the fundamental 
issue or goal of the sector, then identifying their diagnostic frames (what is causing 
the issue or presenting barriers to the goal) and then, their prognostic frames (what 
solutions are needed to address those causes or barriers). 
In analysing informal institutions, the work of a range of authors was 
particularly informative, including Scott (2001), Lauth (2000), Helmke and Levitsky 
(2003), Blyth (2009), Blyth & Schmidt (2009),  Schmidt (2003, 2006; 2008; 2009); 
Schmidt & Radaelli, (2004) Ostrom (1999; 2008; 2005) Considine (2005) and 
Lowndes (2010). Taken together, these works indicated that identification of 
informal institutions is a search for patterns in descriptions actors give to their 
perceptions of how they and their colleagues (other actors within the sector) are 
expected to behave individually and collectively. Lowndes (2010:73) stated that: 
“The researcher’s aim should be to identify the specific rules of behaviour that are 
agreed upon and (in general) followed by agents, whether explicitly or tacitly agreed, 
these rules are specific to a particular setting, recognised by actors (if not always 
adhered to) and can be described and explained to the researcher”. As discussed in 
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Chapter 3, Ostrom’s (2005) institutional grammar tool from the Institutional 
Analysis Development Framework (IADF) was used to guide the discourse 
analysis, enabling identification of the essential structure of an institution. 
Unpacking these analytical approaches, alongside the needs of network analysis, 
directed the choice of two complementary data acquisition methods: semi-
structured interviews and an online survey.  
8.1.4 The substantive results 
As discussed above, while treated as analytically separable, the selected influential 
factors in a sector’s capacity for reflexive learning were not considered to be 
causally separable. Hence, a synthesis of the substantive results was not only 
important from a theoretical position it was also the central concern of the thesis. 
This final section of the discussion layers the major findings together to construct 
an overall reflection on the capacity for reflexive learning in the policy sector of fire 
management in the state of Victoria, Australia.  
8.1.4.a Bureaucrat frames of fire management and climate change, and the 
implications for the sector’s reflexive learning 
Participating bureaucrats framed the policy context of fire management as one of 
emergency management (EM) or sustainability (balancing social-ecological 
imperatives). Both are globally popular policy narratives. The EM master-frame 
painted this fundamental goal as a moral or ethical choice focused on managing the 
threat of bushfire to human safety. In the associated diagnostic sub-frames, policies 
or perspectives that demanded consideration of other aspects of fire and land 
management were conceived as barriers to achieving the safety goal. Portrayed as 
undermining, impeding or complicating the safety imperative, such considerations 
were described as somewhat irrational. This conception particularly related to issues 
of ecological imperatives and community understanding and management of 
bushfire risk. The EM master-frame drew on an imagery of imbalance, with the 
balance described as being ‘tipped toward’ environmental concerns, implying it was 
‘tipped away from’ the imperative of human safety. ‘Making sense’ of the policy 
context through this prism seemed to direct prognostic sub-frames toward actions 
that managed the hazard and fuel – suppression activities and fuel reduction 
burning.  
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Because drivers of fire threats to human safety were conceived as clear and 
readily identifiable, one of the oft-repeated prognostic or solution sub-frames was 
that provision of information regarding the ‘obvious’ need to manage the hazard 
should be enough to lead to actions considered appropriate. The rationalist 
“information will lead to action” logic that still underpins such conceptions also 
seemed to engender a rhetoric that certain people in the sector with the ‘right’ 
experience or knowledge are experts with the necessary knowledge to convey. Such 
logic also tends to portray community members as victims who need ‘education’. 
The underlying ‘control over nature’ tenet of the EM master-frame contrasted with 
the ‘humans-as-part-of-nature’ tenet of the other identified master-frame; that of 
sustainability. The discourse of this frame hardly ever used the word ‘ecosystem’. 
Land management was the closest intimation of ideas related to ecological 
management but was always in the context of managing fuel on that land. 
Conceptualisation of landscapes as places of fuel hazard was in strong contrast to 
those who described landscapes in terms of complex ecosystems through a 
sustainability frame. 
The emergency management derivation of a human-security master-frame is 
a globally popular theme (Beck, 1992; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993; Koenig, 
2006), with its anthropocentric nature apparently derived from a broader societal 
rationale of ‘control over nature’. In Australia, this rationale arguably stems from 
our Australian colonial imaginings of the settlers ‘overcoming adversity’ (Porter, 
2007). More simply, the presence of this frame was unsurprising in a policy sector 
where emergency management is a key tenet of its existence. Yet despite a strong 
theoretical movement from hazard to risk management within the disaster 
management literature and key guiding documents (ISDR, 2005; State Government 
of Victoria, 2008), interpretations of approaches to EM found here focussed on 
reducing the hazard and responding to events. There was less of a sense of ideas of 
vulnerability reduction, than those conveyed in the disaster risk reduction and 
climate change adaptation literature, as well as international documents such as the 
Hyogo Framework (UNISDR, 2005).  
The majority of research participants described the sector’s policy context 
as being part of a bigger, dynamic, social-ecological system, reflecting the discourse 
of sustainability. Through a sustainability master-frame, fire management was 
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typified as a value-based balancing act as opposed to a singular and supposed 
rational choice. Bureaucrats expressing this frame were less definitive in their 
prognoses or solution sub-frames than those using an EM frame. A key point of 
difference was that through the sustainability master-frame, human-security does 
not take precedence a-priori. The ‘fundamental goal’ was to balance the social and 
ecological imperatives of fire management, and that this balance would be diverse. 
Consequently, when using the imagery of imbalance in one of the diagnostic sub-
frames to convey the idea that the imbalance was tipped toward safety and away 
from ecology - the opposite to that of the EM frame.  
Another diagnostic or causal sub-frame rested on the idea that many people 
did not have an understanding of and therefore capacity to know how to ‘live with’ 
their environment, including fire as a natural process within that environment. The 
concomitant prognostic or solution sub-frame was a need for governments and the 
sector to enable debates and discussions surrounding which value takes precedence 
where. These sub-frames were subtly different to those of the EM master-frame. 
Characterising fire management as a socio-ecological balancing challenge arguably 
reflects still emerging societal sensibilities regarding the interconnectedness of 
human-environment systems (Hajer, 1995; Koenig, 2005; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993) and associated interpretations of sustainability (Dovers, 2004; Dovers & 
Handmer, 1993; Eder, 1996:205).  
Concurrently, there was strong frame convergence with respect to land-use 
planning and development as a major cause of the issues facing the sector. Yet 
while there was general agreement on the need to avoid development in ‘high risk 
areas’, there was divergence between the associated solution sub-frames as to how 
safety and conservation should be addressed in already developed areas. There was 
complete dissonance as to which agency/ies the respondents felt has responsibility 
for addressing the issue, and typically responsibility was lain at the feet of ‘the other 
agency’. 
Another example of the use of frame analysis for understanding subtle 
differences in perspectives and thereby where ‘communication problems’ might be 
found, included the fact that within both frames, community engagement was 
considered a crucial ‘solution’. However, irrespective of frame, respondents were 
loyal to their home organisations, describing their organisation as having the better 
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approach to engagement. The desire for being seen to have better engagement and 
thereby credibility with communities was part of an identified informal institution, 
which is discussed in the next section (Section 8.1.4 b). 
Overall, the frame analysis illustrated how differing conceptions of what is 
driving the issues facing a policy sector leads to different conclusions and 
arguments for different policies and practices. Each framing focused on particular 
aspects of the policy context. Both had fairly well reasoned bases for their internal 
logics, there is science and data that can support both, and neither appeared more 
valid. The analysis illuminated several examples of sub-frame convergence and 
divergence, revealing subtle differences between underlying positions that on the 
surface appeared shared. For example, while each master-frame conceived the 
sector as being ‘out of balance’, they diverge in conceptions of the direction of that 
imbalance. The findings also illustrated that the master-frames diverged in terms of 
scope and explicit recognition of the challenge of value-based decisions. As 
outlined above, the strongest frame dissonance surrounded issues of ecological 
conservation and environmental values.  
Given that the broad mandate of this sector is both disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) and natural resource management (NRM), it was unsurprising to find a 
sustainability master-frame alongside one of emergency management. The research 
has made explicit the similarities and the subtle differences between these 
perspectives. While a majority of bureaucrats used a sustainability master-frame, 
many incorporated concepts of emergency management as part of their ‘solution’. 
Equally, those with a predominantly emergency management frame often couched 
their arguments as also having an environmental benefit, or at least as not having a 
negative environmental impact. While a sustainability framing might bridge 
principles of emergency and ecological management, it might also present a 
cognitive barrier to those who conceived of environmental concerns as restricting 
emergency management objectives. Drawing upon the metaphor of ‘balance’ may 
provide some initial space for exploring variations in the prioritisation of policy 
options. It may also help to convey a more dynamic situation, with inherent value 
trade-offs. It may also aid in encouraging the notion of developing a learning 
capacity, as opposed to a drive to ‘solve the problem’(Hudson, 2007). Given the 
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commonality of a desire for ‘community engagement’, similar discussions might 
also be enabled in that area.  
The second purpose of the frame analysis was to gain some insight into 
frames through which adaptation is conceived. The research found three general 
frames of the implications of climate change and ideas relating to adapting to those 
implications. The first revolved around a conviction that climate change would not 
change the issues facing the sector. Therefore, there would be no need to change 
approaches and ‘the solution’ was to ensure these existing approaches continued. 
This interpretation seemed very much to draw on the rational model of public 
administration. As Saint-Martin & Allison (2011) argue, this kind of synoptic model 
of public policy is not mobilised because of its empirical robustness, but because of 
its symbolic properties; symbolic of our ability to measure, control and manage 
‘problems’ with rational, almost perfunctory approaches. 
The second framing of climate change was as exacerbating existing 
emergency management challenges within the policy sector, with an emphasis on a 
rising threat to human safety because of the increasing potential for bushfires. 
Implications of climate change for ecosystems were also generally linked to an 
increased exposure of humans to bushfires42. On occasion, such implications were 
conceived as exacerbating the challenge of value judgements similar to those 
expressed in the sustainability framing. By associating climate change with an 
increasing threat to human safety, the dominant ‘solution’ frame revolved around 
the idea of bolstering the sector’s emergency response capacity. Interestingly, 
recourse to emergency management in prognostic sub-frames was mostly expressed 
as a need for increased hazard management through fire suppression and fuel 
management. The discussion in Chapter 6 deliberated that recourse to readily 
quantifiable actions may be encouraged by general emphasis in governments and 
public administration for order and structure, as seen in concepts such as evidence-
based policy and the rational model of public administration. Cannon (2000) and 
Young (2002b) suggest that settings of uncertainty often give rise to strong 
temptations to eliminate such uncertainties by seeking to fit the full spectrum of the 
problems into a few familiar categories and non-quantifiable factors are excluded. 
Greater insight into why recourse was often made to risk management and, by 
                                                 
42 This framing was irrespective of whether the data were collected before or post the major bushfires of February 2009 
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default, hazard management in response to climate change was provided in the 
institutional analysis findings, discussed in the following section 8.1.4b. 
Very few respondents framed climate change as driving such significant 
change that the policy context for fire management was becoming unbounded and 
increasingly complex. For some of these participants this situation was almost 
incapacitating, because there was no certainty on which to base decisions. For a 
small number of these bureaucrats, climate change engendered a need to reflect on 
and even, reframe those frames. 
There are several implications of these findings for the fire management 
sector’s capacity for reflexive learning and adaptation. One particularly interesting 
finding was that while most bureaucrats framed the sector in terms of sustainability, 
when issues of climate change were raised, the majority framed the fundamental 
issue as one of risk and emergency management. As the frame analysis (Chapter 5) 
suggested, risk/emergency management and human security more generally, are 
already strong discourses within the disaster risk reduction (DRR) field and its 
associated policy sciences, and is increasingly being adopted in the adaptation field.  
Risk management provides a very powerful discourse for policy 
practitioners and researchers in conceptualising management approaches to the 
challenges of DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA). There is an increasing 
emphasis on ‘extreme events’ in both arenas and the notion of managing the risk of 
such events is increasingly advocated in their literature and related policy 
statements. Conceiving the issues of fire management and adaptation through an 
emergency (risk) management frame directs attention to concepts such as threat, 
hazard, and danger. Such a frame validly leads to prioritisation of strategies 
focussed on hazard and harm minimisation. However, a focus on threat preparation 
and emergency response tends to exclude consideration of other values, choices 
and struggles that are inherent to both fire management and adaptation separately, 
let alone in combination. These values, choices and struggles include how, why and 
where we live in landscapes, as well as to which risks we give attention. Under this 
dominant emergency management rubric, risk management approaches are more 
likely to be applied in a very instrumentalist manner, which can also ignore the 
underlying drivers of vulnerability and resilience in social-ecological systems.  
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Several authors challenge traditional risk management approaches as 
assuming an objective and universal meaning of an overall issue, to the exclusion or 
subordination of all other dimensions of meaning with which issues such as fire and 
climate change may be invested (Wynne, 2002:468). As was quoted earlier, Lash and 
Wynne posited in 1992 (p4) that while the dominant discourses of risk have taken 
on the trappings of liberal pluralism, they remain firmly instrumentalist and 
reductionist. This study suggests that a linear interpretation of risk assessment and 
management tends to remain dominant. Indeed, in 2009 Pidgeon and Butler stated 
that: while contemporary risk approaches align well with dominant political 
rationalities in affluent Western democracies, they have serious limitations as a basis 
for the delivery of aggressive climate policy aims”. The appeal of risk management 
is that encourages transformation of uncertainties into manageable, calculable ‘risk 
factors’(ibid). Traditional risk management approaches quantify risk (likelihood and 
consequence of impact) and develop efforts to address those risks. This tends to 
direct attention to actions in locations where the impacts of the risk may manifest. 
However, such analyses ignore factors that underlie or drive the creation of the 
risks – especially the consequential part of that equation – many of which are at 
scales beyond that of an individual home, township or ecosystem. Moreover, the 
assumption of calculability can easily exclude those factors that are not readily 
calculable (Cannon, 2000; Pidgeon & Butler, 2009) thereby constraining 
opportunities for exploring a multitude of knowledge and values, and thus, the 
basic premise of reflexive learning for an adaptive capacity. The implied calculability 
means that while a risk management language is expressed the focus remains on 
hazard management as a means to reduce climate change associated risks. 
This frame analysis illuminated several factors influential in the sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning. Firstly, it highlighted that multiple interpretations 
regarding a policy sector’s context can exist within a bureaucracy. Such findings 
reinforce the contention in some of the public administration and political science 
literature that bureaucracies are not unitary actors (John, 2002:67; Page, 2006a). 
This analysis may also provide a nuanced understanding of why, even with shared 
discourse expressed in policy documents, there remain contestations regarding 
policy options and perceptions of ‘silos’ within the fire management sector. Many 
participants expressed frustration that communities, ‘government’, or other 
agencies did not appreciate or understand their perspective. As well as providing a 
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nuanced understanding of these kinds of communicative barriers, identification of 
different policy master-frames and their diagnostic and prognostic sub-frames may 
support frame reflexive practice.  
Secondly, the presence of at least two different master-frames is positive for 
the sector, because each provides different ideas and perspectives on the issues it 
faces, including the implications of climate change. From a reflexive learning 
perspective, it would be better to view differences between these master-frames as 
strengths rather than conflicts. Shared frames may serve as a basis for discussion 
aimed at transforming circular debates between the various perspectives into an 
expanded and therefore, potentially more adaptive suite of policies and practice. 
For example, in the face of the complexities and uncertainties of climate change, 
the overlap in framing of land use planning as a major driver of concern presents 
itself as an obvious focal point for the sort of discussion that could actively make 
explicit the underlying policy frames.  
Finally, framing of adaptation through a traditional risk or emergency 
management frame likely limits the perceptual scope of policy and management 
options in this sector. Such a contained framing may not only limit the scope of any 
reflexive learning, it may see the sector continually circling within a risk 
management paradigm that implies the need for calculability of risk factors to 
exclusion of other more social and complex factors. As indicators of constraints on 
fire management’s paradigm, let alone its approach to climate change, recourse to 
more rationalist, technocratic approaches is salutary for efforts aimed at evolving 
the concept of vulnerability reduction in the fire management sector. It is even 
more salutary for any effort to move the sector from an approach that implies a 
mythical panacea, toward one of reflexive learning (in this, fire management is 
certainly not alone). Hence, the second part of the analytical framework – the 
institutional analysis- was useful in gaining some insight into why adaptation was 
framed through an emergency management lens, and in exploring the capacity for 
reflexive learning (questioning these underlying frames and the sector’s policy 
paradigm) within the sector. 
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8.1.4.b  Informal institutions of the sector, their relationship to the identified 
frames and the implications for reflexive learning 
The institutional analysis identified several informal institutions within the policy 
sector of fire management. Unpacking this institutional landscape endowed the 
research some insight into the sector’s institutional capacity for reflexive learning. 
When taken together with the frame analysis findings, the institutional analysis 
provides some insight into why an emergency management frame appeared to be 
the guiding construct for managing the uncertainties and complexities of climate 
change.  
Firstly, the institutional analysis suggested that there are strong perceptions 
that communities and political leaders expect the sector to be demonstrably reactive 
and to make infallible decisions. The discourse of participating bureaucrats 
intimated that these expectations stem from a perception of society having a 
rationality of ‘control over nature’ and an ever-present notion of a rational and 
linear model of public administration. These seemingly externally imposed 
institutions were described as having several internal (sectoral) manifestations and 
therefore implications for reflexive learning within the sector. Particularly 
informative was an argument posited by several participants that these institutions 
constrained the time and space for learning and reflection which meant that people 
tended to rely upon existing systems and approaches. Some respondents suggested 
that several policy options consequently start with a visible or quantifiable 
‘solution’, rather than a reflection on underlying drivers of the issues. The data 
suggested that an institutionalised drive to be demonstrably reactive seemed to 
shape decision and learning pathways along well-worn tracks - something 
antithetical to the theory of reflexive learning.  
It is important to stress that the need for policy sectors to be responsive to 
society’s challenges is not in question. Nor are the ideas of transparency and 
accountability that may form part of the notion of demonstrable actions. Rather, 
both the literature and findings from this current study suggest that an issue with 
reactive decision-making without some underpinning reflection is that it limits 
policy options to those already known and used. Moreover, if that demonstrable 
reactivity focuses policies and governance solely on quantifiable ‘outputs’, a sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning will be constrained to learning about those things that 
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can be quantified, the limitations of which were discussed in the preceding sub-
section. Such limitations come to the fore when a changing climate contributes to 
hazard events outside past experience and alters our ability to continue reliable 
quantification of those factors. Adaptation is as much a social process as a technical 
or engineered one.  
Without concerted efforts to address this institutionalised need for 
demonstrable reactivity, based on ideas of quantifiable actions and the rational 
model of policy administration, the constraints on a capacity for reflexive learning 
already facing this sector may be exacerbated. This is especially the case in the face 
of projections that climate change will increase the number of fire weather events 
and thus the potential for increased bushfire impacts. In policy sectors, such as fire 
management, where hazard events are touted as ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
learning, such events will only provide opportunities for reflexive learning when the 
‘learning’ process is genuinely girded by attempts to appreciate the underlying 
drivers of vulnerabilities and the frames and institutions that guide overarching 
objectives . As the research findings have indicated, without a frame reflective basis, 
so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ may simply serve to reinforce existing policy 
paradigms. 
Concomitant with the institution of demonstrable reactivity was an 
apparently institutionalised perception of a societal and political expectation that 
any decisions the agencies make must be infallible. Like its counterpart, this 
institution also likely stems from the well-worn rational model of public 
administration, which “presupposes that the world is knowable (or unknowable) as 
a place populated by narrowly interest-motivated individuals who are predictable 
most of the time using rationalist models and quantitative methods” (Blyth & 
Schmidt, 2009:166). The rational-choice basis of that model tends to imply there is 
‘a single solution’ for a public policy issue and that decisions would be infallible if 
policymakers simply chose the rational, and therefore ‘right’, action. The institution 
of infallible decision-making was also expressed in statements that admissions of 
uncertainties were generally not countenanced in the sector and that 
experimentation is discouraged because ‘mistakes’ may occur. A handful of 
respondents argued that such admissions are discouraged because they may reveal 
to be illusory the broader societal and political perceptions of ‘guaranteed’ 
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protection and control. Clearly institutional constraints that limit experimentation 
and the seeking of alternatives or complements could trap the sector in a cycle of 
insight inertia (Godkin, 2010).  
Appreciating that those two externally imposed institutions guide much of 
the sector’s governance and policy decision-making provided some explanatory 
power and context for several other identified informal institutions. One of the 
most prevalent was the institution of science as the ultimate, neutral arbiter in 
policy and management decisions: Dupre’s (2001) scientism. Several research 
participants enlisted the supposed neutrality of science to justify their policy 
position/s. In arguing that the use of ‘science’ is an informed, rational position, 
these participants also painted as irrational, those who disagreed with their own 
‘scientifically-supported’ position. Recourse to ‘the science’ would be appealing in 
an institutional landscape permeated by notions of control and certitude. It also 
reflects the doctrine of evidence-based policy. The limitation of scientism in a 
capacity for reflexive learning is when the emphasis falls solely on quantifiable, 
reductionist sciences. Such an emphasis ignores the reality that many policy issues 
involve value judgments that can be informed by knowledge that in some circles is 
not considered quantifiable, ‘hard science’.  
Questioning this institution is to ask what constitutes evidence in ‘evidence-
based policy’ - not a new challenge for public administrators and researchers (Lane, 
2000; Marston & Watts, 2003; Pawson, 2006). What the idea of reflexive learning 
demands is the questioning of what and whose evidence informs policy. It demands 
exploration of whether the bases of policy choices and the directions of policy-
relevant research are drawn from a confined area of knowledge, a singular discipline 
or even sub-discipline. It requires an explicit exploration of whether a sector’s 
underlying frames and institutions direct attention to particular fields of knowledge, 
research and sciences.  
The institutional analysis conducted here attempted to do just that and 
found that, within this sector, knowledge of fire-fighting and fuel management 
seemingly holds greater legitimacy than other bodies of knowledge. Considering the 
frame and institutional analyses in combination offered some insight into why these 
particular ‘types’ of knowledge were perceived to have a greater level of legitimacy 
than other knowledge. Many of these bodies of knowledge resonate with the 
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institution of demonstrable, quantifiable actions and the focus of the emergency 
management frame on hazard management, expressed so strongly in conceptions 
of dealing with climate change. The extent of this focus can be seen through even a 
brief examination of conference programs, journal articles, and research agendas 
concerned with fire management, where the predominant focus is physical science 
conducted to inform hazard management. A handful of participants also stated that 
this ‘conventional wisdom’ is formally institutionalised in many workplace 
agreements.  
In the context of exploring a capacity for reflexive learning however, the 
subject matter of this institution is not of concern. What is of concern is that while 
“development of epistemic communities can facilitate the forging of expert 
consensus” (Haas, 1992) and give evidentiary weight to particular policies, it also 
runs the risk of creating and reinforcing ideological echo-chambers. If a single 
epistemic community dominates the knowledge basis of a sector’s policy paradigm, 
different perspectives and other disciplinary evidence can be excluded, even that 
which may be complementary to existing approaches. The exclusory nature of tight 
demarcation of legitimate knowledge is antithetical to a key principle of reflexive 
learning: that of considering a wide range of knowledge and concomitant frames. If 
knowledge operates hierarchically through one area being endowed greater 
legitimacy than another, “far from being a neutral concept, evidence-based policy 
(EBP) can be a powerful metaphor in shaping what forms of knowledge are 
considered closer to the ‘truth’ in decision-making processes and policy argument” 
(Marston & Watts, 2003:145). When institutions narrowly define a sector’s 
‘legitimate knowledge’, they can also prescribe research agendas (Young, 2002a) of 
sectors and those institutes seeking to contribute the evidence for EBP. Areas 
outside the fields of ‘legitimate’ knowledge are less likely to receive research funding 
and therefore by default, less attention and less evidentiary weight. 
Institutionalisation of a narrow body of ‘policy-relevant’ knowledge can also 
constrain a capacity for adaptive governance by excluding open (public) discussions 
about the practical and conceptual limits of the ‘conventional wisdom’. Once again, 
this recalls the reticence to admit uncertainty or limitations on knowledge or ability, 
and goes some way to explaining a focus on dealing with ‘the hazard’ in the 
emergency management frame, as opposed to underlying social and ecological 
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vulnerabilities to fire. Its presence also revealed the persistent tendrils of both the 
rational model of public administration and a societal rationality of control over 
nature. Perhaps worse for this policy sector, emphasising the quantification of 
hazard management will reinforce, or at least leave unchallenged, the fallacies of 
‘solution’ and control over nature. If these fallacies are not discussed in broader 
community and societal debates, they will become increasingly obvious as our 
climate changes. Moreover, if they are not discussed, the apparent adversarial, 
culture of blame that seems to raise its ugly head after any major fire will continue 
alongside with its stable-mate of insight inertia. Without openly dialogue, it is 
difficult to see how anything more than lip service will be given to more complex 
and less quantifiable approaches to reducing vulnerabilities of our social and 
ecological systems to altered fire regimes and the impacts of climate change.  
Finally, the notions of control and rationality that seem to permeate the 
identified informal institutions also appeared to buttress a ‘popularity contest’ 
between the agencies and departments within agencies. Each group seemed to be 
vying for the reputation of having ‘the’ solution to managing the hazard of fire, 
whether through prescribed burning, community engagement, or something else. 
As was discussed earlier, competition for reputation can create and maintain 
defensive reasoning (Argyris, 2004; van Buuren, et al., 2004), which, through 
resistance to exploring the basis of a position, can undermine capacity for reflexive 
learning. Not only did it appear that the competition for reputational capital 
engenders a “dialogue of the deaf” (Sabatier, 1999) instilling some antagonism 
between agencies and among departments within agencies, it also appeared to 
compound the issue of it being ‘taboo’ to discuss or explicitly identify the 
limitations of control and knowledge of managing and living with fire.  
Many participants were adamant that there is deliberate promotion of one 
organisation over another, and that this excludes communication of more complex 
issues surrounding fire management. They argued that this is because 
communication of uncertainty and complexity would entail admission that there is 
not a ‘solution’ and that the rationality of ‘control over nature’ with its implied risk 
free environment, is a fallacy. Admitting a lack of knowledge or uncertainty 
appeared to be an anathema to the entwined institutionalised ‘legitimate’ knowledge 
and the institution of reputational capital, underpinned as they are by a societal 
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rationality of control. Yet excluding issues that fall outside the bounds of apparently 
treatable or solvable (less complex) situations does not indicate a capacity for 
reflexive learning. 
Collectively, these institutions appeared very much to be various 
expressions of a general societal rationality of control over nature and the rational 
model of public administration. Perhaps they themselves are derivative of a 
“rationalistic, technocratic society based on market principles and scientific 
methods” (John, 2002:158). Institutionalisation of a perceived need for 
‘demonstrable reactivity’ and ‘infallible decisions’, alongside ‘science as arbiter’ each 
contained an assumption that factors contributing to the challenges and decisions 
are readily calculable. As was discussed earlier, an emergency management frame 
entails an implicit depiction of hazards as amenable to conventional procedures of 
calculation, management and control within the capacities of established 
institutions (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009:679). Therefore, the identified informal 
institutions indicated a high degree of institutionalisation of an emergency 
management frame within the bureaucracy of this sector.  
The inherent tendency of a traditional emergency/risk management frame 
to neglect the systemic nature of contemporary hazards (Turner and Pidgeon 1997) 
that are embedded in dynamic, complex social-ecological systems (Pelling, 2003b; 
Wisner, et al., 2004) is not conducive to a reflexive learning approach to 
governance. Institutions informed by reductionist, positivist perspectives often 
exclude many social, ecological and political considerations. This is particularly so 
where such factors or consequences lie outside prevailing scientific risk-knowledge, 
and are therefore conceived to be indescribable, not amenable to use in probability 
calculations or cost-benefit analyses so often used in risk management approaches 
and, so are simply not given any standing (Cannon, 2000; Pidgeon & Butler, 2009; 
Wynne, 2002:469).  
Institutionalisation of the emergency management frame also suggested that 
while it was more than two decades ago when Eder (1990) argued that the public 
sphere was best understood as being restructured due the emergence of new rules 
supplied by an emerging discourse of ecology (or sustainability), a sustainability 
discourse may still be emerging in Victoria’s fire management sector. The fact that 
this discourse is still emerging may also be symptomatic of a broader, ongoing 
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cultural struggle in Australia that revolves around how we live in the Australian 
landscape: “We are not close to being settled in our relationship with the Australian 
continent” (Dovers, 2000).  
If the fire management sector continues to focus on quantifiable actions 
because of their assumed predictability and controllability, its adaptive capacity will 
be limited. In considering climate change adaptation, a continued sole focus on 
implications for its emergency management capacity will not seek to question the 
underlying frames and institutions that currently guide approaches to governance 
and policy within the sector; to consider whether they are adaptive. Deliberate 
reflection upon these institutions would be required to bolster the sector’s capacity 
for reflexive learning. Informal institutions are drawn from underlying policy 
frames and often stem from existing institutions that are influenced by broader 
societal contexts (and expectations). Consequently, any challenge or change to a 
sector’s informal institutions will have to resonate with or rely on efforts to expand 
the policy frames that inform the sector’s paradigm.  
Making underlying policy frames explicit and engendering frame reflection 
may encourage some work towards challenging these informal institutional 
constraints and thereby improve the adaptive capacity of this policy sector. 
Changing frames and informal institutions will necessarily have to involve a broad 
range of actors. The focus of this research however, was on the role of bureaucrats 
within public policy processes. From this perspective, changing underlying frames 
and institutions relies in part on the ability for bureaucrats to access and discuss 
different frames. It was here that networks among the sector’s bureaucrats were 
considered to play a key role. 
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8.1.4.c Bureaucratic networks, their relationship to the identified frames and 
informal institutions, and the implications for reflexive learning 
The third component of the analytical framework sought to explore the networks 
among the sector’s bureaucrats, as networks were thought to play a number of key 
roles in a policy sector’s capacity for reflexive learning. As well as being important 
for connecting multiple actors in a fragmented governance context, networks are 
important in enabling frame reflection through provision of and exposure to a 
range of different information and frames (de Boer, et al., 2010:7; Lewis, 2005; 
Lewis, et al., 2008). Equally, networks facilitate the socialisation and internalisation 
of institutions (March & Olsen, 1989). Pelling and High (2005b) posit that 
networks, as forms of social capital, are particularly important for the functioning 
of informal institutions. The basic network analysis undertaken here sought to 
explore these facets. 
Even to confine the boundary of a network analysis to that of a policy 
sector’s bureaucrats is to include a very large number of people. Due to practical 
limitations, the network analysed here must therefore be considered a 
representation; one action situation (Ostrom, 2005) within a network embedded 
within a web of networks. Standard qualitative social network analytic (SNA) 
techniques enabled a description of several network structural characteristics. The 
first was that it is possible that each bureaucrat could ‘reach’ every bureaucrat in the 
network, although the ‘path’ they would need to take may be very long because the 
network was not densely connected. An average shortest possible path between two 
people was 4.6 ‘degrees of separation’, which indicated that despite only being 
loosely connected, information can move fairly easily through this symmetrical 
network. Several sociograms, or visual depictions of the network were provided in 
Chapter 7. 
There was a high degree of variation in the average number of connections 
between bureaucrats. The quantitative network analysis hinted that hierarchy does 
not greatly influence the movement of information and ideas through this network. 
Indeed, the SNA suggested that the network found in this study was fairly 
‘democratic’ in that no one organisation had a greater degree of influence within 
this network than any other, and the ‘centrality’ of an actor was not influenced by 
various actor characteristics, such as role, level or organisation. Most importantly 
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for this study, the analysis indicated that policy master-frame did not greatly 
influence degree centrality43.  
Building upon the basic quantitative analysis, this research also utilised an 
interpretative analysis of the network’s function from the perspectives of the 
network participants. To begin, a majority of participants indicated that they have 
an informal network both internal and external to their organisation that they use in 
support of their work. There were fairly standard conceptions of how their 
networks are supportive, including: providing access to information they felt they 
were unlikely to hear about without their network; testing the veracity and agenda 
of official information; and using their network as a barometer for the palatability 
of new ideas or responses to sensitive or ‘tricky’ policy issues. A very senior 
respondent for example, described deliberately trying to build communication 
networks when initiating work in a new area, so to reduce perceptions of ‘territory 
invasion’ and build a more collegiate environment.  
Some participants talked of a kind of frame reflection engendered through 
interaction with others, including discovery of new and more varied management 
options, as well as removal of perceived constraints. These results supported those 
from the quantitative analysis, suggesting that there is an exchange between actors 
who hold different frames. Very often participants identified specific individuals 
who worked across ‘frame boundaries’. Descriptions of using networks as 
barometers for testing new ideas, also suggests that networks are used for testing 
the institutional landscape into which a new idea might have to fit. Such 
conceptions are supported by numerous arguments in the literature that reflexive 
learning occurs within the interactive, context-orientated space of constant give-
and-take of practice (Wagenaar & Noam Cook, 2003). 
As well as these more simple interpretations of networks, the interpretative 
analysis also indicated that the sector’s informal institutions influence the function 
of this bureaucratic network. This in turn implied several issues for the sector’s 
capacity for reflexive learning. For example, several participants described 
limitations of time and conceptual space for the creation and maintenance of 
networks, recalling similar constraints engendered by an institutionalised need for 
demonstrably reactivity. More interestingly for this study was the finding that while 
                                                 
43 The number of connections 
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many bureaucrats stated that working co-operatively (in a networked manner) was 
standard and expected practice, a major motivator for such co-operative 
approaches was the notion of consistency of advice to Ministers, government and 
communities. From this perspective, networks were a means of reinforcing or 
supporting a particular policy frame, not as a means of connecting different frames 
or perspectives. Several respondents used the rhetoric that networked, integrated 
approaches are valuable, but the underlying argument was that such approaches are 
useful for gaining acceptance of their policy frame. For example, a new incumbent 
was provided the old incumbent’s network contacts. This was viewed as facilitating 
access to the knowledge within that network and giving him the ‘stamp of approval’ 
– “he’s one of us, let him in the room”. The new incumbent suggested that it might 
also have been a means of influencing their perspective. This interpretative analysis 
suggests that the frame-connective structure of a network might also be reflective 
of efforts to create or sustain an ideological echo chamber. Interpreting the purpose 
of networks as a tool to enable ‘consistency’ recalls a key driver of the sector’s 
informal institutional landscape, where admissions of uncertainty or variability 
‘should be’ excluded. 
Overall, the quantitative SNA shed a subtly different light on the function 
of this network. It suggested that while the network can transfer information and 
ideas, active work should undertaken to expand the concept of the purpose of such 
networks from a ‘consensus tool’ to that of idea and information exchange, with a 
view to expanding management options. However, expanding the range of frames 
considered will likely require challenging some of the sector’s informal institutions 
– in particular, those of the underlying rationality of control and rational model of 
public administration. Working to maintain a frame will not support reflexive 
learning. In the context of wanting to present a consistent story to Ministers, 
governments and communities, it would arguably be better to present the different 
views, and include a discussion around the fact that there are value judgements to 
be made and that these will vary spatially and temporally. From a reflexive learning 
perspective, the sector could present a consistent view that there is not a consistent 
view, why there is not a consistent view, and that having multiple views provides 
the sector a greater adaptive capacity. 
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8.2 CONCLUSION – FIRE MANAGEMENT’S 
CAPACITY FOR REFLEXIVE LEARNING  
(& THEREBY, ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE) 
Application of a tripartite analytical framework gave rise to a nuanced 
understanding of the existing capacity for reflexive learning in the policy sector of 
fire management in Victoria, Australia, than would have application of a singular 
approach. By definition, a single analytic framework would have provided a one-
dimensional interpretation, and may have ignored the fact that governance and 
policy processes emerge from interactions among a myriad of processes and causes. 
In conclusion, the findings indicated that this sector has some capacity for reflexive 
learning, but that this potentiality is constrained by its current institutional 
landscape. If sectors such as fire management are to adopt adaptive approaches to 
policies and governance in adapting to climate change, this research highlights the 
need to give attention to several facets beyond formal governance and institutional 
arrangements. This section summarises the key points of the conclusion that the 
selected fire management sector currently has constrained potential for a reflexive 
learning capacity.  
Firstly, the findings concur with other research that argues bureaucracies are 
not necessarily unitary. The identified network of bureaucrats was not unitary in its 
conceptions of the sector’s context and fundamental purpose. The presence of at 
least two master-frames, each with their own logics and foci, provides the sector at 
least two perspectives from which to explore a broader range of options for policy 
and practice in confronting a changing climate. While the presence of the 
sustainability and emergency management master-frames may not surprise many 
who work in the sector, this research has provided a nuanced appreciation for why 
these master-frames are present. Ideally, further research would identify additional 
frames or at least encourage the sector to expand the frames it includes within its 
purview. Because people are less likely to resist information if it can be presented in 
forms that affirm rather than denigrate their policy frames and beliefs (Kahan & 
Braman, 2006:165; Sabatier, et al., 2005a), the sector could build upon some of its 
nascent work around cultural burning, learning from indigenous knowledge and 
relationship with fire, and its more innovative programs based in principles of 
community development (as opposed to education). Expanding the sector’s 
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purview of frames is important from the perspective that reflexive learning is 
essential to an ability to adapt to climate change. This is particularly the case 
because the findings showed that these participants were quite unitary in their 
framing of responses to climate change as requiring a risk management approach. 
While the majority of bureaucrats framed fire management through a 
sustainability lens, the emergency management frame was highly institutionalised. 
The research unravelled some of the drivers for an institutionalised emergency 
management paradigm within this sector and highlighted implications of this for 
reflexive learning and adaptation. The analysis bespoke an institutional landscape 
underpinned by broader societal rationalities of control over nature and the well-
worn rational model of public administration. These tendrils, interwoven across 
that institutional landscape, seemingly galvanise attention toward approaches and 
frameworks perceived to have a degree of certainty or control, including an 
emergency management frame focussed on controlling ‘the hazard’ through 
suppression or fuel management. As these approaches are generally quantifiable, 
the emergency management frame resonates with the rational model of public 
administration in its idealistic quest for a linear application of science in public 
policies.  
A highly institutionalised frame focused on hazard management has the 
potential to limit governance, management and policy to physical, technical or 
engineering ideas. This has direct implications for the community-safety aspects of 
the sector. On one hand, there is an argument that if communities only understood 
the requisite, supposedly obvious and rational knowledge that the authorities have, 
then they would be incentivised to take actions to protect themselves from a 
bushfire hazard. On the other hand, the institutionalised notions of credible 
knowledge and skills, reinforces notions of expertise, which may actually be 
disempowering for community members. Consider the conceptual differences 
between needing specialist fire trucks to suppress a bushfire and preparing to 
defend ones home from the same bushfire with mops and buckets. At the same 
time, the sector presents conflicted notions of ‘shared responsibility’ while wanting  
(or perhaps are driven to by broader societal and political expectations) to remain 
experts and leaders in the field. 
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The problem of bounding the legitimacy of knowledge to that which is 
quantifiable not only creates perceptual tensions between agencies, communities, 
and policy areas, but traction for adaptation may be especially difficult where the 
knowledge required is not readily quantifiable nor immediately demonstrable. This 
argument is not to discount in any way the very obvious imperative of emergency 
management. Rather, the results evidence that despite the discourse of adaptive 
management and risk reduction or resilience in a number of policy documents, the 
sector may not have culturally shifted to embrace broader theories of disaster risk 
reduction espoused in international literature – those that focus on reducing 
underlying drivers of vulnerabilities to natural hazards and that emphasise the need 
for learning and transformation of approach. In the context of climate change 
adaptation, the associated uncertainties of our trajectories are unlikely to be 
assuaged by a ‘requisite’ knowledge that is solely drawn from readily quantifiable 
data. Climate change will undoubtedly increase the need for us to make value 
judgments. Science can help inform such choices, but it cannot make those choices 
for us. 
Reflexive learning asks us to expand our purview, to actively consider and 
perhaps include a more diverse array of frames – a gallery, so-to-speak. The 
findings suggest however that it may be challenging to introduce different frames 
that challenge or do not ‘fit’ with the sector’s current institutional landscape. For 
example, dealing with climate change was viewed primarily through an 
institutionalised emergency management frame. Such conceptions are reinforced in 
some of the adaptation literature, but this author is not convinced that emergency 
management should be “at the frontline of climate change”. Besides encouraging a 
war-like narrative that conveys a battle for control over a natural process, to 
genuinely support our capacity to live with and in a changing environment, such 
sectors need to embrace ideas of DRR and NRM. Bolstering an emergency 
management capacity is not the end of the adaptation story – nor is it the 
beginning. It does not encourage us to question where and how we live, and how 
that may have to continually adapt and change into the future. It certainly ignores 
the social construction of risk.  
Reflecting on how we frame public policy issues such as fire management is 
greatly assisted by the diversity of perspectives we consider, and these are most 
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readily found beyond our immediate network of colleagues. In exploring the 
bureaucratic network of the fire management sector, the findings indicated a 
complex role for these networks in enabling adaptation to climate change in policy 
sectors. The identified network was both a source of new ideas and potential 
frames, as well as a tool by which to reinforce or maintain a paradigm. The sector 
will have to support the sensing and seeking character of its bureaucratic network if 
it is to encourage a reflexive learning capacity. 
A key lesson from the findings of this research is perhaps an old one. There 
is no single answer or solution to the societal challenges that public policies aim to 
address including adapting to a changing climate. Certainly, the fire management 
sector has a suite of policy options within its portfolio. It would be encouraging to 
see this suite presented and analysed as a whole more often. Perhaps even the idea 
of ‘solution’ is misleading when we are living in a changing climate. Addressing 
institutionalised notions of control over nature will likely require a society-wide 
discussion about the limits of control and the fallacy of the idea of certainty; 
something that is becoming increasingly important as our climate changes. Given 
that fire management could encompass a social-ecological approach to living 
sustainably in a landscape of numerous natural hazards, this sector may have the 
emotive power at least to initiate such a conversation. 
In identifying factors that influence fire management’s capacity for reflexive 
learning, this research seeks to support the sector in its efforts to tackle the 
challenges that climate change presents. The findings suggest that the sector might 
begin by using the existing sustainability frame to develop a common language that 
builds upon shared conceptions and expands the range of existing policy 
perspectives. However, in using this frame the sector would be wise to be explicit in 
making human safety an equally central part of its storyline, emphasising the very 
real threat bushfires can pose to both human and ecological communities and that 
there is fairly good information to inform options to reduce their vulnerabilities to 
bushfire. Drawing on ideas of a sustainable future contains potential to combine 
risk reduction efforts through activities aimed at vulnerability reduction and 
ecological conservation goals.  
Alternatively, a transition or transformation framing, such as those 
proposed by Meadowcroft (2009) or Pelling (2010), might encourage ideas around 
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reflexive learning, rather than a fruitless drive for a singular ‘solution’. Singular 
solutions tend to emphasise trade-offs and by definition, distinguish definitive 
positions around which stakeholders immediately gravitate, often precluding 
collaboration, innovation and creativity (Coffman & Umemoto, 2010:599). Such 
panaceas are fallacies in complex, dynamic social-ecological systems (Meinzen-Dick, 
2007; Ostrom, 2007). As was presented in the theoretical basis (Chapter 2), 
connection of different frames into a jointly meaningful story can generate 
motivation and commitment for collective action and, provided participants are 
able to deal with the variety, confers the potential for crafting innovative solutions 
(Dewulf, et al., 2011:52). A transition or transformative frame could encourage 
visioning of a sustainable future that includes increased adaptive capacity and 
reduced vulnerabilities of our social and ecological systems to inappropriate fire 
regimes, including certain bushfires.  
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8.3 REFLECTING FORWARD  
(FUTURE RESEARCH) 
The most fundamental challenge is defining and articulating the next 
paradigm. We all know suppression isn't the answer on extreme days, and 
Black Saturday has seen a backlash against the wisdom and efficacy of the 
personal responsibility and empowerment paradigm (although maybe that 
is more about the difficulty of implementation rather than the concept). 
Land use planning and building controls are often seen as the answer but 
have deteriorated since the fire [Fires of February 2009]. Who can bring 
together the complex, multi-level, multi-layered array of controls riddled 
with pre-requisites and co-requisites needed for effective fire management 
and which are 'owned' by different agencies and groups with sometimes 
complementary and sometimes conflicting views of the world? [Survey 
respondent 2-3] 
A research inquiry such as this is an inherently reflexive process. It raises as many 
questions as it seeks to address, sometimes more. Several areas for potential future 
research were identified. The first was one that encourages a focus on a more 
holistic picture of fire management and how we actually ‘live with fire’. It seemed 
that the research literature very much follows the institutions of the policy 
community of the sector. Research focused on social-ecological adaptation to 
climate change in the context of fire management is virtually non-existent. Most of 
the published literature to date has focussed on climate science, the likely increase 
in weather conducive to bushfires and the narrowing of windows of opportunity 
for prescribed burning. There is a nascent body of work exploring the implications 
of climate change for biodiversity through its interaction with fire regimes.  
Climate change aside, although there is an important growing body of social 
research, the fire management literature is dominated by work examining 
emergency response planning and implementation, and fire behaviour. Very little of 
the fire management literature addresses the policy sector as a whole (some of the 
notable exceptions being Dombeck, et al., 2004; Gill, 2005; Lavorel, et al., 2006). In 
Australia, there is scant fire related literature that explicitly takes a disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) perspective and considers underlying drivers of vulnerability. 
Where it does exist, such work often concentrates on a singular policy approach, 
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such as ‘community engagement’. This fact alone suggests that for research to 
encourage adaptation in the fire management sector, the sector’s research 
community needs to conduct more holistic work - expanding their own often 
disciplinarily defined frames. The potential exchange and mutual learning between 
the fields of DRR and CCA can only be useful and has already been espoused in 
much of the literature. 
The second area of further research or at least, attention, is in the climate 
change adaptation literature which appears to be somewhat self-referential (Dovers 
& Hezri, 2010). For example, the notion that frames and framing is a new approach 
to adaptation and climate change generally is emerging in the adaptation literature. 
This growing body of work would do well to acknowledge, reflect on and learn 
from the thirty-year history of frame analysis and the work of numerous authors 
from across a range of disciplines. The same could be argued for the adaptation 
field to draw from and work with the DRR sector more closely; particularly those 
working in so-called developed countries could draw from work conducted in so-
called developing countries. 
In terms of the contribution of this research, the value of using three 
analyses separately and in combination was evident. A frame analysis alone may 
have led to a conclusion that the sector has potential capacity for reflexive learning 
because of the differences between the frames. The results from a purely 
quantitative network analysis would have reinforced that conclusion. However, by 
contributing both an interpretative analysis of the sector’s networks and informal 
institutions, this research illuminated a more complex institutional landscape that 
places several constraints on the sector’s potential for reflexive learning. Thus, the 
approaches adopted here provide points of discussion and critique for future 
research as well as potential practical traction for other researchers seeking to 
conduct similar research. Future research might test and build upon the approach 
taken here. 
Finally, it may be fruitful for the sector to actively undertake some frame 
reflexive practice. Such efforts could engender a shared appreciation of different 
frames and indeed, may encourage the pursuit of additional frames. Given the 
apparent interconnectedness of the sector’s bureaucrats, it would seem that the 
sector could begin the process of establishing a gallery of frames. It could build 
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upon its existing networks and provide temporal and physical ‘space’ for the 
creation and nurturing of such networks – expanding them beyond public 
administrative boundaries, even into genuine efforts of participatory democracy. 
Drawing from Mehta’s (2010:23) idea of further exploring the role of ideas in 
politics, it would also be interesting and informative to explore how broader 
cultural norms, public opinion, and the media all influence policy and governance 
decisions and the underlying paradigm of this policy sector. Firstly however, the 
sector could start with reflecting on whether it is in fact, talking with itself. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I  
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Introduction 
• Introduce self, explain research purpose, how data will be used etc. 
• Thank for time 
• Discuss what the interview will be about 
• Go through consent, anonymity, participation - forms 
 
1. To start, I like to just find out a little about you and your current role  
[Partic interaction with fire management] 
 
2. If it were up to you, what do you think the ideal fundamental goal of fire 
management in Vic should be?  
a. Why? 
 
3. What’s actually happening? / What are the main issues the sector has to 
address to achieve that goal? 
a. What’s driving that? What values or unwritten rules? Dominant 
views? How is it dominant? 
b. What’s missing? Missing perspectives? How is it missing? 
 
[If issues or approaches to learning within the sector not addressed] 
c. In what ways do ideas for a policy or program response or change 
come about in this sector? 
i. How are policy or program approaches chosen? 
  
4. In fire context, what are the big challenges or issues faced in your role? 
a. Tangible example? 
b. What’s going on? Causes? 
 
5. What projects have you been involved in within this area, that you think was 
successful? 
a. What made it successful? 
b. Unsuccessful ones? 
 
6. What stakeholders / groups do you try to work with in doing your job? 
a. Characterise relationships between stakeholders 
i. What makes it work (or not)? 
b. Good working relationships with?  
i. What helps them work? How do you know? 
ii. What limits?  
 
7. Who are the individuals you regularly turn to for advice on handling these 
issues? 
a. Required by work anyway? 
b. Why these people? 
c. How made connections? 
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d. Who comes to you? 
e. Would you say you usually agree with these people? What do you 
agree on? (Why) 
 
8. Are there groups that you find you are often in disagreement with regarding 
the things we’ve been talking about? 
a. Who/which? What’s usually the cause of the disagreement? 
 
9. Would you say there are significant camps or networks in this arena?  
No –  
a. How come? 
b. What influence do you think this has on policies or management of 
the issues generally? 
Yes – how would you describe them? 
c. Why is it like that? 
d. What influence do you think this has on policies or management of 
the issues generally? 
 
10. Whom would you bring together in open and honest dialogue to really flesh 
out and work through these issues? 
a. What attributes do you think they would bring? 
 
11. Where do you mostly acquire new knowledge? 
a. Is there anything that constrains or limits getting the info you would 
like? 
 
12. How do you see what you’ve learnt informing policies or programs? 
a. Feel your views were genuinely heard/experience of 
 
13. Ever been a time when working on these issues you’ve reconsidered your 
own views? 
a. Changed your views? 
 
14. [If not already mentioned in any detail] Finally, what do you think climate 
change might mean for the issues we’ve talking about? Like the goal of fire 
management or….refer to issue they raised 
 
Who else would you suggest I talk to about these things? 
 
Is there anything you’d like to talk about that I haven’t asked about? 
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INTERVIEW PRESCRIBED CONSENT FORM 
Prescribed Consent Form For Persons Participating In Research 
Projects Involving Interviews, Questionnaires or  
Disclosure of Personal Information 
Portfolio  Centre for Risk and Community Safety 
School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences 
Name of participant: 
 
Project Title: Adaptive governance in fire management: Exploring the 
role of bureaucrats in reflexive learning 
 
 
Name(s) of investigators:    (1) Karyn Bosomworth Phone: 9925 9663 
(2) John Handmer Phone: 9925 2307 
 
1. I have received a statement explaining the interview/questionnaire involved in this 
project. 
 
2. I consent to participate in the above project, the particulars of which - including details of 
the interviews or questionnaires - have been explained to me. 
 
3. I authorise the investigator or his or her assistant to interview me or administer a 
questionnaire. 
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) Having read Plain Language Statement, I agree to the general purpose, methods 
and demands of the study. 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and 
to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied. 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching. It may not be of direct 
benefit to me. 
(d) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.   
(e) The security of the research data is assured during and after completion of the 
study.  The data collected during the study may be published, and a report of the 
project outcomes will be provided to Professor John Handmer at RMIT University.   
Any information which will identify me will not be used. 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
Witness:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this consent form after it has been signed. 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive Officer, RMIT Human 
Research Ethics Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  The telephone 
number is (03) 9925 2251.   
Details of the complaints procedure are available from the above address.   
 
306 
APPENDIX II 
ONLINE SURVEY 
BEFORE STARTING YOU NEED TO READ THIS PAGE  
Before starting, please read the following  
For fire management to achieve community safety and sustainability objectives it needs 
good working relationships between policy administrators across a very large range of 
policy areas and issues.  
This survey is about the connections or networks between those people.  (It is not about 
the relationships people turn to during fire fighting or incident management).  
Completing the survey takes about 20 minutes. All information provided is confidential. 
All data will be coded. Everyone will remain anonymous. The questions should not 
cause you any distress, inconvenience, or social discomfort. I am the ONLY person who 
will see the raw data.  
The survey is part of my PhD with RMIT University and the Bushfire CRC. My 
supervisor is Professor John Handmer. If you have any questions about the survey at 
all, please feel free to contact me at: k.bosomworth@student.rmit.edu.au or John at: 
john.handmer@rmit.edu.au  
You are under no obligation to do this survey. It is entirely voluntary.  
RMIT asks me to remind you about  
Security of the web This survey has been encrypted. However, users should be aware 
that the World Wide Web is an insecure public network that gives rise to the potential 
risk that a user’s transactions are being viewed, intercepted or modified by third parties 
or that data which the user downloads may contain computer viruses or other defects.  
Security of the data This project will use an external site to create, collect and analyse 
data collected in a survey format. The site we are using is Survey Monkey. If you agree 
to participate in this survey, the responses you provide to the survey will be stored on a 
host server that is used by Survey Monkey. No personal information will be collected in 
the survey so none will be stored as data. Once we have completed our data collection 
and analysis, we will import the data we collect to the RMIT server where it will be 
stored securely for a period of five (5) years. The data on the Survey Monkey host 
server will then be deleted and expunged.  
If you would prefer to complete the survey on paper, please contact me on the email 
address above.  
I thank you in advance,  
Karyn Bosomworth  
PhD Candidate  
Centre for Risk and Community Safety, RMIT University  
& the Bushfire CRC  
 
*Before beginning you need to respond to the following:  
 I have already read and understood the plain language statement (it should have 
been attached to the invite email), I have also read & understood the above 
regarding web security, and I agree to participate  
 
 I have read the above but would like to read the plain language statement before I 
decide whether or not to participate  
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2. Plain Language Statement  
This page outlines the research project and your rights as a participant. Please be sure 
you have read and understood this in deciding whether or not to participate. (Link to 
plain language statement) 
 
3. THIS SURVEY & YOUR JOB  
This survey is about the connections between policy practitioners -people who work on 
or with fire management issues. Fire management includes a vast array of issues from 
community safety through to biodiversity and water management Fire management 
includes a vast array of issues from community safety through to biodiversity and water 
management  
 
REMEMBER: All identifying features, such as names, organisations etc will be coded so 
that everyone remains anonymous.  
 
*1. Please tell me about yourself:  
What organisation do you work for?  
What's your occupation / job title?  
Where are you located? (Eg SW, NW, NE, Melbourne, etc)  
[Adapted from Vehovar (2008) – Using online questionnaires, Standard background 
information] 
 
2. To help identify some of the connections in the fire management sector, it would be 
really useful for me to know who sent you the link to this survey, and which organisation 
they work for: (text) 
 
3. Do you participate in any of the following (Please select all that are relevant)  
 Intra-organisational project/s (Projects that involve people with different skills & 
knowledge but are only people from your organisation)  
 Project/s that involve a number of different organisations, including your own 
 Neither 
If yes, please describe the project/s here  
4.  Please choose the option that most closely reflects your view on what the 
fundamental goal of fire management should be:  
 People living safely with the risk of fire 
 Prevention and management of bushfire risk 
 Sustainable communities in a healthy environment 
 Sustainable land management based on ecological goals 
 Other (please specify) (text)  
 
[Adapted from Sabatier 1993 - Exploring core policy beliefs/ fundamentals] 
 
5. Where do you think that the responsibility for achieving that goal should sit? (text)  
[Adapted from Fischer 2003] 
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4. CHALLENGES & DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES  
Please write from your personal perspective  
6. What do you think is the most significant challenge facing the fire management sector 
of Victoria? And, why is this the most significant? (text) [Diagnostic] 
 
7. What's creating or causing the challenge/s you described above? (text)  
[Diagnostic] 
 
8. What are the biggest challenges YOU face in working with other government 
agencies or departments? (text) [Diagnostic] 
 
9. What are the biggest challenges YOU face within your own agency, to get your job 
done? (text) [Diagnostic] 
 
10. What views or assumptions currently dominate approaches to, or debates about, fire 
management in Victoria? (text) [Diagnostic] 
 
11. What perspectives are missing from those approaches or debates? (text)  
[Diagnostic] 
 
5. YOUR NETWORKS  
I am particularly interested in the informal networks between people who are actively 
concerned with and/or involved in policy and issues as they relate to or interact with fire 
management challenges.  
All names, job titles and organisations will be coded. For example: 1D officer T3  
 
12. How often, because of the position you hold (or the contacts you have), do others 
turn to you to help them deal with a difficult situation?  
Never   Seldom  Occasionally  Quite often  Very often 
 
13. And what about you? Are there people who would help you deal with a difficult 
situation?  
No, nobody  Very few  Some    Quite a few  Very many 
 
14. Outside of what your work formally requires, whose advice or support do you 
voluntarily seek out when you have a policy question or issue that involves (bush)fire?  
If your answer is "no-one", please write "no-one" in the first box.  
[5 initial spaces were provided, with the option to extend beyond that. Asking for name, 
organisation, title/occupation] 
 
15. If you could create a team to develop and implement an integrated and adaptive 
approach to fire management in Victoria, who would you want on that team and what 
attributes do you think they would bring?  
[5 initial spaces were provided, with the option to extend beyond that. Asking for name, 
organisation, title/occupation and attributes you think they would bring]  
 
 
6. CO-OPERATION & COLLABORATION  
16. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
[Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree] 
I have an informal network of colleagues within my organisation that I can turn for 
advice or help  
I have an informal network of colleagues that includes people from other 
organisations that I can turn to for advice or help  
I often seek the advice of friends who work outside of any field related to fire when 
considering fire related issues  
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Official channels are useful for information and answers for any questions about 
fire and its related policies  
I always check official information – reports, formal meetings, etc – with those in 
my informal network  
Other comments  
17. As for the previous question  
I have a good understanding of how my organisation, or myself, can have input into 
policies and programs that relate to or interact with fire issues  
What I learn through experience informs my organisation’s processes and policies 
that relate to fire  
What my colleagues and I learn through experience, has informed processes and 
policies at the state level  
I have a good understanding of the knowledge that underpins the fire related 
polices and programs with which I work or have to interact  
I have easy access to people who can explain what underpins the fire related 
polices and programs with which I work or have to interact  
Other comments (text)  
7. LEARNING & PARTICIPATION  
(This is the last page of questions)  
18. What opportunities have you had to learn about policies, programs and issues that 
relate to fire? (text)  
 
19. What opportunities do you have to input into relevant policies, programs and 
discussions? (text)  
 
20. What sorts of opportunities would work best for you? (text)  
 
21. What, if anything, has stopped you or helped you participate in these sorts of 
opportunities? (text)  
 
22. If there's anything else you'd like to add, please do so here: (text)  
 
8. THANKYOU!  
Thank you. I appreciate the time you spent on this survey.  
If there are people whose input you think would benefit the study, please feel free to 
forward them the email that you received with the Plain Language Statement and the 
link to the survey attached.  
 
If you have any questions about the research, please contact me at: 
k.bosomworth@student.rmit.edu.au  
 
Once again, thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule.  
I sincerely appreciate it.  
Karyn  
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APPENDIX III 
INDIVIDUAL EGO-NETWORKS OF 10 MOST CENTRAL BUREAUCRATS 
Figure 8 Ego network for node 29         Figure 9 Ego network for node 75  
 311 
75
83
94
135
149
171
227
287
3
6
22
29
38
83
94
126
135
167
169
171
179
185
186
189
207
221 227
249
274
287
294
Figure 10 Ego network for node 149        Figure 11 Ego network for node 207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
312 
3
7
8
12
55
63
107
129
151
160
170
196
199
208
217
243 262
277
315
42
43
49
53
70
85
110
145
162
175
176
177
193
212
218
227
278
282
287
291
314
Figure 12 Ego network for node 217      Figure 13 Ego network for node 218 
 313 
43
83
94
126
177
186
207
221
227
249
38
43
85
135
149
167
177
207
212
218
221
227
278
287
Figure 14 Ego network for node 221        Figure 15 Ego network for node 227   
314 
5
29
207
221
249
5
43
49
149
176
207
218
227
282
287
Figure 16 Ego network for node 249      Figure 17 Ego network for node 287 
 
